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ARTICLES
EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG*

"There is only one EqualProtection Clause."
- Justice Stevens'
I. INTRODUCTION

The immediate impact of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger
is nothing short of momentous. 2 Not only do the Supreme Court's most
recent affirmative action decisions settle the deeply contested question of
whether race may be considered in higher education admissions, but they
also, more broadly, envision permissible and impermissible uses of racial
classifications in that context, and surface new, challenging questions about
3
the official use of affirmative action.
Yet Grutter and Gratz are also momentous for what they tell us about
the long-term struggle over the structure of equal protection doctrine. This
*

Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School

of Law-Newark;

A.B.

1985, Brown

University; J.D. 1990, Harvard Law School. This Article received the Outstanding Scholarly Paper
Award from the Association of American Law Schools in 2003. Many thanks to Michelle Adams,
Norman Cantor, Sherry Colb, Michael Dorf, James Ellis, Paula Ettelbrick, Katherine Franke, Nan
Hunter, John Leubsdorf, Deborah Malamud, John Manning, Martha Minow, James Gray Pope, Arun
Subramanian, George Thomas, Kenji Yoshino, and the participants in the Rutgers School of LawNewark Faculty Colloquium series for their insights and excellent suggestions. The Dean's Research
Fund of Rutgers School of Law-Newark provided helpful support, and Heather Bernard, Elizabeth
Mazza, and George Tenreiro provided invaluable research assistance.
1. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
2.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding the use of race as a factor in law
school admissions); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (striking down the use of race in an
affirmative action plan for undergraduate admissions).
3.
For an extended discussion of the Court's application of strict scrutiny in these cases, see
infra notes 25, 106.
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struggle, which has been under way for decades, 4 will affect the future of
equality analyses far beyond affirmative action.
Specifically, two interrelated developments have shaken the
foundations of the Court's three-tiered equal protection framework. 5 First,
as evidenced in Grutter and Gratz, the categorical application of rigorous
review to suspect classifications has become its own battleground,
complete with disputes over whether context should affect the strictness of
strict scrutiny. 6 Second, at the other end of the equal protection spectrum,
the Court's rational basis jurisprudence wavers between its typical
deference to government decisionmaking 7 and the occasional insistence on
meaningful review, 8 without a unifying theory for meshing the two
9
seemingly distinct approaches.
Rather than simply tinker with the three tiers of equal protection
review to address these theoretical and doctrinal challenges, this Article
takes a step back from the front lines of equal protection jurisprudence to
consider how and why the tiered framework evolved and whether we still
4. See infra Part II (reviewing the development of suspect classification analysis and rational
basis review).
5. Throughout this Article, references to equal protection analysis encompass review under both
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the equality guarantee incorporated into the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2
(1975) ("This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely
the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 500 (1954) (stating that "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser
duty on the Federal Government" than on the state governments to protect against certain forms of
unequal treatment).
6. See infra notes 25, 106 and Part II.
7. See infra Part 11. The Court enshrined the dismissive treatment of nonsuspect classifications
and the distinction between this treatment and the rigorous treatment of suspect classifications during
the 2002 Term by reinforcing the tiered framework's additional role as a cornerstone of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). In Hibbs,
the Court invoked its intermediate scrutiny of sex-based classifications as the reason Congress could
address sex discrimination by states more freely than age or disability discrimination. See id. at 1982
(commenting that it is "easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations," as the
Court requires for classifications such as sex, which it subjects to heightened scrutiny, than to prove a
state's "'widespread pattern' of irrational reliance" on traits such as age or disability, which are subject
only to rational basis review) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000)).
8. See infra Part II. In Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), which was also decided in
the 2002 Term, Justice O'Connor made the latest entry into the debate over the contours of rational
basis review by advocating more stringent review for laws aimed at "harm[ing] a politically unpopular
group." Id. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. Dep't
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)). Justice Scalia, in his dissent, charged Justice O'Connor
with further muddying the rational basis inquiry. See id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. See infra Part II.

2004]

EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS

l° The fault lines within suspect classification analysis l ' and
need it.
rational basis review, as well as the overlapping values expressed within
high and low levels of scrutiny, prompt an urgent, though rarely addressed,
question for equal protection jurisprudence: can a single standard of review
effectively screen all types of classifications without negating either the
deference to government decisionmaking traditionally accorded under
rational basis review or the bias-sensitive review effectuated by strict and
12
intermediate scrutiny?
10. The focus here is exclusively on the Court's approach to differentiating between
classifications. The tiered framework, however, is not the only aspect of equal protection jurisprudence
that warrants reconsideration. In particular, the Court's insistence that discriminatory purpose
necessarily be proven to trigger scrutiny of facially neutral measures, see Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 244-48 (1976), has been extensively criticized as interfering unduly with effective equal
protection analysis. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 970 (1993)
(advocating "deliberate skepticism [by whites] regarding the race neutrality of facially neutral"
legislation); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991)
(asserting that the "color-blind" approach to constitutional analysis legitimates racial inequality);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that the intentional discrimination requirement fails to address
unconscious racial motivation); Reva Siegel, Why Equal ProtectionNo Longer Protects: The Evolving
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. I 1, 1147 (1997) (maintaining that the
intentional discrimination requirement in Washington v. Davis "sanction[s] practices that perpetuate the
race and gender stratification of American society"); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the
Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989) (criticizing the Court's purposeful discrimination
requirement as a troublesome retreat from the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
.(1954)).
Critique of the fundamental rights strand of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, which
dovetails partially with the critique offered here, also falls outside the scope of this Article. For a
discussion of the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence, see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-6 to 16-13 (2d ed. 1988) (addressing fundamental rights
theory and doctrine), and Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1175 (1996) (same).
11. Unless otherwise indicated, this Article's references to "suspect classification" encompass
classifications deemed quasi-suspect as well, because the Court treats both types of classifications as
meriting its suspicion. Similarly, references to "heightened scrutiny" encompass all levels of review
above rational basis unless otherwise indicated.
12. This question presupposes at least two important points that are the subject of considerable
debate. First, the effort here to assess and revamp a judicially created test accepts that, notwithstanding
the countermajoritarian difficulty presented by appointed life-tenured judges reviewing legislative acts,
courts will continue to review official enactments for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause. Cf.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF

POLITICS (2d ed. 1986) (analyzing the countermajoritarian difficulty and defending judicial review as
located in our national and constitutional history); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS (1999) (advocating that the Court should be relieved of the final power of
constitutional construction). The relationship between the countermajoritarian difficulty and the
analysis presented here is addressed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 320-24.
Second, the reconceptualization of the equal protection doctrine presented here assumes that
doctrinal analysis and critique have some value beyond illuminating (or obscuring) the broader political
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My principal aim is not to revisit and reshape core elements of the
current doctrine; 13 instead, I take the bulk of the current doctrine "as is"to
demonstrate that the problems with the three-tiered framework for judicial
scrutiny are sufficient to warrant immediate consideration of an alternative
standard for review, such as the single standard proposed here, even absent
other doctrinal transformations.
or ideological agenda of the Supreme Court. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-AntidiscriminationAgenda,
Ill YALE L.J. 1141, 1177 (2002) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Anti-AntidiscriminationAgenda] (suggesting
that scholars consider "jettison[ing] the whole enterprise of taking constitutional doctrine seriously" in
light of the Court's manipulation of cases and doctrine to achieve ideological aims). Although
Rubenfeld makes a compelling case for the simultaneous doctrinal dissonance and political coherence
in contemporary constitutional analysis and, as conceded below, any doctrinal test is ultimately
malleable, the Court's doctrine continues to warrant scholarly attention for several reasons. See infra
notes 239-41 and accompanying text. First, doctrinal tests are the Court's central mode of discourse
with the lower courts, which render the bulk of constitutional decisions. Moreover, although doctrinal
tests lack the ultimate power to dictate outcomes or constrain judicial overreaching, they have
tremendous potential either to cloak or to highlight the Court's principles of decisionmaking.
13.
As many thoughtful critiques have demonstrated, particular doctrinal elements are in need of
transformation. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427-28 (1997)
[hereinafter Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action] (criticizing the theory underlying affirmative action cases);
Siegel, supra note 10, at 1113 (challenging the requirement that discriminatory purpose be shown
before state actions are found unconstitutional). Among these critiques is a challenge to the
symmetrical treatment of classifications burdening dominant and vulnerable classes. See generally
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race": The Inversion of Privilege
and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 617-18 (2003)
(critiquing the Court's simultaneous solicitude for socially advantaged classes and lack of solicitude for
socially disadvantaged classes). As antisubordination theory suggests, powerful reasons support
reviewing burdens on politically marginalized groups more strictly than burdens on dominant groups
that enjoy full, meaningful access to the political process. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 135-81 (1980) (arguing that the intensity of equal
protection review should hinge on a group's access to the political process); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-56 (1976) (advocating "the groupdisadvantaging principle" to focus constitutional review on the actual harms to a burdened group). Cf
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (observing that "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities" and that classifications
burdening those minorities may warrant "more searching judicial inquiry"). If equal protection review
were reconceptualized in this manner, many of the problems identified above would be addressed, if not
fully resolved. Nothing in the Court's current record, however, suggests that such a transformation is
imminent. See generally Rubenfeld, Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, supra note 12 (arguing that an
"anti-antidiscrimination" agenda underlies many recent Supreme Court decisions, which the Court
justified on other doctrinal grounds, and that this agenda firmly underlies the current Court's thinking).
Cf Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination,39 How. L.J. 1, 92 (1995) (arguing that
racial prejudice has driven the Court's affirmative action decisions).
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The long-standing stasis of the set of classifications deemed suspect or
quasi-suspect initially suggests the need to reconsider the tiers. 14 The
Court did not articulate detailed indicia for discerning which classifications
should fill this set until the early 1970s 5 --decades after it first referred to
race as a suspect classification.1 6 Almost immediately, the "set" closed
when a majority of the Court accorded sex-based classifications quasisuspect status.' 7 It has not expanded since. Notwithstanding advocates'
efforts to demonstrate that measures based on traits outside the "set"
similarly embody prejudice, the Court repeatedly has rejected suspect
status for classifications based on other characteristics.' 8 While lack of
expansion does not necessarily mean the screening system is flawed, it
does suggest possible ossification of the governing framework that
warrants careful examination.
Further raising concern are the indicia the Court developed in 1973 to
identify which classifications are more likely than not to be prejudice laden
and, therefore, suspect.
A close look reveals intractable internal
contradictions. The indicia, which focus on, inter alia, a history of
discrimination based on the trait, the trait's immutability, and the relative
political powerlessness of those bearing the trait, 9 are at once overbroad
and underinclusive. 20 Considered as a group, the inquiries could sweep out
14. This set includes classifications based on race, alienage, national origin, sex, and nonmarital
parentage. For a discussion of these classifications and the development of the suspect classification
process, see infra Part II.A-B.
15. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (articulating "the
traditional indicia of suspectness"). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973)
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (elaborating on the same).
16. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
17. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (declaring that sex-based classifications "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives"). Preceding Craig, in 1973, a plurality of the Court explicitly subjected a sex-based
distinction to heightened scrutiny. See Frontiero,411 U.S. at 688-91 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
Some have argued that the Court had actually been applying a form of heightened review since Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See TRIBE, supra note 10, § 16-26; Gerald Gunther, Foreword:In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
33-34 (1972). See also infra note 226 (discussing the timing of the application of heightened scrutiny
to classifications of nonmarital children).
18. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (rejecting
heightened review for classifications of people with mental retardation); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976) (declining to treat age as a suspect classification); James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137, 140-42 (1971) (refusing to extend suspect status to wealth-based classifications and rejecting
the argument that wealth amounted to a proxy for race).
19. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (detailing suspect and quasi-suspect classification
inquiries). See also infra Part II.
20. Ironically, over- and underinclusiveness of classifications are some of the very evils the
Equal Protection Clause forbids. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
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some of the traits that currently receive the Court's extra attention and
sweep in others, such as disability and sexual orientation, that the Court has
not yet subjected to heightened scrutiny. 2 1 In fact, if faithfully applied, the
"test" potentially would support removal of race from the set of
classifications deemed suspect because-although it has historically (and
today) been the basis for significant discrimination and is arguably
immutable 22-race, and in particular the problem of race discrimination
against members of minority racial groups, has received significant positive
attention from the majoritarian political process in recent years. 23 Given
that suspect classification analysis was conceived initially to streamline and
intensify review of race-based classifications, which were presumed to be
infected with impermissible prejudice, 24 a test that would result in race not
being considered a suspect classification has questionable calibration.
Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 343-53 (1949) (explaining and criticizing both types of classifications and
their relationship to equal protection jurisprudence).
21.
See infra Part n.B. Compare Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (noting that racial
"classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny"), with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632
(1996) (applying rational basis review to sexual orientation-based classifications, although not deciding
whether such classifications should be considered suspect or quasi-suspect), and Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. at 442 (declining to find mental retardation to be a quasi-suspect classification). This is not to
suggest that it would be ill-advised to add disability and sexual orientation to the list of suspect traits,
but to underscore the lack of fit between the inquiries and the current set of classifications considered
suspect.
22. The Court has recognized that the significance accorded to race in American society may be
socially constructed, acknowledging that "[c]lear-cut [racial] categories do not exist. The particular
traits which have generally been chosen to characterize races have been criticized as having little
biological significance .... [R]acial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather than
biological, in nature." Saint Francis Coll. v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987) (citations
omitted). See also IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996)

(analyzing the role of courts in defining race); infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (2000) (prohibiting, inter alia, race discrimination
in programs receiving federal funds); id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (prohibiting employment discrimination
because of, inter alia, race); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65), reprinted as amended in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 606-09 (1994) (authorizing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
to study the barriers to promotion for members of racial minorities and women). The current test, if
applied literally, would also likely support removal of sex from the set of suspicious characteristics in
light of the similar legislative commitment to eradicating sex discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(l) (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on, inter alia, sex); 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(l)
(2000) (prohibiting discrimination based on, inter alia, sex in credit transactions); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(2003) (prohibiting sex discrimination in education programs and activities receiving federal funds).
See also infra note 175 and accompanying text. Cf Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 443-46 (noting
that although people with mental retardation have historically suffered discrimination and bear an
unchangeable characteristic, their receipt of positive attention from elected officials supports the
determination that retardation-based classifications not be deemed quasi-suspect).
24. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment's "strong policy" to eliminate official race discrimination "renders racial classifications
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If suspect classification analysis operated well, notwithstanding the
flawed indicia and fixed set of suspicious classifications, rethinking the
heightened scrutiny tiers would not be warranted. There is more, however.
Perhaps the most pressing issue raised by the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence is the now primary use of suspect classification analysis to
invalidate or call into question measures seeking to remedy past racial
discrimination or limit the effects of racial bias in electoral politics.25 Put
another way, the suspect classification label has made it more, rather than
less, difficult for government to remedy the effects of hostility toward
racial minorities in employment, voting, and other arenas. 26 Instead of
serving primarily to ensure freedom from race-based discrimination, the
Court's categorical use of rigorous review for all suspect classifications,
'constitutionally suspect,' and subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny,' and 'in most circumstances
irrelevant' to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose") (citations omitted).
25. Even in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court made clear that it was sustaining the law school's
consideration of race in admissions in part because "universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition," and not necessarily because it intended generally to permit race-based
affirmative action in other contexts. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339-41 (2003). See also
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999) (stating that "strict scrutiny applies if race was the
'predominant factor' motivating the legislature's districting decision"); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 218-31 (1995) (discussing the evolution of the application of strict scrutiny to racebased affirmative action plans); infra note 106 (discussing limitations of Grutter's application of strict
scrutiny for other affirmative action cases). Cf Adarand, 515 U.S. at 245-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority's insistence that strict scrutiny be applied consistently to all racial
classifications, including those made for remedial purposes).
Since Adarand and the explosion of redistricting cases addressing the use of race, substantial
commentary has pondered the effects of the Court's strict scrutiny mandate for measures that purport to
remedy the effects of past and current race discrimination. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the
Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1569, 1570 (2002) (explaining how "[s]trict scrutiny has been rather useless to the groups whose
mistreatment prompted its adoption" and addressing differences in the application of strict scrutiny
redistricting and affirmative action cases); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action:
Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1847 (1996) (exploring possibilities for class-based affirmative
action in the wake of the Court's insistence in Adarand on strict scrutiny for racial classifications);
Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny
After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2000) (maintaining that courts often invoke strict
scrutiny as an outcome-determinative device, rather than a useful analytical tool, and proposing a
solution to this problem); Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present,and Future, 20 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1 (2002) (engaging in public policy analysis of affirmative action plans based on race and
ethnicity).
26. See, e.g., Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 546 (stating "that all laws that classify citizens on the basis
of race, including racially gerrymandered districting schemes, are constitutionally suspect and must be
strictly scrutinized," regardless of the legislative purpose); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 234-35 (requiring an
affirmative action program aimed at remedying the effects of racial discrimination to meet the rigorous
strict scrutiny standard, which insists that a racial classification "serve a compelling governmental
interest, and.. . be narrowly tailored to further that interest").
See also Rubenfeld, AntiAntidiscriminationAgenda, supra note 12, at 1169-77.
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regardless of context, functions today as a barrier to programs designed to
27
redress race discrimination.
The Court's reorientation of an analysis originally conceived to ferret
out governmental reliance on arbitrary or biased assumptions regarding
individual traits 28 may point to intractable structural contradictions within
suspect classification analysis regarding the purpose of, and triggers for,
skeptical scrutiny. Alternatively, the analysis might work well in theory
27. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1143 ("[Tloday doctrines of heightened scrutiny function
primarily to constrain legislatures from adopting policies designed to reduce race and gender
stratification .... "). See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (invalidating a university's
effort to diversify its student body by according weight to race in a numerically scaled admissions
process). Because sex-based classifications are subjected to a less rigorous, though still demanding,
standard of review, the Court retains greater flexibility in evaluating affirmative action programs that
seek to remedy past sex discrimination than in assessing race-based remedial measures. Compare
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (stating that a sex-based classification must be
"substantially related" to an "exceedingly persuasive" government interest to survive equal protection
review), with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235 (affirming strict scrutiny's application to a race-based
affirmative action initiative). See also Sidney Buchanan, Affirmative Action: The Many Shades of
Justice, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 149, 157-58 (2002) (arguing that all affirmative action challenges should be
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny to reconcile the paradox that sex-based programs face more
lenient review than race-based remedial plans). As the Court demonstrated recently, it views
intermediate scrutiny as allowing broader freedom to uphold sex-based distinctions. See Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001) (upholding different immigration rules for men and women seeking to
naturalize a child). Perhaps the flexibility afforded by intermediate scrutiny would not have given rise
to the immediate need for reconsideration of the tiered approach. On the other hand, as contended here,
a single standard could achieve the positive effects of stabilizing equal protection doctrine, ensuring a
focused, meaningful inquiry and diminishing the real problems flowing from the extant standard. See
infra note 105 (discussing cases in which the Court sustained sex-based classifications). Cf Lawrence
G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 CAL. L. REV. 819, 820-21
(2002) (characterizing intermediate scrutiny as neither sensible nor consistent). Applying the proposed
standard to sex discrimination cases, infra Part V.B, shows how intermediate review likewise can give
way to a single standard of review without abandoning the current and necessary careful review of sexbased distinctions.
28. For a discussion of these traits, see infra notes 65, 75-87 and accompanying text. The cases
that led the Court to articulate the suspect classification standard in McLauglin, 379 U.S. at 192, all
involved government distinctions based on race that were imbued either explicitly or implicitly with the
assumption of white supremacy, see, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (addressing
the harm caused by the separate-but-equal theory), or of a danger whites perceived to be posed by
people of color, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218, 223-24 (1944) (upholding
detainment of Japanese Americans during World War II based on fears of "espionage and sabotage").
Cf Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (voiding Virginia's antimiscegenation law because it
was based on "invidious racial discrimination"). Indeed, as will be addressed at greater length below,
notwithstanding its invocation in McLaughlin nearly forty years ago, strict scrutiny has often not been
necessary to invalidate racial classifications. See infra notes 63, 68 and accompanying text. Even in
Loving, which invoked the strict scrutiny and compelling government interest language from Korematsu
and McLaughlin, the Court ultimately invalidated Virginia's antimiscegenation law using the language
of rational basis review: "There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious
racial discrimination which justifies this classification." Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added).
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but lack sufficient constraints against misapplication in practice. 29 For the
purposes of this Article, the questions raised by the critique of suspect
classification analysis are whether a different analytic framework could
play a role in (1) enabling and encouraging courts to consider the
legislative context in reviewing a classification's compliance with the
Equal Protection Clause, and (2) constraining, or at least exposing,
individual judges' reactions to particular traits or particular uses of
classifications, such as remedial legislation.
At the other end of the equal protection spectrum-rational basis
review-the Court highlights its deferential approach to the law- and
policymaking branches.3" So long as a classification is neither suspect nor
quasi-suspect, the Court promises that it will give every beneficial
presumption to the government when assessing the validity of differential
treatment. 3 1 And the Court has done so, for the most part, by upholding
over one hundred classifications on rational basis review since 1973.32
Notwithstanding this deference, the Court has invalidated almost a
dozen classifications since 1973 as lacking a rational basis for equal
protection purposes. 33 For example, in cases addressing subjects as varied
as access to absentee ballots, 34 distribution of dividends from state
projects, 35 and taxation of out-of-state car purchases, 36 the Court has
departed from its habitual approval of governmental distinctions. Finding
that the differential treatment in these and related cases either lacked a
legitimate and specific explanation or gave effect to stereotypic
assumptions or hostility toward a class, the Court firmly rejected the
37
measures at issue.
29. See Rubenfeld, Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, supra note 12, at 1172-77; Spann, supra
note 13, at 92.
30. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (emphasizing that rational basis review
does not "authorize 'the judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative policy determinations') (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(per curiam)) (alteration in original).
31.
See, e.g., id. (stressing that "a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor
proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity") (citations omitted). See
generally infra Part II.D (describing rational basis review).
32.
See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Courtfrom the 1971
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 416-19 (1999) (listing rational basis cases

decided from 1973 through May 1996).
33. See id. See also infra notes 118, 120 and accompanying text.
34. See O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1974).
35. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982).
36. See Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985).
37.

See supra notes 34-36; infra note 120.
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Against the backdrop of the Court's respect for government's need to
distinguish between constituents and the related commitment not to intrude
on most government decisionmaking, this set of rational basis invalidations
has challenged scholars-as well as the Court-to identify some unifying
theory. 38 Yet, while the Court regularly explains its approach to rational
basis review,39 it has not offered a theory for making collective sense of its
variable lot of decisions. Nor has the Court broadly embraced any of the
rational basis review theories proffered by scholars during the past three
40
decades as holding the key to its rational basis jurisprudence.
As with strict scrutiny, however, the problems of extant rational basis
review go beyond doctrinal instability. In particular, the deferential
formulation of rational basis review can skew judicial analysis where the
government appears to have acted to achieve a legitimate goal. In these
cases, the standard's emphasis on deference at times leads courts to skip
over the required step of evaluating the link between that permissible goal
and the government's action. 4 1 For example, although a government body
may have a legitimate interest in conserving scarce financial resources as a
general matter, that goal alone does not explain why a government would
single out one group from among all others to bear the cost-savings
38. See infra Part V. One could argue that a dozen or so cases not adhering to the usual
deferential rule do not merit treatment as anything other than odd or random cases falling outside the
doctrine, as some cases inevitably do. However, the analytic consistency among these cases, the
regularity of their appearance over time, and the sheer number-nearly ten percent of all equal
protection cases decided under rational basis review during three decades-make it unreasonable to
brush off these cases as exceptional, unusual, or unrelated to the Court's overarching equal protection
analysis.
39. For recent characterizations of the standard, see, for example, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
632-33 (1996), FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1993), and City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,441-42 (1985).
40. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 13, at 145-79 (analyzing the courts' role in enforcing the
constitutional equal protection guarantee when groups are disadvantaged in the lawmaking process);
Gunther, supra note 17, at 20-24 (advocating that rational basis review should insist on meaningful
justifications for government action); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1713-17 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences] (arguing that "naked
preferences" for interest groups do not constitute legitimate justifications for government action). See
also infra notes 294-316 and accompanying text. Cf Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah
Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257-58 (1996) (contending that the "pariah principle" explains the
Court's invalidation of the antigay amendment in Romer, and that the principle falls outside and does
not explain the lowest level of the three-tiered equal protection framework).
41.
Cf Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-33 (explaining rational basis review's insistence on a rational
connection between a legitimate government interest and the government's action). See also infra notes
332-42 and accompanying text (illustrating how the highly deferential approach to rational basis review
interfered with the Court's review of whether a proffered justification actually explained a
governmental classification in Dandridgev. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
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burden.4 2 As a result, the rational basis "test" may fail to ensure even a
43
baseline of meaningful review.
As an alternative to reworking the three tiers in response to the
conflicts within suspect classification analysis and the Court's uneven
maneuvering between deferential and meaningful rational basis analysis, I
contend that a single standard of review may provide a starting point for
revitalizing meaningful equal protection review at the highest and lowest
levels. By the same token, a unitary standard potentially would narrow the
gap between the virtually assured fatal blow dealt to classifications under
strict scrutiny and the rubber stamp regularly received by classifications
subjected to rational basis review. 44 In addition to offering a forwardlooking device4 5 for balancing the dual competing priorities of scrutiny and
deference, the single standard proposed here-by slipping out from the
Court's current tiered categorization-may shed light on the cohesiveness
not readily apparent in the Court's rational basis cases.46
The proposed single standard consists of three inquiries that emerge
from the Equal Protection Clause's fundamental opposition to laws
42. See infra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the Court considered a
cost-savings justification for official action).
43.
See infra notes 332-42 and accompanying text (illustrating how the highly deferential
approach to rational basis review interfered with the Court's review of whether a proffered justification
actually explained a governmental classification in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
44. As Gerald Gunther observed, the most rigorous version of judicial review has often been
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," in contrast to "the deferential old equal protection ... with minimal
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, supra note 17, at 8 (footnote omitted). But see
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (emphasizing that strict scrutiny is not
always fatal to suspect classifications).
45.
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution:A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation](referring to the Equal Protection Clause as a forward-looking measure in
contrast to the history-oriented Due Process Clause). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing
Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1185-86 (2000) (arguing that
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause frequently defers to past practices, whereas the Due Process
Clause has destabilized traditional forms of discrimination).
46.
This lack of cohesiveness could be tolerated and, indeed, embraced if the flexibility of
rational basis review enabled occasional extra-rigorous review as its sole consequence. Cf. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that "candor compels the
recognition that the relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard of review normally applied takes on a
sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification"); Gunther, supra note 17, at 18-24
(characterizing this heightened form of review as rational basis with "bite"). However, no standards
guide when the "bite" should be imposed, perhaps because the Court has not acknowledged this
heightened form of rational basis review other than in cases reviewing classifications based on traits of
sex and illegitimacy that were ultimately deemed quasi-suspect or suspect. See infra notes 88, 205, 226
and accompanying text.
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distinguishing between classes for no legitimate purpose 4 7-best known as
"class legislation" in the pre-Lochner era. 4 8 The three distinct yet
overlapping inquiries grow out of commitments common to equal
protection review at the highest and lowest levels. First, the standard
proposes an "intracontextual" inquiry, which asks courts to consider
whether a plausible, nonarbitrary explanation can justify the government's
singling out of a particular trait from among all others within the regulatory
context. 49 Second is an "extracontextual" inquiry, which seeks to ensure
that justifications are not simply generalizations about a characteristic that,
though plausible, lack specific relevance to the regulatory context and
could support broad, acontextual distinctions based on that trait (i.e., class
legislation). Finally, where a trait-based distinction is justifiable in context
based on a government interest that would not support broad-scale
burdening of the trait holders, the proposal urges courts to pursue a "bias"
inquiry. This inquiry would determine whether the line drawing reflects
impermissible government purposes, such as hostility toward or
stereotyping of the trait being regulated.
To lay the foundation for the proposed single standard, I focus initially
on tensions in the current tiered approach to equal protection review.
Turning first to suspect classification analysis, Part II explores the genesis
and development of the suspect classification indicia, and then highlights
weaknesses within and conflicts between the indicia. I also consider the
role that suspect classification analysis has played in driving the Court's
categorical, rigid review of racial classifications. Finally, Part II turns to
suspect classification's lenient counterpart within the tiered framework and
sketches the Court's wavering between reflexive, unfocused deference and
meaningful review during the past thirty years. Part I ultimately concurs
with the Court and other scholars that the extant rational basis
jurisprudence lacks internal coherence.
Part HI initiates consideration of whether a single standard might
respond to the structural and analytic problems identified in Part II. Can a
47.
48.

See infra Part IV.A.
See generally Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness,

96 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1997) (discussing the original understanding of "class legislation" within the
public debate and early judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause).
49. The phrase "regulatory context" is used throughout this Article to refer to the context in
which a classification operates or has its effect. So, for example, the regulatory context of a measure
restricting the adjustment of eyeglass lenses would be the eye wear business and all who work in it.
Although the parameters of this context may be set broadly or narrowly, as will be addressed below, the
determination of whether a classification is reasonable (or not arbitrary) under any review standard can
be made only by reference to the context in which the distinction is made.
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single standard provide sufficiently careful review to capture prejudiceinfested classifications while not becoming excessively rigid? Can a single
standard also provide for meaningful review of ordinary classifications
without unduly restricting the government's need, at times, to draw
imprecise distinctions between its constituents? Further, would a single
standard entirely disrupt contemporary jurisprudence or, more positively,
provide the focused analysis and theoretical and doctrinal coherence that is
currently lacking?
As background to later efforts to answer these questions, I consider
why the tiered structure remains in place even while many of its flaws have
received judicial and scholarly attention. Because suspect classification
was first adopted as an analytic device, justices on the Supreme Court have
repeatedly taken issue with the dual (and ultimately triple) track taken by
equal protection analysis. I look first to how and why these justices have
called the multiple tiers into question. This part next considers why, in
light of widespread criticism of the tiered framework's operation, no
judicial or scholarly consensus has emerged to date in favor of a single
standard of review.
Part IV distills a single standard from the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence. This part first demonstrates the essential concern with class
legislation that permeates review of all classifications, and then derives the
three specific inquiries described above from the common concerns of high
and low levels of review. Part IV then considers the proposed standard in
light of various equality theories, including three of the leading positions in
the ongoing debate regarding the values equal protection review should aim
to protect.
Turning a critical eye toward the proposed single standard, Part V
examines some of the issues that might arise in application. In particular,
Part V applies the standard to reconsider a number of rational basis and
heightened scrutiny cases to assess the standard's effect, if any, on equal
protection jurisprudence.
In Part VI, I conclude that the three tiers may be understood best in
historical terms; that is, they may have served as a "training" tool for the
Supreme Court and lower courts that lacked an inclination or ability to
identify bias or outmoded stereotypes within familiar classifications, such
as those based on race, sex, and nonmarital parentage that pervaded much
long-standing legislation. At this point in the evolution of constitutional
doctrine, however, I contend that the tiers may have outlived their role in
streamlining judicial analysis of distinctions based on race, sex, and other
traits that historically enjoyed wide acceptance as bases for differential
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treatment. Instead of effectuating the Court's ability to enforce the basic
constitutional equality guarantee, the high degree of deference flowing
from rational basis review and the rigidity of strict scrutiny have become
obstacles to equality. In contrast, a single standard, such as the one
advanced here, would provide sufficiently careful scrutiny to capture
invidious classifications currently screened under heightened scrutiny. At
the same time, a unitary standard's insistence that deference be coupled
with meaningful review would ensure genuine review of all other
classifications without overly burdening the leeway and flexibility essential
to an effective legislative process.
II. PARSING THE LANDSCAPE: A CLOSE LOOK AT SUSPECT
CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS AND THE "MIXED BAG" OF
RATIONAL BASIS JURISPRUDENCE
Within a relatively brief time period, the equal protection guarantee
moved from being "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments" 50 to
enjoying a new status as "the Court's chief instrument for invalidating state
laws." 5 1 In scores of cases throughout the past fifty years, the Court has
woven together first principles with additional underlying concerns to
create a multifaceted doctrinal framework for the analysis of government
52
action that differentiates between classes.
Today, this framework has evolved to a point where suspect
classification analysis has become the Court's "chief instrument" for
invalidating measures intended to remedy rather than perpetuate past race
discrimination, 53 and rational basis review has been applied so variably that
even the Court admits that "[t]he most arrogant legal scholar would not
claim that all of these cases applied a uniform or consistent test under equal
54
protection principles."
50.
51.

See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978).

52.

See generally Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90

MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991). Klarman notes that in McLaughlin, for the first time, the Court "both
articulated and applied a more rigorous review standard to racial classifications." Id. at 255.
53.
In contrast, under the Court's current jurisprudence, affirmative action plans aimed to benefit
green-eyed people would face far less rigorous review than plans that seek to eradicate the effects of
conceded racial or sex-based discrimination. Cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2360 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (maintaining that the Equal Protection Clause
"does not.., prohibit the use of unseemly legacy preferences or many other kinds of arbitrary

admissions procedures," but "does prohibit.., classifications made on the basis of race").
54.
U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980). See also Schweiker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221,243 n.4 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Members of the Court continue to hold divergent

views on the clarity with which a legislative purpose must appear, and about the degree of deference
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To lay a foundation for reconsidering the tiered framework, this part
will examine how equal protection jurisprudence has evolved by first
exploring the genesis and evolution of suspect classification analysis. As
shown below, the indicia of suspectness and the categorical application of
strict review have inhibited the Court's ability to review carefully the full
range of classifications embodying bias and to conduct a nuanced,
contextualized analysis of a classification designated as suspect but adopted
for benign or remedial purposes.
Second, this part will look closely at the "mixed bag" of rational basis
cases decided following the Lochner era's demise. 55 For the most part,
these cases are laissez-faire in approach, embracing nearly all instances of
government line drawing. 56 Yet even with this determinedly deferential
posture, the Court has invalidated nearly ten percent of all classifications
reviewed during the past twenty years. 57 What links these cases-and what
separates them from the majority of their doctrinal peers that have upheld
official classifications-is not apparent at a glance. Indeed, scholars have
puzzled over the driving force of rational basis review for the past quarter
afforded the legislature in suiting means to ends.") (internal citations omitted); Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 462 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he doctrinal difficulties of the Equal
Protection Clause are indeed trying"). Justice White also noted the Court's inconsistent approach to
rational basis review:
[W]e employ not just one, or two, but . . . a "spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause." Sometimes we just say the
claim is "invidious" and let the matter rest there .... But at other times we sustain the
discrimination, if it is justifiable on any conceivable rational basis, or strike it down, unless
sustained by some compelling interest of the State ....
Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 458 (White, J., concurring) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
55. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). While the Court invalidated a number of
measures during the Lochner era, the analytic strength of these rulings is questionable as the Court
continues to distance itself from the active role in reviewing government action that it assumed during
the early 20th century. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 459-60
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The suggestion that the traditional
rational-basis test allows this sort of searching inquiry creates precedent for this Court and lower courts
to subject economic and commercial classifications to similar and searching 'ordinary' rational-basis
review-a small and regrettable step back toward the days of Lochner v. New York.") (citation omitted);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970) ("[The Lochner] era long ago passed into
history."). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874 (1987)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy] ("The basic understanding has been endorsed by the Court in
many cases taking the lesson of the Lochner period to be the need for judicial deference to legislative
enactments.").
56. See, e.g., Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230 (recognizing that the equal protection guarantee does
not impose "an obligation to provide the best governance possible," and that the "Court properly
exercises only a limited review power over Congress, the appropriate representative body through
which the public makes democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and economic
problems") (citation omitted).
57. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; infra notes 118, 120 and accompanying text.
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century in an effort to enshrine some sense of doctrinal stability. 58 To date,
none of their proposed theoretical constructs has been fully embraced by
the Court.59 Nor has the Court articulated its own connective link between
the cases.
A. THE GENESIS AND REFINEMENT OF SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
ANALYSIS
Shortly after United States v. Carolene Products Co. pronounced in
1938 that certain forms of governmental discrimination warrant closer
review than others, 60 the Court made its first explicit reference to race as a
"suspect" basis for discrimination. 6' Given that "[a] core purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race," 62 the initial application of the "suspect"
58. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 13, at 31, 146, 151, 156-70; Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra
note 40, at 1713-17; Gunther, supra note 17, at 20-24.
59. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Brian Boynton, Note, Democracy and
Distrust After Twenty Years: Ely's Process Theory and Constitutional Law from 1990 to 2000, 53
STAN. L. REV. 397, 421-22, 439-46 (2000) (identifying "crucial differences" between Ely's process
theory and the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis).
60. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that "a more
searching judicial inquiry" may be warranted where government action burdens "discrete and insular
minorities"). As Bruce Ackerman has suggested, "anonymous and diffuse" classes may be equally or
more at risk of unequal treatment by prejudice-infected governing bodies than "discrete and insular"
minorities, but the Court has not, at least overtly, wrestled with that important observation. See Bruce
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 722-24 (1985). For additional
discussion of footnote four, see also Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "InsiderOutsider," 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (1986) (critiquing the process-based theory in Carolene
Products as "substantially at odds with the United States Constitution"), and Louis Lusky, Footnote
Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982) (describing footnote four's
historical development and examining its enduring legacy).
61.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The Court opined that racial
classifications are "immediately suspect" and "subject to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. In Hirabayashi
v. United States, the Court upheld a wartime curfew for people of Japanese ancestry and declared that
race is "in most circumstances irrelevant" to any permissible government interest. Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
62. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (footnote omitted). See also Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 303-08 (1879); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 8 (1988) (asserting that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment is "to reaffirm the lay public's longstanding rhetorical commitment to general principles of
equality, individual rights, and local self-rule"). Even with this mandate, a willingness to recognize the
invidious nature of racial classifications was neither immediate nor wholehearted following the
enactment of the Equal Protection Clause. Although explicitly burdensome classifications were
invalidated regularly for many years, the Court maintained the view that separate treatment could
constitute equality. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). Cf Derrick Bell, Racial Libel as American Ritual, 36
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 13 (1996) ("The spirit of Plessy's 'separate but equal' standard is revived in the
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designation in 1944 to a racial classification made historical sense.
Although racial classifications were regularly invalidated in light of this
purpose well before the concept of suspect classification became associated
with strict judicial scrutiny, 63 the embrace of a suspicious stance 64 toward
the government's differential treatment based on particular traits was
new.65 By incorporating this suspicion into a legal test,66 the Court took its
Court's willingness to employ disingenuous terms to disguise its continued willingness to sacrifice
black rights to further white interests.").
Of course, the Equal Protection Clause also has long been applied to assess classifications based
on characteristics other than race. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574 (1949)
(invalidating a value-added tax imposed on foreign but not domestic corporations); Valentine v. Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32, 33 (1936) (striking down a gross receipts tax as arbitrary and,
therefore, violative of the equal protection guarantee); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 566-67 (1931)
(observing that "the constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws is interposed against
discriminations that are entirely arbitrary"). Indeed, the Court had, early on, completely accepted an
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that extended the equality guarantee beyond the specific
rights envisioned to be protected by the Framers. See Klarman, supra note 52, at 216. See also Michael
J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023,
1028-32 (1979) (arguing that early interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause reflected a "broader
understanding of the amendment").
63. Although Korematsu deployed the term "suspect," "the Court actually applied its most
deferential brand of rationality review" to the racial classification at issue. See Klarman, supra note 52,
at 232. Michael Klarman has argued persuasively that the Court did not apply more rigorous review of
racial classifications for another two decades, until McLaughlin was decided. See id. at 254-57. In
McLaughlin, the Court utilized the concept of suspectness it had first introduced in Korematsu and
Hirabayashi, but it enhanced the rigor of its review, emphasizing that racial classifications
presumptively contravene the Fourteenth Amendment's "strong policy" against distinguishing between
individuals based on race. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). The Court in Cleburne
reinforced McLaughlin's centrality to contemporary analysis of racial classifications by citing it to
explain strict scrutiny. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
For examples of racial classifications struck down prior to McLaughlin, see Watson v.City of Memphis,
373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963) (rejecting a plan to delay desegregation of city recreational facilities nine
years after Brown), Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (invalidating racial segregation in education as "inherently
unequal"), Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948)
(ordering Oklahoma to provide legal education without regard to race), and Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303,
307-08 (rejecting a race-based restriction for jury service). But see Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537 (upholding
racial segregation of railroad cars).
64. As the Court has explained, "[Racial] classifications are subject to the most exacting
scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and
must be 'necessary ...to the accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose." Palmore, 466 U.S. at 43233 (quoting McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196) (omission in original).
65. The designation of certain traits as warranting a heightened level of review broke sharply
with the Plessy regime's view that race-based differential treatment should be reviewed no differently
from other government distinctions between classes. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543-45. Even prior to
Plessy, however, the Court occasionally evaluated racial classifications with reference to the recognized
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment: combating racial discrimination. In Strauder, for example,
Justice Strong asked, "What is [equal protection] but declaring.., in regard to the colored race, for
whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against
them by law because of their color?" Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
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first formal step since the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause in 1868
toward streamlining review of governmental trait-based distinctions. 67 The
suspect classification formulation also put governing bodies on explicit
notice that any race-based decisionmaking was going to meet skeptical
68
judicial review.
During the fertile period of social change in the 1960s and 1970s,
American cultural ideas of equality and impermissible discrimination
changed dramatically regarding traits in addition to race. Moving beyond
an awareness of the pervasive harm caused by racial discrimination, albeit
grudging in some jurisdictions, American society faced new demands for
66. The elaboration of what is commonly thought of as the suspect classification test-indicia
that signal which classifications merit close judicial review-did not come until years later as the Court
contemplated applying heightened scrutiny to classifications of characteristics other than race. See
infra text accompanying notes 73-87. The delay between the conceptualization of suspectness and the
crafting of a test to determine which traits fit within the suspect category may have resulted from the
widespread awareness that the equal protection guarantee condemned race discrimination. This
background assumption rendered unnecessary the creation of a test to explicate or justify the Court's
suspicion of racial classifications.
67. The Court illustrated the streamlining effect of the new analysis by explaining that
"[c]lassifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate
public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category." Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 (citation
omitted). See also McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196 (insisting that racial classifications be "necessary, and
not merely rationally related" to a legitimate government interest).
68. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427 (2003) (."[A]ny person.., has the right to
demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification
subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial scrutiny."') (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)).
Given that explicit racial classifications were almost invariably invalidated after Plessy and well
before the adoption of suspect classification analysis and its accompanying heightened review, one
could argue that the Court's "new" approach represented a largely external stylistic shift rather than a
fundamental change in analysis. See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401-02 (1964)
(invalidating-before the Court decided McLaughlin-a law requiring a candidate's race to be posted
on electoral ballots because it lacked a legitimate purpose); Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," but not referencing heightened scrutiny);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 426-27 (1948) (invalidating a statute denying
commercial fishing licenses to "alien Japanese"); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1939)
(finding an equal protection violation in the systematic exclusion of African Americans from grand jury
venire).
Further, one could argue that the truly significant shift for purposes of assessing racial
classifications occurred in the abandonment of Plessy's separate-but-equal formulation. See Brown,
347 U.S. at 494-95. Nevertheless, because a majority of the Court treats the shift to strict scrutiny as
analytically important for racial classifications, I will proceed from that premise for purposes of
revisiting the applicable standard of review. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236 (referencing Korenatsu's
validation of a now-condemned racial classification and observing that "[any retreat from the most
searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error occurring in the future").

2004]

EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS

equality in a wide range of arenas. 69 Building on the legal and social
change sparked by the civil rights movement, the movements for women's
rights and lesbian and gay rights raised challenges of unprecedented
breadth to then widely accepted forms of discrimination based on sex and
sexual orientation.7 ° Advocates for people with mental retardation, the
poor, noncitizens, and others likewise pressed for the removal of barriers to
their constituents' equality. 7 1 The creation of legal defense funds, inspired
by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund's triumphs, provided
the legal tools to complement the organizing accomplished by their
72
grassroots counterparts.
69. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and
Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001). The concept of equality advocated by many of these
groups in their public rhetoric and legal actions was a broad and varied one. See generally, e.g., Mary
Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209 (1998) (discussing the evolution of feminist thought regarding legal
rights); Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist
Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249 (1998) (addressing the relationship
between feminist theory and law reform). Numerous cases also reflect the varying efforts through
legislation and litigation to achieve equality. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
719-21 (1982) (challenging the denial of admission to men desiring nursing degrees); County of Wash.
v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1981) (demanding a pay increase under comparable worth theory to
compensate for the undervaluation of jobs performed predominantly by women); Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 90-91 (1976) (seeking to end discrimination in civil service based on alienage);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (arguing that the recovery of workmen's
compensation benefits not be denied to children whose parents did not marry); Brown, 347 U.S. at 48688 (challenging the constitutionality of racial segregation in public schools on the ground that separate
schools were unequal). Cf Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 331-33 (1972) (asserting that a one-year
residency requirement for voting rights denied equal treatment).
70. See generally DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE
GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM AND GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW (1998). For a comprehensive list of
sex discrimination cases beginning with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), through mid-1998, see
Becker, supra note 69, at 273-77. For early judicial responses to challenges brought by lesbians and
gay men to discrimination based on sexual orientation, see, for example, Singer v. U.S. Civil Service
Commission, 530 F.2d 247, 255 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977) (upholding a gay man's
dismissal from federal employment for "openly and publicly flaunting his homosexual way of life")
(internal quotation marks omitted), Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1161, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(sustaining a gay man's challenge to employment discrimination based on sexual orientation), Gaylord
v. Tacoma School District No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Wash. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879
(1977) (rejecting a teacher's challenge to sexual orientation-based employment discrimination), and
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Wash. App. 1974), appeal denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974)
(rejecting a gay couple's challenge to the denial of a marriage license). See also Developments in the
Law: Sexual Orientationand the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508 (1989).
71. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (mental
retardation); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (citizenship); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)
(poverty).
72. See generally Jack Greenberg, War Stories: Reflections on Thirty-Five Years with the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 587 (1994). See also In re Thom, 301 N.E.2d 542
(N.Y. 1973) (per curiam) (reversing denial of charitable organization status to Lambda Legal Defense
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In addition to engendering popular discussion and debate, these
advocates pressed the Supreme Court to complicate its analysis of barriers
to equality.7 3 Through legal challenges to nonracial classifications,
advocates demanded the same skepticism that the Court was already
applying to race-based laws and policies. 74 Taking up this gauntlet, the
Court began the process of articulating more precisely than it had in the
race discrimination cases 75 exactly when a classification would be accorded
close judicial scrutiny.
In 1971, the first phase of this articulation began with the invocation
of the concern expressed in Carolene Products for "'discrete and insular'
minorit[ies] ' 76 in a case strictly scrutinizing a state law denying welfare
benefits to noncitizens. 77 Declaring in Graham v. Richardson "that
classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race,
are inherently suspect," 78 the Court opined that noncitizens "are a prime
and Education Fund, the first national organization focused exclusively on gay and lesbian civil rights
litigation); COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 34-40, 107-11 (1976) (discussing the NAACP Legal Defense and

Educational Fund and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund); PATRICIA A. CAIN,
RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (2000) (reviewing and analyzing the history of lesbian and gay civil rights litigation);
ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 8 (1990)

(noting that the NAACP "anchored" the "escalating protests against discrimination [d]uring the 1930s
[with] a concerted attack on school segregation"); Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some
Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI LEGAL F. 9, 11 (discussing the
Women's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union); Eric L. Muller, The Legal Defense
Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.

158, 158-63 (1985) (reviewing the history and strategic decisionmaking process of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund); Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, A Legal Voice for the Chicano Community: The
Activities of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 1968-82, 65 SOC. SCI. Q.
245, 245-56 (1984) (examining the history and activities of the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund); William B. Glaberson, Puerto Rican Legal Fund: 10 Years Old and Growing, 188
N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (July 9, 1982) (discussing the origins and litigation strategy of the Puerto Rican Legal
Defense and Education Fund); NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, OUR HISTORY, at
http://narf.org/intro/history.html (reviewing the history of the Native American Rights Fund) (last
visited Mar. 17, 2004).
73. Cf J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2315-16 (1997) (addressing
the relationship between constitutional analysis and social movements).
74. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). As discussed above, supra notes 60-65 and
accompanying text, in its earlier race discrimination cases, the Court had not developed a test for
suspectness even while designating racial classifications as suspect.
76. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
77. Id. at 376.
78. Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted).

20041

EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS

example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened
' 79
judicial solicitude is appropriate."
Unadorned reference to footnote four of the Carolene Products
decision gave way to a more elaborate analytic framework, still in place
today, as cases continued to present the Court with a wide range of
potentially suspect classifications beyond race, nationality, and alienage.
Just two years after Graham, in 1973, Justice Lewis Powell outlined what
he called the "traditional indicia of suspectness," 80 adding history and
political power to the growing set of judicial concerns. He explained that,
to be deemed suspect, "the class [must be] saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." 8' Also in 1973, a
plurality of the Court added that a characteristic's "relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society" was an important indicator of whether
government's use of a characteristic should be deemed suspect.8 2 By way
of example, the plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson contrasted sex with
"such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability." 83 In an
apparent effort to further refine and control the set of classifications
79. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)). After Graham, the Court regularly invoked the discrete and insular minority concept in
discussing laws drawing distinctions based on alienage. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219
n.5 (1984); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
454 U.S. 432, 438 (1982); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 302 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs,
Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721
(1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973).
80. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Notwithstanding Justice
Powell's reference to tradition, this precise formulation-involving history, immutability, and relative
political powerlessness-had never before appeared in the Court's analysis. Notably, too, Justice
Powell referred to the "class," not the "classification," in setting forth these indicia. See id. See infra
notes 91-99 and accompanying text regarding the consequences of the focus on the burdened subclass
within the classification.
81.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. Later decisions assessing whether potential classifications should
be treated as suspect have tended to require all three criteria-history of discrimination, immutability,
and relative political powerlessness-to be satisfied. See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985) (finding that although mental retardation is immutable,
classifications based on mental retardation did not satisfy all the indicia of heightened scrutiny).
82. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). See
also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (identifying this concern as relevant, although
rejecting an argument that classification based on illegitimacy warranted strict scrutiny). In Murgia, the
Court formulated this inquiry to focus on whether the group at issue (people aged fifty and over) had
been singled out "on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities."
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (per curiam).
83. Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
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potentially eligible for close review, the Court in Frontieroinquired, for the
first time in the suspect classification context, whether the characteristic at
issue was "an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
84
birth."
This set of indicia, as developed over time, aimed to identify
characteristics that "are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy, '85 and, as a result, warrant the
extrajudicial suspicion that comes with suspect classification analysis. As
John Hart Ely observed, "the doctrine of suspect classifications is a
roundabout way of uncovering official attempts to inflict inequality for its
own sake-to treat a group worse not in the service of some overriding
social goal but largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its
84. Id. (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). In some cases, the immutability inquiry was
characterized as a concern with whether the characteristic at issue was "obvious" or "distinguishing."
See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14. See also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (citing Murgia,
427 U.S. at 313-14). The concern with the relationship between judicial review and personal agency
had surfaced earlier in the rational basis review context as the Court assessed whether an individual's
membership in the prejudice-laden category was voluntary and, therefore, avoidable. The Court, while
applying rational basis review to a nonmarital parentage classification a year before Frontiero was
decided, explained that it would be "illogical and unjust" to penalize an infant for a status out of his or
her control. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (footnote omitted). See
also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (finding that children of undocumented noncitizens were
"not accountable for their disabling status" and, therefore, should not be denied public education). In
contrast, the Court in Cleburne observed that an immutable status might, in some instances, correlate
with ability and provide a basis for sustaining a classification. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442
n. 10. See also infra text accompanying note 104.
With some frequency, lower courts have relied on the "immutability test" to refuse close review
of sexual orientation-based classifications. See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City
of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 293 & n.2, 300-01 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that sexual orientationbased classifications merit only rational basis review because "attempted identification of homosexuals
by non-behavioral attributes could have no meaning"); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 101-03 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (upholding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's refusal to hire a lesbian applicant and
rejecting heightened scrutiny in part because "[i]t would be quite anomolous [sic], on its face, to declare
status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause"). But cf Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726, 728 (9th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring) (concluding that "homosexuals constitute a suspect class" in
part by defining immutability to encompass "those traits that are so central to a person's identity that it
would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how
easy that change might be physically").
85.
Cleburne Living Cr., 473 U.S. at 440. Cf Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) ("The
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic process .. ") (footnote omitted). Although later cases set out
the suspect classification criteria in different ways, the basic indicia-history of discrimination,
immutability, and political power-were fully in place in the early 1970s. Later decisions simply
wrestled with their application. See, e.g., Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440-47.
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members." 86
And the demanding review imposed on suspect
classifications, requiring that use of the protected trait be narrowly "tailored
to serve a compelling state interest,, 87 takes a lesson from Carolene
Products: that bias-infected discriminatory classifications based on that
trait are unlikely to be corrected promptly by legislative means.
B.

CONFLICTS WITHIN AND AROUND THE INDICIA OF SUSPECTNESS

The suspect classification indicia-including the history of
discrimination, the immutability or distinctiveness of a trait, and relative
political power--currently suffer from both misapplication and theoretical
inconsistencies. As a result, the set of classifications that might be
considered suspect or quasi-suspect has remained largely unchanged for
more than a quarter century. 88 Given the strong correlation between the
indicia and some nonsuspect traits, it appears that a central reason for
heightened scrutiny's restriction to five traits is temporal, in that those traits
received the Court's protection before slippery slope-type fears about the
potential reach of rigorous review set in. 89 By privileging temporality over
equity, this "first in time is first in right" approach underscores the urgent
90
need to revisit the framework for equal protection review.
86. ELY, supra note 13, at 153.
87. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440.
88. The point in time at which the set actually closed is somewhat debatable. The Court's 1976
decision to apply intermediate scrutiny to a sex-based classification in Craig was arguably the last time
the Court altered its method of analyzing a particular classification. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210
(1976). But see Gunther, supra note 17, at 33-36 (arguing that the Court had already begun applying
heightened scrutiny in Reed v. Reed, 494 U.S. 71 (1971), although it did not acknowledge that it was
doing so). In fact, it was not until 1988 that the Court formally acknowledged its application of
intermediate scrutiny to classifications of nonmarital children. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461
(1988). But long before that decision, the Court tended to rigorously review classifications based on
illegitimacy. Gunther, supra note 17, at 33-36. With respect to sex-based classifications, the battle
continues over where exactly those classifications should fall on the suspect/quasi-suspect spectrum. In
United States v. Virginia, the majority described the heightened scrutiny test as requiring an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for sex-based classifications, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996), while
Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring, characterized the test as requiring that the classification "'serve
important govermmental objectives and... be substantially related to [the] achievement of those
objectives.'" Id.at 558 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (citations
omitted)). In dissent, Justice Scalia maintained that the Court has "no established criterion to determine
when to apply 'immediate scrutiny."' Id. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Cf Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 445 (voicing concern that "if the large and amorphous
class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect. .,it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups"); Kenji Yoshino, AssimilationistBias in Equal Protection:
The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L. 485, 562 (1998)
(describing as "restrictive animus" the Court's "desire to limit the number of groups protected" under
heightened scrutiny).
90. See Yoshino, supra note 89, at 562.
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The quieting of a once-vibrant analytic tool also suggests that the
indicia themselves have become ossified or that they lack the specificity
necessary to constrain misapplications of suspect classification analysis.
As this section argues, the contradictions between indicia and outcomes,
whether the result of deliberate manipulation or logical error, support
reconsideration of the tiered framework.
The most apparent conflicts within the suspect classification
framework occur between the Court's insistence on symmetrical evaluation
of all classifications, whether or not they burden a vulnerable group, and
the indicia's targeted focus on the vulnerable group. 9 1 With respect to the
history-of-discrimination inquiry, for example, a dominant group, such as
whites, will not have suffered a history of discrimination based on race
while the minority or subordinated group, here people of color, will be able
to demonstrate that history. Similarly, the inquiry into relative political
power is, by definition, answered differently by members of a dominant
class, such as men, than by women who have been subordinated based on
the same characteristic of sex. Whether race, sex, or alienage negatively
influences political power depends on the particular race, sex, or
citizenship status of the respondent. Subgroup membership is what
matters. Yet to the Court, the classification-and not the affected class-is
what will trigger heightened review. 92 This deeply rooted conflict suggests
that the current analytic framework, or at least the way it has been
developed by the Court, may not be as carefully conceived or applied as its
widespread acceptance suggests.
As a practical matter, moreover, the indicia conflict with the Court's
own assessment of which traits warrant heightened review. The political
powerlessness criterion, for example, asks whether a group is "powerless in
the sense that [the burdened group has] no ability to attract the attention of
the lawmakers." 93 If pursued to its logical end, this inquiry could actually
91. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 90 CAL. L. REv. 735, 75054 (2002) (discussing the tension between symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches to the review of
discriminatory laws). See generally Hutchinson, supra note 13 (criticizing the Court's insistence on
symmetry).
92. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995) ("'[The standard of
review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited
by a particular classification ... ')(quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 49394 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)).
93. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 445. Similarly, in Foley v. Connelie, the Court subjected
an alienage classification to strict scrutiny because "aliens-pending their eligibility for citizenshiphave no direct voice in the political processes." Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (citation
omitted). In making this assessment, the Court also examined whether the legislative response to those
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support removal of traits such as race and sex from the list of suspect
classifications, contrary to the Court's expressed intent,9 4 in light of the
substantial legislation prohibiting differential treatment based on race and
sex. 95 Other traits that receive far less legislative attention but nonetheless
affect individual opportunity, such as intersexuality or transgender
identity,9 6 would enjoy a better fit with the Court's stated concerns.97
Graham's earlier and simpler version of the Carolene Products'

political power inquiry into whether classifications would prejudice
"discrete and insular minorities" does not escape this tension between the
dichotomous commitments to generally applicable scrutiny of a trait
regardless of the trait bearer's identity and heightened protection for
vulnerable "minorities." 98 Instead, it reinforces the position that the
Court's chief concern should be with the latter, and that the dominant group
presumably should be able to redress grievances effectively through the
political process.

99

In addition to the tension between concern for the class and for the
classification reflected in the history and political power inquiries, the
with the particular trait "belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more
intrusive oversight by the judiciary." CleburneLiving Ctr., 473 U.S. at 443.
94. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (sex); Adarand,515 U.S. at 237 (race).
95. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7201(b) (2000) (ensuring equal employment opportunities in
government employment regardless of race); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (prohibiting educational
programs that receive federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of sex); 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1994) (prohibiting employers from paying different wages based on sex). See also James W.
Ellis, On the "Usefulness" of Suspect Classifications,3 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 380 (1986) ("If the
fact that advocates have obtained passage of some noninvidious, protective legislation precludes
heightened scrutiny, women and racial minorities should now be consigned to the rational basis test.").
96. See generally Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender
Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 392 (2001)
(describing and analyzing the discrimination against, and the legal claims made by, transgendered
individuals); Julie A. Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man, and When Is a Woman a Woman?, 52 FLA. L.
REV. 745 (2000) (discussing the legal status of transgender, transsexual, and intersex individuals).
97. Justice Brennan's suggestion that the Court consider a group's demographic representation in
government likewise evinces concern for the minority or marginalized bearers of the trait at issue. See
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (noting that
"women are vastly underrepresented in this Nation's decisionmaking councils").
98. Then-Justice Rehnquist separately criticized this indicator as insufficiently selective,
observing that "[o]ur society, consisting of over 200 million individuals of multitudinous origins,
customs, tongues, beliefs, and cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would hardly take extraordinary
ingenuity for a lawyer to find 'insular and discrete' minorities at every turn in the road." Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (discussing the
constitutional presumption "that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic processes" absent some defect in those processes, such as unconstrained bias against a
particular group).
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importance accorded to immutability as an indicia of suspectness runs
contrary to the Court's own recognition that society, not nature, gives many
traits their significance. l1 The immutability requirement also finds itself
in conflict with the factual reality that purportedly fixed traits, such as sex,
are in fact more alterable and flexible than commonly presumed. 101 Other
characteristics deemed suspect or quasi-suspect, such as alienage and
illegitimacy, may also be changed. Moreover, the Court itself has
acknowledged that the immutability requirement for suspect classification
status fails to filter classifications meriting heightened judicial skepticism
in a meaningful way. 102
"Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or
she can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose
that elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling.
Moreover, classifications based on physical disability and intelligence
are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators
who assert that immutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is
given, is that those characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is
trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. 10 3At
that point there's not much left of the immutability theory, is there?"
100. See, e.g., St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4, 613 (1987). See also Flynn,
supra note 96,at 395 (advocating "that gender identity, rather than anatomy, is the primary determinant
of sex"). Cf Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Construction Arguments in
Court, 81 OR. L. REv. 629 (2002) (analyzing the potentially destabilizing effect of antiessentialist and
social construction arguments on the fixed categorical definitions preferred by most courts).
101.
See ELY, supra note 13, at 150 (criticizing the Court's reliance on immutable traits for
suspect classification status, noting that "even gender is becoming an alterable condition").
102. The immutability criterion also has been the suspect classification inquiry subject to greatest
misapprehension by lower courts. For example, in analyzing whether sexual orientation-based
classifications may be deemed suspect, courts typically have made two errors: (1) they fixate on the
science related to sexual orientation and the control an individual has over his or her sexual practices;
and (2) they treat the legal test as though physical immutability is an absolute requirement, instead of
properly examining whether the characteristic of sexual orientation is obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing. See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,
293 (6th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging the Sixth Circuit panel's earlier conclusion that the law cannot
"successfully categorize persons by subjective and unapparent characteristics such as innate desires,
drives, and thoughts") (citation omitted); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (maintaining that homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature and, therefore, cannot be
considered an immutable trait). Another court, following a trial at which extensive evidence was
introduced regarding the genetic and biological origins of sexual orientation, rejected heightened
scrutiny for a sexual orientation-based classification based in part on the court's determination that the
scientific evidence related to immutability was not conclusive. Evans v. Romer, 1993 WL 518586, at
*11 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993). See also LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO
THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 43-73 (1998) (discussing scientific and other evidence regarding
sexual orientation presented to the Colorado district court in Romer).
103. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442 n.10 (quoting ELY, supra note 13, at 150) (citations
omitted). See also Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protectionfor Gay,
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Indeed, the Court has raised its own questions about whether all of its
indicia, taken together, actually provide a useful and principled test for
determining which types of classifications merit close judicial attention.
Commenting on its decision not to apply heightened scrutiny to
classifications of people with mental retardation, the Court stated that
if the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed
quasi-suspect... it would be difficult to find a principled way to
distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable
disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate
the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of
prejudice from at least part of the-public at large. One need mention in
this respect
only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the
10 4
infirm.

Although the Court has shown no signs of abandoning these criteria,
its concession that the value of the indicia is limited reinforces the prospect
that the current three-tiered framework could benefit from reconsideration.
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identify, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915,923-32 (1989) (analyzing and critiquing the use
of immutability arguments).
A related flaw, not addressed by the Court, is that protecting only fixed, unchangeable
characteristics provides little useful assistance in assessing classifying measures that discriminate based
on outward, changeable manifestations of these deep-rooted traits, such as personal appearance, beliefs,
and practices. To the extent that the Court is also committed to focusing the inquiry on characteristics
that are "obvious" or "distinguishing," rather than immutable, it succeeds in avoiding the problems
outlined above. But, as with an examination of political powerlessness that turns on a particular
demographic group's representation in government, a requirement that a characteristic be merely
"obvious" or "distinguishing" offers little to limit the potential set of suspicious classifications. Further,
like the immutability inquiry, a characteristic's status as obvious or distinguishing provides minimal
information, if any, about whether government's use of the characteristic is likely to reflect
impermissible bias. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 89, at 498 (observing that since visibility is relational,
whether a trait is visible will "depend not only on the trait but also on the 'decoding capacity of the
audience,' which in turn will depend on the social context") (footnote omitted).
More useful perhaps, though still suffering from some of the flaws identified above, is the inquiry
made in the asylum context regarding whether possession of a trait gives rise to "membership in a
particular social group," which is one of the five grounds on which a person may be eligible for asylum
in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2000). The Board of Immigration Appeals has
explained that the trait "'must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not
be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences."'
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N.
Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)).
104. Cleburne Living C'., 473 U.S. at 445-46. Dissenting from the decision to strike down the
Virginia Military Institute's ("VMI") sex-based admissions policy, Justice Scalia described the Court as
applying different levels of scrutiny "whenever we feel like it," adding that "[wie have no established
criterion for 'intermediate scrutiny' . .. but essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea to load
the dice." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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C. THE RIGID APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY
The virtue of the judicial presumption that certain types of trait-based
legislation, such as laws distinguishing on the basis of race or sex, are
impermissible 10 5 also contains its own vice. Categorically imposing that
negative presumption any time government relies on a suspect trait has two
primary unfavorable consequences. First, it requires application of the bias
presumption even where the classification is aimed to remedy bias.
Second, it has a distorting effect on rational basis review by discouraging
designation of additional traits as suspect, even where the traits fit well
within the Court's indicia, out of concern that all classifications based on
those traits, including those that are long established or have wide popular
support, will be presumed invalid.
The first concern with the strict presumption of illegitimacy regarding
use of a suspect classification surfaces most prominently in review of
affirmative action programs designed to ameliorate the effects of race
discrimination. For example, the Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peha, citing suspect classification analysis's demand for strict scrutiny,
treated the remedial context as irrelevant and required the lower court, on
remand, to apply the same rigorous review as it would to a program
designed to perpetuate race discrimination. " Of course, it is possible that
105. Arguably, sex-based classifications suffer less from this lack of flexibility in review because
the Court has recognized that they are sometimes relevant to government action; but such cases are
relatively rare and their holdings arguably reflect traditional stereotypes about women. See, e.g.,
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57, 73 (2001) (finding the difference between mothers and fathers to be
sufficiently significant to uphold a law imposing greater restrictions on obtaining citizenship for the
child of a U.S. citizen father than for the child of a U.S. citizen mother); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 83 (1981) (sustaining the categorical exemption for women from registration for military service
based on the different roles of men and women in military service); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (upholding a statutory rape law penalizing men but not women because it
"reasonably reflect[ed] the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall more
heavily on the female than the male"); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1977) (deferring to
Congress's power to regulate immigration and upholding an immigration law preference for children of
American women but not American men); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1974) (citing distinct
financial vulnerability of "lone" women as the basis for upholding a tax exemption provided to widows
but not widowers).
106. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 204, 224, 229-31 (1995). At first
glance, the insistence in Grutter that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action
under the Equal Protection Clause" might suggest that the Court has backtracked from its flat refusal in
Adarand to distinguish between classifications imposed to diminish the effects of racial discrimination
and those imposed to enshrine it. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) (citation
omitted). On a careful reading, however, it appears to be the higher education admissions context and
not the context of affirmative action more generally that inspired this flexibility. Throughout its
opinion, the Court emphasized its "deference to a university's academic decisions" and the
"fundamental role" of education in "maintaining the fabric of society" and "preparing students for work
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this rigid and categorical review flows not just from the suspect
classification analysis itself, but also from the majority's belief in the
perniciousness of any racial classification.107 Indeed, some have argued
that the Court's ideological commitments are entirely responsible for the
disregard of context in evaluations of remedial measures."°
The contention here, however, is that regardless of whether these
ideological commitments would lead the Court to invalidate a remedial

program under lesser scrutiny, suspect classification analysis's insistence
on consistent, tough review for every use of a suspect trait is independently
detrimental to the analysis. Even if strict scrutiny allows limited room for
careful contextual review, "there is a danger that the fatal language of
and citizenship" in reaching its conclusion. Il at 2339-40. By framing the case through the lens of
Justice Powell's analysis in Regents of University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), rathe
than any of the more recent affirmative action decisions, the Court reinforced the notion that, while
university admissions policies may escape the usual rigidity of suspect classification analysis, no other
category of decisionmaking is likely to receive that same benefit of the doubt. See also Grutter,123 S.
CL at 2374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (declaring that the university admissions process is a "special
context," and the "one context" that could warrant giving "appropriate consideration to race").
Further, the Court's application of strict scrutiny to reject the University of Michigan's
undergraduate admissions plan for according a point value to racial identities demonstrates that even
within the educational environment, the presumption that consideration of race is illegitimate remains
strong and not as context sensitive as Grutter might imply. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. CL 2411, 2417,
2419-20 (2003). Although the undergraduate admissions office argued that its volume of applications
rendered a more individualized approach "impractical," the Cor dismissed that argument in light of
"the limits imposed by [its] strict scrutiny analysis." Id. at 2430. Justice Souter's contention, in dissent,

that the undergraduate and law school admissions programs are not fundamentally dissimilar, also
reinforces the perception that Grutter'scommitment to a less categorical analysis may not have wideranging effect. See i. at 2441 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The very nature of a college's permissible
practice of awarding value to racial diversity means that race must be considered in a way that increases
some applicants' chances for admission .... The college simply does by a numbered scale what the law
school accomplishes in its 'holistic review .... "').
107. In Adarand, the Court explained that "'[racial classifications are simply too pernicious to
permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification.' Adarand,515 U.S.
at 220 (quoting Fullilove v. Kluznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Justice
Thomas went further to spell out his view of the across-the-board danger of race-based classifications:
Inhere can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as
poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination.
So-called "benign"
discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps,
minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such
programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those

who believe that they have been wronged by the government's use of race. These programs
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or
to adopt an attitude that they are "entitled" to preferences....

In my mind, government-

sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination
inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.
ld at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
108.

See Rubenfeld, The Anti-Anidiscrimnination Agenda, supra note 12, at 1175-77 (criticizing

the Court's manipulation of cases and doctrine); Spann, supra note 13, at 92 (accusing the majority of
the Court of racism).
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'strict scrutiny' will skew the analysis and place well-crafted benign
programs at unnecessary risk."' 0 9 Further, to the extent that the tiered
framework requires identical treatment of every use of a suspect
classification, its rigidity runs contrary to the Equal Protection Clause's
core values." 0
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate
Invidious discrimination is an engine of
racial subordination.
a
disfavored group to enhance or maintain the
subjugating
oppression,
power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the
opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society. No sensible
conception of the Government's constitutional obligation to "govern
impartially" should ignore this distinction .... III

As Justice Stevens added, "The consistency that the Court espouses would
disregard the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome
11 2
mat."
Although a majority of the Court has promised that strict scrutiny will
not always be "'fatal in fact,"' 1 13 the Court's categorical application of
strict scrutiny to suspect classifications inescapably sends the message to
governments that developing a race-conscious effort to ensure equality is a
high-risk proposition that stands only a limited chance of surviving legal
challenge. 114
109. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. See infra Part Ill.A (discussing the equal protection guarantee's concern with eradicating
class legislation through careful contextual assessment of all types of laws).
Ill. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
112. Id. at 245. Similarly, Justice Ginsburg has commented that
[t]his insistence on consistency would be fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of rank
discrimination long reinforced by law. But we are not far distant from an overtly
discriminatory past.... Actions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature
are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination
and its after effects have been extirpated.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411,2443-44 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
113. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237).
114. Indeed, moments after the Court issued its ruling upholding the University of Michigan Law
School's affirmative action plan, opponents of affirmative action vowed to force careful scrutiny of the
admissions process of every institution of higher education to ensure that none oversteps the narrow
bounds set by the Court. See Greg Winter, The Supreme Court: Other Campuses; Ruling Provides
Relief but Less than Hoped, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A26. The recent group of redistricting cases
also reinforces the vulnerability of plans that take race into account for remedial purposes. See, e.g.,
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958, 985-86 (1996) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (holding that Texas's
redistricting plan constituted impermissible racial gerrymandering); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 902,
905 (1996) (using strict scrutiny to invalidate North Carolina's congressional redistricting scheme
because race was used as a "dominant and controlling" factor) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 909 (1995)); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910, 927-28 (1995) (holding that Georgia's
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In addition, the all-or-nothing application of heightened scrutiny to
classifications designated as suspect functions as a disincentive to
broadening the existing set of suspect classifications. Because most
classifications do not give effect to bias all the time, courts have been
reluctant to impose an analytic framework that would always require extrarigorous review of classifications that can sometimes have a benign use.
As a result, when the Court has found that a nonsuspect classification
embodies prejudice, it has engaged in a careful type of rational basis review
that contrasts sharply with its typical emphasis on legislative deference.
For example, as the Court effectively acknowledged in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the risk of designating
classifications based on mental retardation as suspect is that all legislation
regarding people with mental retardation-including positive, supportive
legislation-would have to be strictly scrutinized.1 15 However, the refusal
to designate a classification as suspect raises the risk that even where bias
has motivated the classification, it will not be caught by an application of
lenient rational basis review. 116 Although Cleburne's zoning provision
ultimately was invalidated because of its impermissible fear-based purpose,
the problem with this all-or-nothing approach to equal protection is that the
next invidiously motivated governmental classification to burden people
with mental retardation may not be caught in rational basis review's loosely
knit web." 7
congressional redistricting plan, which gave consideration to race in drawing district lines, violated the
Equal Protection Clause). Only very recently has the Court expressed a specific willingness to sustain
government action that is motivated in part by a concern with race. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325.
This new development, however, does not appear to presage a future expansion of context-sensitive
assessments of racial classifications. Cf Karlan, supra note 25 (exploring the differences between
applications of strict scrutiny in affirmative action and redistricting cases); Rubin, supra note 25
(analyzing the restrictive, formalistic use of strict scrutiny).
115. See City of Cleburne v. Clebure Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-45 (1985). As just
noted, the Court could have made this same observation regarding the imposition of heightened scrutiny
on race- and sex-based classifications.
116. See infra notes 123-25, 131 and accompanying text for a discussion of lenient application of
rational basis review.
117. In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice O'Connor's formulation of rational basis review suggested that
this type of error was not likely to occur because "[w]hen a law exhibits ... a desire to harm a
politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review."
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2485 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, as no other
justice joined her opinion, it is not clear whether a majority of the Court shares her perspective. See
supra note 8 (discussing Justice Scalia's critique of this position).
As a separate matter, the issue of strict scrutiny as an all-or-nothing proposition may similarly
influence some courts against designating sexual orientation as suspect or quasi-suspect, even though
these same courts might agree that sexual orientation fits the heightened scrutiny criteria. These courts
may fear that holding the use of sexual orientation to be suspect would require rigorous review and,
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Thus, although the underlying commitment of suspect classification
analysis-that the Court's review should capture classifications that likely
reflect impermissible prejudice-is a sensible one, the current set of indicia
for determining which classifications are suspect, coupled with the rigid
application of strict scrutiny to all suspect classifications, may fail to
achieve that aim. As shown in the next section, rational basis review shares
with suspect classification analysis the same essential concern of ensuring
equality. A single standard of review that embraces these common
concerns, which is proposed in Part IV, aims to provide the necessary rigor
to identify invidious classifications while avoiding the weaknesses of
suspect classification analysis as it is currently formulated and applied.
D. THE UNEVENNESS OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
To the extent that strict and intermediate scrutiny serve a
homogenizing purpose, in some broad sense, by creating the appearance of
consistent analysis and results, the Court's rational basis cases present a
sharp counterpoint. Although most classifying laws and policies withstand
equal protection challenge, the Court also consistently invalidates
classifications under rational basis review. Against a backdrop of more
than one hundred cases subjected by the Court to equal protection rational
basis review since 1973 118-the year after Gerald Gunther published his
ultimately, invalidation of all sexual orientation-based classifications, including those restricting service
by gay people in the military that, to date, no appellate court has been willing to invalidate. See, e.g.,
Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 635-36 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the "don't ask, don't tell"
prohibition against openly lesbian and gay military personnel); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 26062 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); BenShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding the separation of a lesbian service
member from the military under an earlier policy); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (sustaining a gay man's separation from military service).
118. See Farrell, supra note 32, at 416-19. Of course, some laws challenged prior to 1973 were
also invalidated on rational basis grounds. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-11 (1966)
(striking down a New Jersey law requiring imprisoned indigents to reimburse the county for the costs of
an unsuccessful appeal, but not imposing the same burden on those receiving suspended sentences).
See also Gunther, supra note 17, at 25-37 (reviewing the 1971 Term's relatively high concentration of
these cases). In addition, prior to 1937, the Court invalidated myriad government classifications. See,
e.g., Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 35, 38-39 (1928) (invaliding a state disparate
taxing scheme that benefited building and loan associations); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 417 (1920) (striking down a scheme taxing an in-state business for its out-of-state revenues);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (voiding Arizona's Anti-Alien Labor Law); Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fd Ry. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1915) (rejecting a rule that imposed an attorney's fee
obligation only on railroads); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 564 (1902) (rejecting
an Illinois exemption of agriculturists and livestock dealers from criminal penalties imposed on others);
Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 110 (1901) (invalidating a state law imposing
regulations on stock yards operating above, but not below, a certain volume). However, the number of
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landmark article offering a new model for equal protection analysis' 19-the
Court has invalidated nearly a dozen classifications.' 20 This periodic
exercise of judicial authority under the lowest scrutiny level raises a serious
equal protection invalidations during the Lochner era is disproportionately high, owing to the Court's
inclination to strike down much of the government regulation that restricted business. See Michael Les
Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 293-95 (1985); Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note
55, at 877-81.
119. See Gunther, supra note 17, at 20-24. For a discussion of this model, see infra notes 311-16
and accompanying text.
120. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996) (invalidating a measure barring
antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109
(1989) (striking down a Missouri property ownership requirement for service on a government board);
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 344-46 (1989) (sustaining a
challenge to Virginia's systematic undervaluation of some, but not all, real property); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985) (invalidating a town's different treatment of
individuals with mental retardation for zoning purposes); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472
U.S. 612, 618-23 (1985) (rejecting a New Mexico tax preference distinguishing between long-term and
short-term resident Vietnam veterans); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985) (striking down a
use tax that burdened out-of-state car buyers); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985)
(rejecting an Alabama law that provided tax relief to in-state but not foreign businesses); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (sustaining a challenge to a Texas law that denied education to undocumented
children); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (invalidating Alaska's dividend distribution
system that favored long-term residents); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1974) (striking
down a New York statute that permitted county jail detainees to register to vote, or vote as absentees, if
they were detained outside, but not within, their county of residence); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (invalidating a legislative restriction aimed at preventing hippies from
obtaining food stamps).
In addition, the Supreme Court analyzed numerous classifications based on sex and illegitimacy
during this period by using the language of rational basis review. However, because these
classifications are now deemed quasi-suspect, cases applying rational basis review to them are not
discussed here on the theory that the Court might have been applying heightened review in practice but
not in name. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) (articulating a "strong" version of
rational basis review and rejecting a mandatory preference for men in estate administration). See also
Gunther, supra note 17, at 34 ("It is difficult to understand [the Reed] result without an assumption that
some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor entered into the analysis.... Only by importing
some special suspicion of sex-related means ...can the result be made entirely persuasive."); supra
note 88 (discussing the transition to heightened scrutiny for classifications based on sex and nonmarital
parental status). Nonetheless, precisely because these cases can be seen as bridging the purported gap
between lower and higher levels of scrutiny, they are useful as illustrations of the core concerns shared
by all levels of equal protection review. See infra Part IV.
One additional case held that an individual had stated an equal protection claim by alleging that
government acts targeted at him lacked a rational basis. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
564-65 (2000) (challenging an onerous easement condition as an arbitrary violation of the equal
protection guarantee). Because this case had been decided by the district court on a motion to dismiss,
the Supreme Court did not determine finally whether the disparate treatment amounted to a
constitutional violation. Id.
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question about how, exactly, the Court settles on the degree of deference it
will give to legislative acts at this bottom tier. 121
To illustrate this inconsistency and demonstrate how its consequences
support reconsideration of the tiered framework and a shift to a single
review standard,1 22 this section will sketch the Court's "weak" and "strong"
approaches to rational basis review. It will then offer some hypotheses
regarding the tension between them and the doctrinal wavering that
complicates and undermines contemporary rational basis review.
The familiar refrain that courts should stay out of the business of
judging most legislative distinctions characterizes the weak rational basis
cases and dominates the doctrine in this area. As the Court has explained,
"equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness,
or logic of legislative choices."' 123 Instead, nonsuspect classifications must
be sustained "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
121.
Although the actual number of rational basis invalidations by the Supreme Court since
Gunther introduced the concept of rational basis with "bite" is small, these cases, with their tension
between deference and meaningful review, guide lower court review along with their highly deferential
counterparts. See Gunther, supra note 17, at 20-24. One could render an alternative reading of these
cases that would bring the numbers even lower by taking several of them out of equal protection
altogether and others out of the realm of rational basis review, leaving only a random few that fall
outside the typical deferential guideposts. For example, the invalidation of distinctions based on
residence or length of residence might more accurately be explained by reference to the dormant
Commerce Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Erika K. Nelson, Unanswered
Questions: The Implications of Saenz v. Roe for Durational Residency Requirements, 49 U. KAN. L.
REV. 193, 217-18 (2000) (reanalyzing the Zobel and Hooper decisions under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause). Cf Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Poverty, Residency, and Federalism: States' Duty of
Impartiality Toward Newcomers, 1999 Sup. CT. REV. 277, 310 (discussing the residency requirements
in Zobel and Hooper in connection with state citizenship rights and states' ability to foster
communities). Similarly, the Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer trilogy could be read as applying covert
heightened scrutiny, see TRIBE, supra note 10, §§ 16-3, 16-31, as illustrating the operation of the
"pariah principle," see Farber & Sherry, supra note 40, at 264, or as illustrating the generalized animus
principle. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 63
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided] ("Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer reflect an
understanding that other groups, not only African-Americans, may be subject to unreasoning hatred and
suspicion."). Cf Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35 ("[L]aws of [this] kind ...raise the inevitable inference
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected .... [This law]
offends conventional and venerable [principles]; a law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose."). However, because the Court frames its analysis as falling within its equal
protection jurisprudence, these cases are appropriately considered here as well.
122. While doctrinal inconsistency is a charge that could be levied against the jurisprudence in
most areas of constitutional law, this section, coupled with Part V's application of the proposed single
standard, shows that the inconsistency, at times, results in inadequate review of certain classifications.
See infra Part V.A (discussing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)). This consequence, in
turn, supports reconsideration of the framework designed to guide that review.
123. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
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provide a rational basis for the classification. "124
In other words,
legislatures act with a strong presumption of legitimacy
"despite the fact
' 125
inequality."
some
in
result
laws
their
that, in practice,
Yet alongside these deferential pledges, a separate cluster of strong
rational basis cases adds additional weight to the minimal requirements just
mentioned by emphasizing that a meaningful relationship must exist
126
between the group singled out and the government's legitimate goals.
As the Court has stated, "the classification must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."'1 27 In other words,
deference does not translate into an absence of genuine scrutiny: "even in
the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of
124. Id. (citation omitted). In United States v. Morrison, the Court's rejection of facts found by
Congress regarding the interstate impact of domestic violence suggests that if legislation is to be
sustained, the facts at issue must be reasonable to the Court as well as to the legislature. See United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000); id. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485 (1970) ("If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality."') (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78
(1911)); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) ("But the law need not be
in every respect logically consistent with its aims.").
126. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,416 (1920). Although F.S. Royster Guano
is a relatively early case, it is cited so frequently that it remains a mainstay of this "strong"
characterization of equal protection review. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001). For
additional examples of strong rational basis cases, see infra notes 206, 213-21 and accompanying text.
127. F.S. Royster Guano, 253 U.S. at 415. Recognizing the great deference accorded to tax
classifications, the Court underscored that even "a discriminatory tax law cannot be sustained against
the complaint of a party aggrieved if the classification appear [sic] to be altogether illusory." Id.
Although tax classifications received regular equal protection review during the Lochner era, see, e.g.,
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 516 (1926) (holding that tax provisions favoring instate businesses violated the Equal Protection Clause); S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 418 (1910)
(finding a tax preference for in-state railway companies to be invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause), the Court's deferential orientation was so powerful that some precedent suggested that
discriminatory tax statutes were entirely immune from compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.
See Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673, 676-78 (1945) (holding that "privilege" taxes
paid by an out-of-state corporation were not subject to equal protection). Ultimately, the Court rejected
Lincoln's categorical hands-off approach. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 665-68 (1981) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause applied to states' treatment of a
foreign corporation). In Western & Southern Life Insurance Co., the Court held that
whatever the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business
within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the
discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose.
Id. at 667-68.
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standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification
adopted and the object to be attained.' 2 8
Grounding this insistence in the Constitution's equality mandate, the
Court has commented that "[t]he search for the link between classification
and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it provides
guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what
129
sorts of laws it can pass; and it marks the limits of our own authority."'
Referring to the underlying purpose of equal protection review, the Court
explained that "[b]y requiring that the classification bear a rational
relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
130
burdened by the law."'
As the preceding discussion illustrates, two distinct emphases emerge
in cases using essentially the same rational basis language.
One,
characterized here as the weak version of rational basis, focuses on the
presumption of constitutionality given to government action and the
31
reluctance of courts to second-guess the acts of their sibling branches.'
The strong cases, in contrast, underscore that even with this presumption of
constitutionality, the rationality requirement for government line drawing
remains meaningful. These strong cases might also be described as having
a contextual focus in that the link between government line drawing and
asserted state interests must be grounded in the context in which the
32
classification operates before judicial approval will be granted. 1
128. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 633 (citation omitted). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982) ("The State
must do more than justify its classification with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate.")
(citation omitted).
131. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) ("[A] classification neither involving
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of
legitimacy."); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) ("[T]he judiciary
may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations
made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines .... "); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) ("[Flederal courts [have] no power to impose upon the States
their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.") (footnote omitted); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) ("State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality."); Williamson
v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) ("The Oklahoma law may exact a needless,
wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the
advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.").
132. See W. & S. Life Ins., 451 U.S. at 668 ("In determining whether a challenged classification is
rationally related to achievement of a legitimate state purpose, we must answer two questions: (1) Does
the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to
believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?").
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A cold look at these characterizations of the rational basis inquiry
could suggest that the distinction drawn out above is semantic at best, but
that would miss the significant, if subtle, shifts in emphasis. These shifts
lead to predictable results, at least in the limited sense that opinions
invoking the test's weak version almost invariably reject equal protection
challenges while the strong language generally appears in the cases striking
down classifications.' 33 Not all the cases emphasizing "linkage" result in
judicial intervention, 134 however; thus, the predictive value of this
distinction is admittedly minor. The distinction's value may be minimized
further if the Court's use of the weak or strong articulation is viewed as
nothing more than self-serving phraseology or a reflection of unresolved
ideological differences on the Court about the role of judicial review. For
our purposes, though, whether or not the contrast between the weak and
strong cases illustrates a deeper jurisprudential struggle, the divergent
emphases reflect a persistent tension about the nature of rational basis
review, which has left the doctrine with a somewhat unpredictable feel and,
at times, without sufficient focus on whether a meaningful connection
exists between government action and the purported justifications for that
action.
In sum, although there is general agreement that rational basis review
requires the greatest deference and the least rigorous scrutiny of any test
seeking to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, differences in emphasis and
application remain plentiful. The wide gaps between the expressions and
applications of rational basis review in the weak and strong cases and the
133. However, the weak language dominates discussion in a few of the cases that ultimately strike
down government action. For example, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the Court stressed
that "it is not difficult to establish a rational relationship between a classification and a government
purpose." Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 (1985). The Court was closely split,
however, regarding both the articulation of the equal protection analysis and the outcome here, with
four justices maintaining that the majority had misapplied the equal protection test and had failed to
defer sufficiently to the state's freedom to classify. Id. at 884-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
More recently, the Court in Quinn v. Millsap similarly stressed the ease of satisfying rational
basis review, stating that "[wle need apply no more than the rationality review articulated in Turner" to
strike down the property ownership requirement at issue. Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 107 (1989)
(referring to Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970)). In Turner, the Court had described the
rational basis inquiry as asking "whether the challenged classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of a valid state objective." Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
134. In Nordlinger v. Hahn, for example, the plaintiff relied on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Commission to challenge California's acquisition value taxation scheme, which resulted in new
homeowners paying substantially higher taxes than long-term homeowners for similar properties.
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 14 (1992). Although the Court sustained the California approach, it
carefully assessed the relationship between the state's interests and the classification in a manner typical
of the strong set of cases. Id. at 11-17.
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resulting periodic invalidations of government line drawing suggest that the
doctrine needs a stabilizing force.
These tensions in rational basis review, coupled with the difficulties in
suspect classification analysis addressed above, encourage this Article's
next turn toward rethinking the framework that supports these review
standards. With the theoretical and doctrinal weaknesses in mind, the
remainder of this Article will take steps toward laying a firmer foundation
for future judicial application of the Constitution's equality guarantee.
III. QUESTIONING THE THREE TIERS
In light of the serious flaws plaguing the theory and application of
heightened scrutiny and rational basis review, it is not entirely surprising
that the three-tiered framework has periodically come under fire by
members of the Court. What is more puzzling, however, is that no judicial
or scholarly consensus has developed in favor of abandoning the tiers and
adopting a single standard. This part will approach this puzzle initially by
setting out the views of those justices who have questioned the Court's
current approach to equal protection review. After a brief tour of these
divergent positions, I will then posit several theories as to why, despite
doctrinal problems and scholarly critique, the Court's approach to equal
protection has remained relatively static. In doing so, I will consider three
of the leading theories that have been advanced to provide some coherence
35
to rational basis review and assess their incorporation by the Court. 1
A. JUDICIAL DISCOMFORT WITH TIERED REVIEW

Even as the Court was first growing comfortable with an approach to
assessing governmental classifications that required determinations of
suspectness and imposing different levels of judicial review, a few
consistent voices on the Court cautioned against the entry into new and
complicated terrain.
Rather than dividing the analytic field into
classifications, these jurists, representing a broad philosophical spectrum,
135. Much scholarship examines strict scrutiny and suspect classification in the context of racebased affirmative action and redistricting classifications. See generally Karlan, supra note 25
(criticizing the application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs); Rubenfeld, Affirmative
Action, supra note 13 (same); Rubin, supra note 25 (same). Because this scholarship focuses largely on
correcting perceived problems within the confines of a heightened scrutiny approach, it is not as
pertinent to this Article's project of collapsing the three-tiered structure back into its original unitary
analytic mechanism. Thus, it will not be addressed in depth here. It does, however, reinforce the
timeliness of reconsidering the tiered framework.

2004]

EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS

than help and might
suggested that the multiple tiers might be more trouble
136
values.
protection
equal
of
application
fair
the
distort
From among the members of the Court, Justice Marshall engaged in
the most detailed effort to flesh out a unitary standard. Instead of
proposing adjustments to the criteria forming the Court's test, Justice
Marshall explained in Cleburne that the Court's overall approach was in
error:
The Court's opinion approaches the task of principled equal protection
adjudication in what I view as precisely the wrong way. The formal
label under which an equal protection claim is reviewed is less important
than careful identification of the interest at stake and the extent to which
society recognizes the classification as an invidious one. Yet in focusing
obsessively on the appropriate label to give its standard of review, the
Court fails to identify the interests at stake or to articulate the principle
that classifications based on mental retardation must be carefully
examined to assure they do not rest on impermissible assumptions or
false stereotypes regarding individual ability and need. No guidance is
thereby given as to when the Court's freewheeling, and potentially
dangerous, "rational-basis standard" is to be employed, nor is attention
directed to
the invidiousness of grouping all retarded individuals
37
together.1
Moreover, Justice Marshall observed that these formal distinctions in
review were not as neat as they purported to be. Condemning the Court's
effort to shore up differences between rational basis review and heightened
scrutiny, he wrote, "this Court's decisions in the field of equal protection
'
defy such easy categorization." 138
Justice Marshall also took specific issue with the framework that the
Court had developed to identify suspect classifications, with the
immutability and political power inquiries receiving his particular
condemnation: "No single talisman can define those groups likely to be the
target of [constitutionally offensive] classifications .... [E]xperience, not
abstract logic, must be the primary guide." 139 He observed, for example,
136. See infra notes 137-62 and accompanying text.
137. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 478 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The following year, in dissent from the
Court's approval of a restrictive food stamp provision, Justice Marshall reiterated his concern with "the
lack of vitality in this Court's recent equal protection jurisprudence." Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635,
643 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
138. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
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that "[tihe 'political powerlessness' of a group may be relevant, but that
Likewise, he
factor is neither necessary . . . nor sufficient." 140
acknowledged that immutability "may be relevant, but many immutable
characteristics, such as height or blindness, are valid bases of governmental
14
action and classifications under a variety of circumstances.' 1
With his criticism of the formalistic distinctions in suspect
classification analysis, Justice Marshall offered a balancing test as an
alternative, seeking to focus the Court's attention on the relationship
between the government interest at issue and the level of societal
condemnation of the classification.
His proposal maintained that
"concentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in
question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification." 142 Justice Marshall
also maintained that the Court was already engaged in this flexible
approach, notwithstanding its creation of multiple tiers for review.
Critiquing the Court's approach, he commented, "A principled reading of
what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards
in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection
143
Clause."
Justice Stevens also strongly opposed the Court's foray into multiple
tiers. Agreeing with Justice Marshall that only a single standard should be
applied, Justice Stevens proposed a somewhat different formulation for
equal protection review. As he famously observed in Craig v. Boren,
140. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
141. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
142. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Cleburne,
Justice Marshall described the balancing proposal this way: "I have long believed the level of scrutiny
employed in an equal protection case should vary with 'the constitutional and societal importance of the
interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn."' Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting))
(citation omitted). In Richardson v. Belcher, a due process case, Justice Marshall added that
it is necessary to consider more than the character of the classification and the governmental
interests in support of the classification. Judges should not ignore what everyone knows,
namely that legislation regulating business cannot be equated with legislation dealing with
destitute, disabled, or elderly individuals.... [T]he Court should consider the individual
interests at stake.
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78,90-91 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall continued, "This
spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize
particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the
interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn." Id. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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"There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to
govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of
review in some cases and a different standard in other cases."' 144 Like
Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens contended that the tiers did not actually
guide the Court's analysis, though he identified a single standard rather
than a sliding scale as the underlying key to the Court's approach:
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely
logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has
employed to explain decisions145that actually apply a single standard in a
reasonably consistent fashion.
Proposing an alternative method of assessing equal protection
challenges, Justice Stevens explained that "[i]n my own approach to these
cases, I have always asked myself whether I could find a 'rational basis' for
the classification at issue." 146 He then explicated how the rationality
inquiry could proceed, emphasizing the importance of an unbiased
legislature and a legitimate public purpose for a classification:
The term "rational," of course, includes a requirement that an impartial
lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a
legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the
disadvantaged class. Thus, the word "rational"-for me at leastincludes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always
characterize 47the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern
impartially. 1
To reinforce that no need for multiple standards of review exists,
Stevens observed,
It would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of height
or weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color. None
of these attributes has any bearing at all on the citizen's willingness or
ability to exercise that civil right. We do not need to apply a special
standard, or to apply
"strict scrutiny," or even "heightened scrutiny," to
148
decide such cases.
144.

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).

145.

Id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).

146.
147.
148.
approach

Cleburne Living Cr., 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 452-53 (Stevens, J., concurring).
For a detailed discussion of Justice Stevens's
to equal protection review, see generally, Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection

Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1987) [hereinafter Justice Stevens].
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Then-Justice Rehnquist also proffered a generalized critique of multitiered review couched within his objection to the Court's creation of the
quasi-suspect tier in Craig:
I would think we have had enough difficulty with the two standards of
review which our cases have recognized-the norm of "rational basis,"
and the "compelling state interest" required where a "suspect
classification" is involved-so as to counsel weightily against the
insertion of still another "standard" between those two. 149
Later, in Rostker v. Goldberg, Justice Rehnquist reiterated his
concerns about the tiers, observing that "levels of 'scrutiny' which this
Court announces that it applies to particular classifications made by a
legislative body, may all too readily become facile abstractions used to
justify a result."' 150
Justice Powell also spoke out in Craig against the "further subdividing
of equal protection analysis." '1 51 Pointing to the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence, Justice Powell suggested that the tiered system might have
emerged from the Court's inability to agree on a universally applicable
standard for equal protection analysis.' 52 Conceding that "substantial
precedent" supported the use of an upper tier, Justice Powell then
highlighted a "valid" criticism of strict scrutiny "as a result-oriented
substitute for more critical analysis,"' 153 suggesting his preference for a
standard that would apply across the full range of possible
classifications. 154
149. Craig, 429 U.S. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1981).
151. Craig, 429 U.S. at 210 n.*(Powell, J., concurring).
152. Id. See also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087,
1090-92 (1982) (cautioning that the Court's discussion in Carolene Products of classifications
warranting close judicial review does not offer a "neat formula for constitutional adjudication").
153. Craig, 429 U.S. at 211 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). During the Court's conference regarding
Cleburne, Justice Powell has been quoted as saying that "'Ihesitate to go to heightened scrutiny, which
I've never favored. I'm not sure even race or gender needs more than rational [basis review]."'
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 251 (1990).
154. Several states have also avoided embracing the tiered framework in reviewing equal
protection challenges based on state constitutional guarantees. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for
example, takes an approach similar to that advocated by Justice Marshall above. See McCann v. Clerk
of Jersey City, 771 A.2d 1123, 1131 (N.J. 2001) ("We have rejected the federal multi-tiered approach in
favor of a less rigid balancing approach in which we consider 'the nature of the affected right, the extent
to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction."')
(quoting Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985)). Likewise, in Alaska, the state
supreme court applies "a sliding scale under which '[t]he applicable standard of review for a given case
is to be determined by the importance of the individual rights asserted and by the degree of suspicion
with which we view the resulting classification scheme."' Dep't of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621,
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However, although each proposal contains interesting elements, none
provides a comprehensive solution to the problems inherent in all levels of
the tiered framework. For example, while Justice Marshall's proposal
offers the appeal of a flexible, context-sensitive approach, his balancing
test provides little guidance to lower courts regarding how to assess the
importance of the interest infringed and then strike the balance between
interests and equality. Further, because relatively minor deprivations can
cause significant harm to the status, if not the actual access to resources of
trait bearers, consideration of the infringed interest's importance may not
be useful and could possibly be detrimental to enforcement of the equal
protection guarantee. 155
Justice Stevens's single standard, while likewise desirable in theory,
also gives rise to difficulties in application.
By insisting that the
government's interest in classifying be legitimate, which is a concern at all
levels of review, implementation of this standard could largely follow
existing law.' 56 However, the additional requirement that government
make decisions impartially and with neutrality presents greater challenges.
The impartiality approach, like Cass Sunstein's proposal that decisions
157
must be made based on public values rather than "naked preferences,"'
does not account for the pluralist nature of the American political process,
which responds to constituent and other politically relevant pressures and
can be characterized as anything but neutral. 158 Further, to the extent that
Justice Stevens's neutrality requirement mirrors in the legislative context
Herbert Wechsler's proposal that courts decide cases according to neutral
principles, it, like Wechsler's, contains few substantive limitations on the
types of principles that may be the basis for line drawing. 159 Thus, it would
629 (Alaska 1993) (quoting State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192-93 (Alaska 1983)).
A
comprehensive critical comparison of state approaches to equality analysis, although beyond the scope
of this Article, could usefully illuminate the utility of these and other analytic frameworks.
155. For this reason, the proposed single standard differs from Justice Marshall's test by requiring
the same intensity of review regardless of context. See infra Part IV.
156. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 211-12. See also supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text
(demonstrating that both low and high levels of review have fundamental concerns with the legitimacy
of government action); infra notes 398-401 and accompanying text (same). For a discussion of Justice
Stevens's methodology, see generally Justice Stevens, supra note 148.
157. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 40, at 1713.
158. See infra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
159. Compare City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (explaining that equal protection review should ensure government's impartiality), and
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1959)
(arguing that judicial review of legislation must be concerned with neutrality), with Michael Wells,
Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 557, 576-79 (1994-95) (critiquing
Wechsler's neutral principles arguments).
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allow arbitrary lines to be drawn, so long as the arbitrariness was applied
neutrally. On the other hand, if non-neutrality and partiality are treated
simply as stand-ins for the legitimacy requirement, Justice Stevens's theory
would do little more than restate, as a single standard, the contours of
current rational basis review.
Justice Rehnquist's suggestion to abandon the middle tier has, relative
to the others, the appeal of simplicity-the bare minimum scrutiny applies
to every classification that is not suspect.' 60 However, it does not allow for
context-sensitive evaluations of race-based distinctions. 16 1 Nor, in Justice
Rehnquist's conception of rational basis, would judicial skepticism toward
62
nonsuspect classifications ever be appropriate.'
Still, notwithstanding the differences and possible deficiencies of the
suggested standards, together they illustrate a strong collective interest in
steering the Court away from its current tack.
B. RELUCTANCE TO RETHINK THE TIERED APPROACH
Despite these justices' advocacy, a single review standard has not
emerged as the consensus view of the Court. Nor have equal protection
scholars or advocates taken up the charge for a unitary review. Instead, the
widely acknowledged problems with rational basis review have led many
scholars to offer undergirding theories for the Court's rational basis cases,
but only a few to argue that the tiered framework might be partly
responsible for those problems.1 63 Likewise, litigators of equal protection
cases before the Court have not generally pressed for anything other than
standard application of the three tiers. 164 Even those whose clients suffer
discrimination based on a trait falling outside the current parameters of
160. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 221-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
163. See infra notes 296-97, 308, 315 and accompanying text. Even scholarship raising questions
about the tiers has largely refrained from developing an alternative approach. See generally, e.g.,
Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation,88 VA. L. REV. 951 (2002) (critiquing the indicia of
suspectness and advocating that the Constitution's text supports heightened review of classifications
based on certain traits); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 350, 371 (2002) (criticizing the tiered framework's results, but arguing that "[t]he problem ... is not
with the [three-tiered] theory").
164. Although the application of strict scrutiny to all race-based classifications has generally
worked against the interests of communities of color seeking to sustain affirmative action programs, a
political assessment may have been made that losing close review of other types of racial classifications
presents an unacceptable risk. However, that risk may be overrated in light of the regular invalidation
of invidious racial classifications under rational basis review prior to McLaughlin. See supra note 67
and accompanying text.
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heightened judicial review have sought to satisfy the test for suspect
classification rather than urging a new construct that might create more
room for the invalidation of discriminatory classifications. 165 This section
will consider the Court's reluctance to revisit the multi-tiered framework,
which has remained largely unchanged for more than a quarter century.
Although any explanation is conjectural, because a majority of the
Court has never addressed the anti-tier arguments, several reasons might
account for the Court's inaction. First, the lingering effects of Lochner's
substantive due process regime and its spillover into equal protection
jurisprudence 166 almost certainly play a role in inhibiting contemplation of
any test that would allow rigorous judicial review to reach a broader range
of government action. 167 The severe criticism aimed at the Court's practice
of replacing the state's "reasonableness" assessment with its own, as in
Lochner's invalidation of New York's restriction on bakery employees'
hours,1 68 helps explain the Court's tentative approach to equal protection
review after that era ended. 169 When the Court reversed course in the mid1930s in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, it handed back power over
determinations of rationality to the legislatures: "Even if the wisdom of [a]
policy be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the
Legislature is entitled to its judgment." 170 By imposing rigorous judicial
165. See, e.g., Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), available at 1995 WL 782809 (advocating strict
scrutiny based on sexual orientation); Brief of the American Association on Mental Deficiency et al., as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985), available at 1985 WL 669784 (arguing for heightened scrutiny of legal distinctions based on
mental retardation).
166. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 52, at 248-52 (analyzing the danger of "reinvent[ing] Lochner
under the Equal Protection Clause"); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 991-93 (1979) (stating that the Warren Court's equal protection
decisions "never quite escaped the charge that [they were] Lochnerism reincarnated"); Sunstein, Naked
Preferences, supra note 40, at 1692, 1697, 1700-03, 1717-19, 1728-32 (comparing modern equal
protection with the Lochner era). See generally Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 55.
167.
For example, in accusing the Court of not exercising sufficient deference with respect to a
legislative classification of nonmarital children, Justice Rehnquist reminded the Court of its historical,
but since condemned, overreaching via the Fourteenth Amendment during the Lochner era. See Weber
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179-85 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
stated that "the Court's opinion ...is an extraordinary departure from what I conceive to be the intent
of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the import of the traditional presumption of
constitutionality accorded to legislative enactments." Id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
168. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905).
169. Cf Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 55, at 875 (suggesting that Lochner-like review
continues to operate today).
170. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937) (upholding a Washington State
minimum wage law). In Nebbia v. New York, the Court similarly articulated its chastened approach to
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review only under limited conditions that are narrowly circumscribed by
the heightened scrutiny criteria, the three-tiered system neatly complements
the deferential review of most governmental discrimination postLochner.171
Second, the suspect classification tier gained its early foothold at a
time when a majority of the Court and significant sectors of society at large
had begun to accept as a matter of course that racial classifications
typically lacked legitimacy.172 As a streamlined process facilitating the
invalidation of race-based distinctions, presumptive strict scrutiny of
suspect classifications could have appeared to be, and perhaps actually was,
a sensible approach. 173 The automatic rigorous review sent a clear message
to errant legislatures that race-based lawmaking would receive skeptical
examination. 174 Similar social recognition of the problems inherent in sexrole stereotyping, while not universal, 175 likewise laid the groundwork for a
judicial review in a statement regarding due process that characterized its newly restrained equal
protection review as well:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned... a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that
policy by legislation adapted to its purpose.... If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied.... [I]f the legislative policy be
to curb unrestrained and harmful competition by measures which are not arbitrary or
discriminatory it does not lie with the courts to determine that the rule is unwise.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
171.
As Gerald Gunther observed about equal protection review at least up to the early 1960s,
"judicial intervention under the banner of equal protection was virtually unknown outside racial
discrimination cases." Gunther, supra note 17, at 8.
172. See Perry, supra note 62, at 1065-67. The passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, for example, can be seen as a societal commitment, albeit a contested one, to the irrelevance of
race in the workplace. See Klarman, supra note 52, at 297.
173. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432, 434 (1984) (striking down race-based
legislation after applying "the most exacting scrutiny"); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392-93
(1969) (invalidating race-based legislation by applying "'the most rigid scrutiny') (quoting Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (same);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (same). Gunther's formulation of strict scrutiny for
suspect classifications as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" well captures the predictable nature of this
review. See Gunther, supra note 17, at 8. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003)
("Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it.").
See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion
that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' .. . When race-based action is necessary to
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow
tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases.") (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
519 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
174. The relatively formulaic method for striking down racially discriminatory classifications also
served institutional interests in judicial economy.
175. Unlike racial discrimination, Title VII's legislative history does not reflect societal
condemnation of sex discrimination comparable to its opposition to race discrimination. See Price
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classifications.

streamlined

process

for

invalidating

sex-based

Still another reason for the Court's reluctance to embrace a single
standard approach might be the difficulty in conceiving a standard that
could operate efficiently, incorporate the values reflected in the multi-tiered
approach, and avoid an equal protection free-for-all in which deference to
legislative decisionmaking and relative predictability of analysis and
outcome would be lost entirely. Even the descriptions offered by
individual justices of their proposed single standards, although useful in
spirit, do not provide much in the way of specific guidance for
implementation. 176 As illustrated above, the conceptual and practical
challenges to a unitary standard, especially one that could maintain
heightened scrutiny's commitment to filtering out prejudice and not result
in undue judicial oversight of government action, are significant. Taking
lessons from the tests of the individual justices, the existing literature, and
the concerns raised above regarding the extant framework, the following
part offers an alternative version of a unitary standard in an effort to
uncomplicate and facilitate enforcement of the equal protection guarantee.
IV. ENVISIONING A SINGLE STANDARD
As the justices' individual standards suggest, any standard of equal
protection review-including the single standard I propose-must occupy
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989) (noting that sex was included as a protected class
in the Title VII bill "in an attempt to defeat the bill"). See also CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT 115-17 (1985). But see
Katherine M. Franke, The CentralMistake of Sex DiscriminationLaw: The Disaggregationof Sex from
Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14-25 (1995) (presenting context for the inclusion of sex in Title VII that
demonstrates the existence of legislative intent to provide meaningful protection against sex
discrimination).
But by 1963, the Equal Pay Act and other legislation prohibiting sex discrimination had been
enacted, reinforcing the legislative and, by inference, popular view that sex was not typically a
legitimate basis for government action. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (invalidating a statute that prohibited vendors from
selling low-alcohol beer to young men but permitted sales to young women); Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 14, 17 (1975) (striking down a statute that provided different ages of majority for girls and
boys); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534-35, 538 (1975) (finding the systematic exclusion of
women from juries unconstitutional); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (voiding a preference
for men over women in appointments as administrators of estates). Similarly, in Frontiero,a plurality
of the Court recognized that through "romantic paternalism" toward women, "our statute books
gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes" that gave rise to
"pervasive" discrimination. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion).
176. See supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
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itself fundamentally with the central concern of the Equal Protection
Clause. Therefore, this part will first isolate and examine that central
concern, which equal protection jurisprudence expresses as a commitment
to prohibiting class legislation. Against that background, I will propose,
apply, and critique a three-part test that incorporates the class legislation
concern together with the subsidiary concerns that are common to high and
low levels of scrutiny within the current framework.
A. CLASS LEGISLATION AS EQUAL PROTECTION'S BASELINE CONCERN

In contrast to the variable way in which the Court has conducted its
equal protection analysis, 177 statements of the clause's baseline concern
have been surprisingly consistent. 178 Regardless of the level of scrutiny
applied, this first principle is invariably identified as preventing
enforcement of class legislation. 179 As the Court recently reaffirmed,
opposition to legislation creating "classes among citizens" for non-neutral
reasons lies at the heart of the equal protection guarantee:
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the
Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."
Unheeded then, those words now are understood to state a commitment
177. See supra Part II.
178. The Court's comments in Plyler v. Doe about the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause are
illustrative:
Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal .... The
experience of our Nation has shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of
some groups. Our response to that experience is reflected in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored
by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of "class or caste" treatment
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) (citation omitted).
179. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48
(1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The term "class legislation" first became widely used in the antebellum
era, not to refer generally to classifying laws as in the Lochner era, but to condemn what were known as
"partial or special laws" that "singled out certain persons or classes of persons for special benefits or
burdens." See Saunders, supra note 48, at 252-53. Not until later did class legislation take on the
meaning commonly associated with the Court's Lochner era interventions, when it provided a
foundation for invalidating laws, including nonclassifying laws, that were thought to serve the interests
of a particular class rather than the general public. See id. at 252, 301; Benedict, supra note 118, at
305-14 (discussing workplace regulations and protective tariffs, inter alia, as class legislation). The
term is used here in the mid-19th-century sense described above, which most accurately reflects the
original concern with "partial or special laws."
See Saunders, supra note 48, at 292-93.
Notwithstanding its complex history, class legislation remains the term of choice here because it, and
not reference to partial or special laws, is the Court's most commonly invoked shorthand to explain the
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. Further, the Court's recent invocation of the class legislation
concept in Romer affirms its continuing importance to the Court. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
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to the law's neutrality where the rights of persons180are at stake. The
Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle ....

This commitment to screening out and invalidating class legislation runs
through much of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
Indeed, Justice John Marshall Harlan's concern with class legislation
was well founded in the history of the Equal Protection Clause's
enactment. 181 As one of the clause's leading advocates proclaimed in a
Senate debate, the equality guarantee "abolishes all class legislation in the
States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons
to a code not applicable to another." 182 The late 19th-century Court on
183
which Justice Harlan sat was steeped in the contemporary debates.
Consequently, as the justices decided early equal protection cases, they
were familiar with the process of drawing distinctions "between class
legislation and legislation enacted for the purpose of benefitting the polity
as a whole."

'1 84

The Court was highly focused on the threat that class legislation posed
to liberty and equality.' 85 Exploring the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equality guarantee shortly after its passage, Justice Harlan
first condemned class legislation while dissenting from the Court's
180. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)) (citation omitted).
181.
See generally Saunders, supra note 48, at 268-92 (reviewing the legislative history of the
Equal Protection Clause).
182. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (Sen. Howard). Senator Jacob M. Howard
of Michigan, who served on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and as the Fourteenth
Amendment's floor manager in the Senate, was instrumental in identifying and codifying the principle
of equality from popular debates that focused on higher law and citizens' rights. See NELSON, supra
note 62, at 48, 73, 117. In presenting the Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate, Howard advocated that
it '"establishes equality before the law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of
the race the same rights and the same protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the
most wealthy, or the most haughty."' Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766).
183. See Saunders, supra note 48, at 293-301.
184. NELSON, supra note 62, at 176-77. Senator Howard's statement remains vital today; the
Court regularly invokes it as confirmation of the Equal Protection Clause's commitment to preventing
arbitrary or hostile class legislation. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214-15 (1982) (quoting
Senator Howard's statement regarding class legislation); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 424 n.23 (1981)
(same); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,600-02 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (same).
185. Disapproval of class legislation also has long been a part of American political sentiment.
See Benedict, supra note 118, at 314 ("[T]he widespread acceptance [in the late 19th century] of
laissez-faire notions of liberty must be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that its major thrust,
hostility to 'special' and 'class' legislation, was already ingrained in American law and political
theory."). The related concern of unequal enforcement-another form of class legislation-was
similarly deeply rooted and also important to some of the drafters of the Reconstruction Amendments.
Id. at 330-31.
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invalidation of an 1875 antidiscrimination prohibition. 186 Just a few years
later in Barbier v. Connolly, the Court initiated a more extensive discussion
of class legislation as it upheld, under the police power doctrine, a San
Francisco ordinance limiting washing and ironing hours for public
laundries.187 Explaining that legislation may often "press with more or less
weight upon one than upon another,"' 88 the Court emphasized that these
sorts of laws "are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary
restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual
inconvenience as possible, the general good."'189 In contrast, the Court
wrote, "[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others,
is prohibited." 190
For the next quarter century and beyond, the Court repeatedly invoked
Barbier's prohibition of class legislation, enshrining it as the central tenet
of equal protection. 19 1 Allegations that particular laws constituted
192
impermissible class legislation surfaced regularly in plaintiffs' lawsuits,
186. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
187. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1884).
188. Id. at 31.
189. Id. at 31-32.
190. Id. at 32.
191.
See, e.g., Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 72 (1887) (upholding a Missouri peremptory
challenge rule that allowed a different number of challenges in capital cases depending on the size of
the city where the indictment took place); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)
(invalidating a San Francisco laundry ordinance because of discriminatory enforcement). As noted
above, supra note 179, the term "class legislation" was also used increasingly to describe burdens
imposed by economic regulation. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332-34 (1921) (striking
down a statute distinguishing between former employees and other tortfeasors for the purposes of
remedies); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 238-39, 243-44, 246 (1917) (upholding
a Workmen's Compensation Act provision requiring periodic contributions from employers in
extrahazardous industries); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fd R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 104, 106
(1899) (upholding a Kansas statute requiring that a reasonable attorney's fee be made part of the
judgment against a railroad company for damages caused by its trains); Gulf, Colo. & Santa F Ry. Co.
v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165-66 (1897) (sustaining a railroad's challenge to a law mandating attorney's
fee payments by railroads but not other defendants under specified circumstances); Marchant v. Penn.
R.R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 390 (1894) (rejecting an appeal by property owners seeking damages from a
nearby railroad); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 30, 35-36 (1889)
(upholding an Iowa statute that imposed liability on a railroad company whose failure to fence its tracks
resulted in livestock deaths). Again, however, these references to class legislation extend beyond the
use intended here.
192. See, e.g., U.S. Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232, 235 (1934); Herbring v. Lee, 280
U.S. 111, 115-17 (1929); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 366, 369-70 (1927); S. Ry. Co. v. Clift,
260 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1922); Payne v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 112, 113 (1918); Farmers Irrigation Dist. v.
Nebraska, 244 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1917); Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 267 (1912); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1908); Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U.S. 226, 233 (1906);
Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 489 (1902); Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79,
112 (1901); Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 21 (1901); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270,
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and the Court expressed its intent to ensure that no class legislation would
93
survive its review. 1
The Court's contemporary cases continue this focus on class
legislation. For example, in rejecting an Alaska provision awarding
residents dividends from a pipeline project based on duration of residence,
then-Chief Justice Burger reiterated that legislation "permit[ting] the states
to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes.... would
be clearly impermissible."' 9 4 Likewise, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court found
Texas's ban on undocumented children attending public schools to be
objectionable in part because it would create a permanent "subclass of
illiterates."' 195 Justice Brennan also explained that "[1]egislation imposing
special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances
beyond their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste' treatment that the
196
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish."
But how does one discern what is class legislation and what is merely
permissible and appropriate classifying by government? The Court has
defined class legislation as "a classification of persons undertaken for its
own sake,"' 197 "a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context
' 198
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests,"
and a subjection of "one caste of persons to a code not applicable to
another."' 199 Although useful as further elaborations of the class legislation
concept, these descriptions do not chart an analytic path for lower courts.
Further complicating the effort to develop a test for class legislation are the
Court's repeated reminders that "[a] law which affects the activities of
some groups differently from the way in which it affects the activities of
274 (1900); Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1900); Gulf Colo. & Santa Fe Ry., 165 U.S. at
152-53.
193. See, e.g., Interstate Consol. St. Ry. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 86 (1907) (describing
a Massachusetts statute as falling between the "Scylla of unjustifiable class legislation" and "the
Charybdis of impairing the obligation of a contract").
194. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982) (footnote omitted). See also supra notes 179-80
and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Court began the analysis in Romer by invoking
Justice Harlan's condemnation of class legislation.
195. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). See also id. at 213 ("The Equal Protection Clause
was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based
legislation.").
196. Id. at 217 n.14.
197. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
198. Id.
199. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215 (quoting Sen. Howard, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2766
(1866)).
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200
other groups is not necessarily banned by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Also adding to the challenge is the Court's view, as expressed in
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., that "it is for the legislature,
not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages" of
20 1
differentiating between classes.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPOSED SINGLE STANDARD

Although plain reference to class legislation provides too little
guidance to serve as a useful new equal protection test, the Court's strong
rational basis cases articulate helpful, specific concerns. Their inquiries
mesh neatly with some of those contained in the heightened scrutiny cases,
which likewise concern themselves with screening out laws crossing the
class legislation threshold. In particular, as shown below, the set of cases
addressing classifications en route to heightened scrutiny-for example,
sex discrimination cases prior to Frontiero,20 2 race discrimination cases
prior to Korematsu v. United States,203 and cases involving discrimination
against nonmarital children prior to Clark v. Jeter2 04 -- offers concrete
guidance for discerning class legislation, perhaps because they
simultaneously embody both the deferential commitment of rational basis
20 5
review and the protective inclination of heightened scrutiny.
The remainder of this section will
inquiry that emerge from these cases.
geared toward capturing impermissible
place the bulk of legitimate, permissible

develop the three central lines of
Each of the proposed inquiries is
class legislation while leaving in
government classifications. These

200. Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947) (citation omitted). The
Court continued,
Otherwise, effective regulation in the public interest could not be provided, however essential
that regulation might be. For it is axiomatic that the consequence of regulating by setting
apart a classified group is that those in it will be subject to some restrictions or receive certain
advantages that do not apply to other groups or to all the public.
Id. (citation omitted).
201.
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
202. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
203. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
204. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
205. As discussed, supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text, for nearly twenty years after
Korematsu first referenced the concept of suspect classification, the Court arguably did not deploy
vigorous heightened scrutiny in race discrimination cases; instead, it performed ordinary deferential
rational basis review. See also Klarman, supra note 52, at 232-36, 245-46, 255. On the other hand, as
discussed above, supra note 84, others maintain that heightened scrutiny was effectively imposed, in
deed if not in name, by the Court in reviewing classifications based on traits that had not yet been
declared suspect or quasi-suspect. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 17, at 33-36 (discussing, inter alia,
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
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interrelated and complementary questions, taken together, comprise a
unitary standard that may surpass the three-tiered approach in uncovering
invidious or otherwise improper line drawing between classes. In addition,
as the proposed standard draws from the batch of strong rational basis cases
in which meaningful review was imposed, it also may serve as a theoretical
tool for understanding the Court's inconsistent balancing between
20 6
deference and review.
Drawing from the extant jurisprudence, the discussion below will
elaborate the following three inquiries to be made of any classification
challenged on equal protection grounds, with the aim of preventing
enforcement of impermissible class legislation as the backdrop:
(1) whether a plausible, nonarbitrary explanation exists for why the
burdened group has been selected to bear the challenged burden in
the context at issue;
(2) whether the justification offered for the line drawing has a specific
relationship to the classification's context; and
(3) whether the classification reflects disapproval, dislike, or
stereotyping of the class of persons burdened by the legislation.
Put another way, the first inquiry considers the reason for the
classification's use in the regulatory context, the second considers whether
that reasoning rests on broad generalizations about the trait at issue that
lack a specific connection to the regulatory context, and the third considers
whether the classification gives effect to an illegitimate government
purpose.207 For brevity's sake, they will be referred to respectively as the
"intracontextual inquiry," the "extracontextual inquiry," and the "bias
inquiry. '20 8 As shown below, if any one of these is not met, a classification
cannot be sustained.20 9
206. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 n.10 (1980) (recognizing a lack of
consistency in the Court's rational basis jurisprudence).
207. Although other shared interests no doubt exist between the rational basis and heightened
scrutiny cases, these three inquiries surface as the dominant analytic concerns, as shown below.
208. The latter two inquiries are arguably subsets of the first, because the demand for a plausible,
nonarbitrary explanation likely will screen out classifications based on unduly broad or impermissible
justifications. Indeed, the entire three-part inquiry could be collapsed into one, which would demand
that a plausible, legitimate, and context-specific justification exist for all government distinctions
between classes. However, separation into three inquiries not only fairly tracks the case law, as shown
in Part IV.C-E, but also, if followed faithfully, constrains courts to reveal their reasoning on each point
and discourages decisions that address challenges in simple, broad, and conclusory strokes.
209. The proposed standard, with its insistence on equal application to all classifications, runs
contrary to the movement in antidiscrimination law to specify traits entitled to protection against
discrimination. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628 (1996) ("These [antidiscrimination] statutes and
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C. INTRACONTEXTUAL INQUIRY

The intracontextual inquiry demands that a plausible explanation exist
for why a group has been singled out for burdensome treatment in a
particular context. It asks, in other words, whether anything about the
burdened group's relationship to the regulatory context would justify it
being singled out from among others for the type of burden being imposed.
This inquiry reflects the central concern of the strong rational basis cases
and the heightened scrutiny cases with the classified trait's effect on an
individual's ability to participate on the same basis as others in the
regulated arena. It also evinces concern for the reasonableness of the
2 10
burden that is imposed on particular trait bearers.
Applied properly, this inquiry would also constrain courts from
accepting descriptions of what legislation accomplishes in the place of
plausible explanations. For example, the argument that restricting the
scope of civil rights enactments will save money may accurately describe
the effect of a ban on sexual orientation-based antidiscrimination
protections, but it does not explain why those in need of sexual orientationbased protections were chosen from among others to shoulder the burden of
2 11
conserving government funds.
ordinances... enumerat[e] the groups or persons within their ambit of protection. Enumeration is the
essential device used to make the duty not to discriminate concrete and to provide guidance for those
who must comply."). In contrast, the tiered framework, with its specification of particular suspect
classifications, appears to be more consistent with prevailing legislative protections, albeit in a less
generous way than most.
However, notwithstanding the important parallels between legislative drafting and legal analysis
in this area, see William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1237-42
(2001), different considerations cause the two approaches to diverge. The enumeration of particular
traits for protection serves symbolic, educational, and deterrent functions that are of heightened
importance in the legislative arena, which must guide not only those paying close attention to legal
categories, but also the public at large. In contrast, the educational function of almost every
constitutional test is much narrower, except in the rare instance where a test has a direct, widespread
bearing on people's lives. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 164-65 (1973) (providing
constitutional protection for women to terminate a pregnancy). See also Sullivan, supra note 91, at
747-50 (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of generality and specificity in antidiscrimination
protection).
Although the proposed standard lacks the focused message of trait-specific legislation (or even
the trait-specific tiers), it is not without symbolic power. Instead, it conveys the message that the Court
will give meaningful consideration to all allegations of differential treatment, including those based on
characteristics falling outside the preferred set of suspect classifications.
210. See infra notes 212-28 and accompanying text.
211. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (finding the goal of "conserving resources to fight discrimination
against other groups" inadequate to justify a Colorado state constitutional amendment precluding
antidiscrimination protections for lesbians and gay men in light of "the breadth of the amendment").
Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (rejecting a cost-savings justification for a law favoring
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This concern with the existence of a meaningful explanation for the
classification of a particular group also corresponds directly to the Court's
overarching equal protection value. Where no reasonable explanation
exists for the government's singling out of a trait in a given context, what
remains "is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state
interests" 212-in other words, class legislation.
Several of the strong rational basis cases center their analyses on this
intracontextual inquiry. For example, in reviewing Texas's ban on public
school education for undocumented immigrants, the Court emphasized the
need for a meaningful connection between the classified population and the
context.21 3
Striking down the ban, the Court stated that "even if
improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring
some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must
support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for
exclusion." 2 14 In assessing West Virginia's taxation scheme in Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission, the Court similarly explained
that "[a] State may divide different kinds of property into classes and
assign to each class a different tax burden so long as those divisions and
215
burdens are reasonable" in context.
men as estate administrators as "the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). But see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509-10,
516 (1976) (upholding a distinction between marital and nonmarital children regarding an entitlement to
child survivor benefits based, in part, on the savings achieved by avoiding case-by-case
determinations); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 300 (6th
Cir. 1997) (upholding a city charter amendment banning "protected status" for gay people "[b]ecause
the valid interests of the Cincinnati electorate in conserving public and private financial resources is
[sic], standing alone, of sufficient weight to justify [the measure] under a rational basis analysis").
With respect to the argument that Alabama's discrimination against out-of-state entities was
justified by the state's desire to favor domestic enterprises, the Court observed that favoritism describes
but does not explain, as required, the singling out of one group for a particular burden. Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 878,882 & n.10 (1985).
212. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
213. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982).
214. Id. at 229. Applying its inquiry to the case at bar, the Court concluded that "[in terms of
educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are 'basically indistinguishable' from
legally resident alien children." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). See also
Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33 (explaining that classifications are sustained where laws are "grounded in a
sufficient factual context for us to ascertain [the existence of] some relation between the classification
and the purpose it served").
215. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989) (citation
omitted). Likewise, in Quinn v. Millsap, the Court firmly rejected Missouri's real property requirement
for service on a government board, finding that land ownership was unrelated to an individual's ability
to participate in decisionmaking affecting the local community. Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 108-09
(1989). Similarly, in Williams v. Vermont, the Court invalidated Vermont's use of a tax preference for
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Likewise, in Cleburne, after noting that the city's concerns with size
and occupancy, which led to the denial of a special use permit for a group
home for people with mental retardation, would not have been similarly
imposed on other groups of people living together, the Court framed a
context-focused inquiry:
The question is whether it is rational to treat the mentally retarded
differently. It is true that they suffer disability not shared by others; but
why this difference warrants a density regulation that others need not
observe is not at all apparent. At least this record does not clarify how,
in this connection, the characteristics of the intended occupants of the
Featherston home rationally justify denying to those occupants what
would be2 16
permitted to groups occupying the same site for different
purposes.

And in Romer v. Evans, the Court offered a strong version of the
demand for a genuine, reasonable connection between the classification
and the government's goals. 2 17 The Court first set the amendment's
classification in context, noting that "[tlhe amendment withdraws from
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries
caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and
policies. 2 18 The Court then characterized Colorado's antigay Amendment
2 as drawing a status-based distinction utterly unrelated to the legislative
context regulated by the measure. 219 Ultimately, this discontinuity led the
Court to conclude that "Amendment 2 is [not] directed to any identifiable
legitimate purpose or discrete objective., 220 As the Court wrote, "it is a
in-state residents, holding that the plaintiffs "ha[d] not been 'accorded equal treatment, and the
inequality is not because of the slightest difference in [Vermont's] relation to the decisive transaction."'
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 24 (1985) (second alteration in original) (quoting Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 572 (1949)).
216.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985). The Court in
O'Brien v. Skinner followed an approach similar to that in Cleburne, first reviewing all the groups of
New York citizens entitled to absentee registration and voting privileges-including those who were ill
or physically disabled, those required to be out of their residential counties on election day for business
reasons, and those detained in a jail in their home county-and then finding "wholly arbitrary" the
state's singular denial of registration and voting privileges to those detained in county jails outside their
home county. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974).
217.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
218.
Id. at627.
219.
See id. at 632 (describing the amendment's "sheer breadth [as] discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it").
220.
Id. at 635.
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classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal
221
Protection Clause does not permit."
Within heightened scrutiny, the intracontextual inquiry emerges
through one of the indicia used to identify suspect classifications: whether a
trait that is the basis for a classification bears on a person's "ability to
perform or contribute to" society. 222 That is, skeptical scrutiny will not
follow if the trait plausibly can be the basis for differential treatment in a
variety of contexts; but if the trait is so irrelevant to abilities that its use as
the basis for differential treatment is likely to be arbitrary, regardless of the
context, heightened scrutiny may be accorded.22 3 In a challenge to sex
discrimination in the distribution of military benefits to service members'
spouses, for example, the Court commented that "what differentiates sex
from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability ...is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society." 2 24 Similarly, the Court rejected a classification
that burdened nonmarital children, partly because "illegitimacy, however
defined, is like race or national origin, a characteristic... [that] bears no
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to
society."225 As a case decided well before classifications of nonmarital
children were formally designated quasi-suspect, 226 the focus in Mathews v.
221. Id. This conclusion illustrates the close connection between the intracontextual inquiry and
the bias inquiry. Where no plausible link exists between the classified trait, the classification, and the
context, the likely explanation for the line drawing at issue is impermissible bias regarding that trait.
See, e.g., Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 450 (finding that, because no plausible explanation existed
for denying a group home permit for the mentally retarded, the only possible explanation for the denial
would have been the impermissible one of fear of, or discomfort with, people with mental retardation).
222. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). See also
supra note 82 and accompanying text.
223. See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 441 (quoting Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686 (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion)).
224. Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). The Court has
since backed away from this unequivocal endorsement of the irrelevance of sex in most settings. See,
e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) ("The difference between men and women in relation to
the birth process is a real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to address
the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender."). See also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356
n.10 (1974) ("Gender has never been rejected as an impermissible classification inall instances.").
However, the Court also seems to believe that, in most circumstances, nothing about the status of being
male or female would justify different treatment because of sex. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) ("Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action.").
225. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976). See also Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854
n.5 (1986) (reiterating that nonmarital parentage has no connection to individual ability).
226. In Mathews, the Court specifically rejected the application of heightened scrutiny, holding
that "the Act's discrimination between individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not 'command
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Lucas on the irrelevance of illegitimacy to most regulatory contexts
reinforces the importance of the intracontextual inquiry across levels of
7
review.

22

Likewise, at the most rigorous level of review of racial classifications,
the Court's focus has been on the implausibility of any nonarbitrary
connection existing between race and most contexts. As the Court has
observed, racial classifications are "'in most circumstances irrelevant' to
228
any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose.,
Yet notably, the Court has also been willing to temper heightened
scrutiny's acontextual insistence on rigorous review. In particular, in cases
evaluating classifications based on alienage, which ordinarily receive strict
scrutiny, the Court has determined "'that strict scrutiny is out of place when
the restriction primarily serves a political function.' '"229 In these cases,
rather than taking a categorical approach to alienage-based distinctions, the
Court has engaged directly with the question of the relationship between
citizenship status and the regulatory context. In Foley v. Connelie, for
example, the Court held that rational basis review should apply to a
citizenship requirement for police officers because of the nature of the
23° which authorizes officers "to
position, 230
exercise an almost infinite variety
of discretionary [governmental] powers." 23 1 In Bernal v. Fainter, on the
other hand, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a citizenship requirement for
notaries public, 232 who are not "invested either with policymaking
responsibility or broad discretion in the execution of public policy that
requires the routine exercise of authority over individuals." 233 This
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,' which our most exacting scrutiny
would entail." Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506 (footnote and citations omitted). However, just over a decade
later, the Court explicitly subjected classifications based on illegitimacy to heightened scrutiny and
acknowledged that prior cases decided on rational basis grounds actually had applied heightened review
as well. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (emphasizing that it "'is illogical' to classify
based on illegitimacy) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
227. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505.
228. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). Cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (emphasizing
that a race-based classification may be necessary to further a compelling governmental interest).
229. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) (citing Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)).
230. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978).
231. Id. at 297.
232. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 228 (1984).
233. Id. at 226-27. Although useful for illustrating the Court's ability to shift away from
categorical review of a traditionally suspect classification, the Court's adjudication of the political
function cases has been subject to criticism. See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal
Protection, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1, 65 (2000) ("Lest you think this organizing concept sorts the cases in a
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context-dependent adjustment of the standard reinforces the value and
viability of context-sensitive review as provided by the single standard
proposed here.
Certainly, the way in which the Court typically reviews justifications
for classifications subject to heightened scrutiny is not identical to its
approach under rational basis review. 23 4 For example, among the subrules
of the tiered scrutiny framework is the mandate that a classification's
defender need not offer justifications for a classifying measure under
rational basis review, unlike under heightened scrutiny, where the
government must specify and defend, with evidence, its justifications for
differential treatment. 2 5 In addition, heightened scrutiny demands that a
rational way, note also that the Court has held that a probation officer and a public school teacher fulfill
important political functions fairly entrusted only to citizens, but a lawyer does not.") (footnotes
omitted); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the
Structure of Equal ProtectionDoctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1438 (1995) (reviewing criticisms of
the political function exception).
234. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (reviewing the
distinctions between the tiers of review and noting that "[tlhe most important difference between
heightened scrutiny and rational basis review is ...the required fit between the means employed and
the ends served").
235. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (stating that the "justification
must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation"), with Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993) ("A statute is presumed constitutional and '[t]he burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,'
whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.") (citations omitted) (quoting Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)) (alteration in original).
Whether courts should engage in imagining justifications not proffered by a classification's
defender has been the subject of some debate on the Court and among scholars. See, e.g., Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244-45 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court should receive with some
skepticism post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose ....[Otherwise] equal protection review [is
no] more than 'a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do."')
(quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)); U.S. R.R. Ret.
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court has frequently
recognized that the actual purposes of Congress, rather than the post hoc justifications offered by
Government attorneys, must be the primary basis for analysis under the rational-basis test."); Gunther,
supra note 17, at 20-21, 44-48 (proffering a model for equal protection review that would foreclose
judicial hypothesizing of justifications for classifications, and addressing potential difficulties with that
prohibition). But cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (finding that legislation is
constitutional "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it"); ELY, supra note 13, at
129 ("I'm skeptical that a method of forcing articulation of purposes can be developed that will be both
workable and helpful."); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222, 233-35
(1976) (arguing that post hoc government justification should be permitted given the nature of the
lawmaking process).
However, the freedom to hypothesize may be more significant in theory than in fact. Among the
full set of cases analyzed in this Article in which the Court invalidated a classification under rational
basis review, the Court never once invented its own justification, but looked only to those justifications
proffered by the classification's defenders. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 635 (1996);
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justification be of greater significance and more closely related to the
236
government's classification than is required by rational basis review.
These distinctions are not insignificant. 237 However, they also are not fatal
to this part's argument that the core concerns of rational basis and
heightened review overlap in certain important respects, including their
potential
shared commitment to assessing the relationship between
238
justifications for a classification and the classification itself.
One additional potential difficulty with this inquiry and with the
extracontextual inquiry that follows is that "context" is not self-defining;
courts have full discretion to determine the contours of the context in which
the classification should be assessed. 239 For example, if the argument is
that the government's preference for minority-owned subcontractors aims
to redress past discrimination in the construction industry, the plaintiffs in
Adarand could argue that it is the context of highway guardrail
manufacture that is relevant, and not the context of the construction
industry as a whole against which the remedial justification must be
measured. Issue would thus be joined on this question of the context's
scope, just as it would be on the question regarding the justification's
plausibility. These struggles over the scope of review and the plausibility
of a given justification, however, are no different from the struggles
prompted by analysis under the three tiers, where, in each instance, the
Court must determine the contextual parameters before assessing how the
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448-50 (1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-38 (1973).
236. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 76-78. See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995) (noting that strict scrutiny requires a classification to be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643-44 (1993) ("A racial classification,
regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an
extraordinary justification.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Pers. Adm'r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)). Mere "plausibility" and "legitimacy" are essential, as
they are under rational basis review, but they are not sufficient to satisfy the standard.
237. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 77-78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also supra note 235 and
accompanying text.
238. Further, in adopting the rational basis presumption of constitutionality, which is applied to
almost all equal protection classifications, the proposed standard keeps with this Article's drawing
from, rather than transforming of, extant doctrine to demonstrate the immediate need to change the
In addition, the presumption's relative noninvasiveness minimizes the
tiered framework.
countermajoritarian difficulty and helps address the contention made in Part II.C: that heightened
scrutiny's inflexibility has resulted in some of the problems now associated with the tiers. Moreover, as
discussed below, infra text accompanying note 282, the common considerations of all levels of review
would allow evidence to be introduced in response to the bias inquiry, so the value of an evidentiary
analysis that comes with heightened scrutiny is not entirely lost in the proposed standard.
239. See generally Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597
(1990) (analyzing the meaning of context in legal and theoretical debates).
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proffered justifications relate to those parameters. 240 Thus, while the
proposed test does not resolve these judgment calls, it also does not
exacerbate the need for the courts to exercise discretion. Further, by
separating the intracontextual and extracontextual inquiries, the proposed
standard actually may supply some guidance to constrain courts, which the
current standard does not offer.2 4'
D. EXTRACONTEXTUAL INQUIRY

Although the intracontextual inquiry likely will screen out the bulk of
impermissible classifications, an inquiry into a justification's breadth also
emerges as important to high and low levels of scrutiny. Specifically, this
proposed inquiry would seek to determine whether the government interest
in maintaining the classification 242 is specific to the relationship between
the trait and the regulatory context at issue. If the justification for official
distinctions based on a trait is so general that it would support
discrimination based on that trait in virtually any context, it risks being
used to support sweeping, indiscriminate trait-based classifications that
deny status and benefits to trait bearers across the board. 243
The Court developed this inquiry in some depth in Zobel v. Williams
as it reviewed Alaska's system for distributing dividends from the oil
pipeline that particularly benefited long-term state residents.244 Alaska
sought to justify its dividing line between long- and short-term residents "to
reward citizens for past contributions," 245 a perfectly benign-sounding
240. Compare Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62, 73 (affirming the significance of physical differences
between men and women in the context of a sex-based immigration law addressing the naturalization of
a child born abroad), with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533-34 (1996) (finding that
"[ilnherent differences between men and women" did not provide an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for discrimination based on sex in the school's admissions policy). Compare Heller, 509
U.S. at 314-15 (upholding a rule requiring a lower standard of proof for the involuntary civil
commitment of individuals with mental retardation than for individuals with mental illness), with
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 450 (rejecting a decision to impose different zoning rules on people
with mental retardation than on others).
241. See infra note 323 and accompanying text (explaining that the inquiries' insistence on
meaningful explanations for government action exposes courts' analyses to scrutiny in a way that the
extant standard's emphasis on deference does not).
242. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing judicial hypothesizing of
justifications for classifications).
243. See Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in ConstitutionalLaw, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 33 (1980)
(arguing that "abstract goals defeat evaluative rationality"); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 20, at
351-53 (analyzing overbroad classifications that burden individuals not associated with the "mischief'
targeted by the law).
244. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 58-64 (1982).
245. ld. at 63.
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government interest. Rather than lauding Alaska's fair spirit, however, the
Court examined whether the proffered justification was sufficiently and
specifically connected to the context of the government line drawing at
issue. If not, the Court explained, the reward-oriented justification could
be used impermissibly to support different treatment of long- and shortterm residents in other areas as well.
If the states can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on length of
residence, what would preclude varying university tuition on a sliding
scale based on years of residence--or even limiting access to finite
public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for civil service jobs, or for
government contracts by length of domicile? Could states impose
different taxes based on length of residence? Alaska's reasoning could
open the door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and
services according to length of residency. It would permit the states to
divide citizens into expanding numbers
of permanent classes. Such a
246
result would be clearly impermissible.
Because the state's justification provided a near-universal reason to treat
long- and short-term residents differently instead of offering a specific
connection to the dividend distribution plan, it was held invalid.247
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the Court similarly
examined Alabama's contention that its different tax treatment of in-state
and out-of-state insurers was justified by its interest in the "promotion of
domestic industry." 248 Like Zobel, this justification appeared at one level
to be perfectly reasonable and, indeed, responsible on the part of the state's
government. In applying rational basis review, however, the Court found
that the goal of promoting domestic industry would support discrimination
24 9
in instances far beyond the specific regulatory context at issue.
Affirming the use of a generalized domestic preference, the Court wrote,
would give way to class legislation and "eviscerate the Equal Protection
Clause in this context.- 250 The Court added that "[a] State's natural
inclination frequently would be to prefer domestic business over foreign. If
we accept the State's view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid
246. Id. at 64 (footnotes omitted).
247. Id. at 64-65. Likewise, in Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, the Court rejected New
Mexico's statute favoring a set of long-term resident Vietnam veterans who had settled in the state prior
to a certain date, holding that the statute effectively "create[d] two tiers of resident Vietnam veterans"
and that those who arrived after the May 1976 cut-off were deemed "in a sense 'second-class citizens."'
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985).
248. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985).
249. Id.
250. Id.
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if the State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic
business. '"251 Thus, even in its most lenient category of review, the Court
has screened for and rejected noncontext-specific explanations for different
treatment that could justify sweeping trait-based distinctions.
The rational basis inquiry into the potential breadth of a justification is
reminiscent of the heightened scrutiny inquiry into how closely a
classification is tailored to the achievement of proffered government
interests.25 2 In reviewing suspect and quasi-suspect classifications, the
Court has insisted that a classification must be, respectively, "narrowly
tailored to further [a compelling government] interest," 253 or "substantially
related to the achievement of [important government] objectives." 254 This
insistence that the justification and classification be closely related is
likewise addressed through the proposed standard's inquiry into the
existence of a context-specific connection between the classified trait and
the regulatory context. A generalized justification that would also support
extracontextual distinctions would necessarily be inadequate, as it could
not show sufficiently why the trait had to be singled out in the context at
issue.
Still, as discussed above, qualitative differences exist between the
heightened scrutiny and rational review standards. 255 However, within the
differences is the shared concern that a justification for a trait-based
distinction not be so general as to support wide-scale, acontextual
burdening of a classified trait. This overlapping commitment reinforces the
extracontextual inquiry's use in the proposed single standard, which aims
to capture the shared concerns of each review level. Moreover, under
rational basis review, the Court applies the extracontextual inquiry with
251. Id. (footnote omitted).
252. Given that the strong rational basis cases insist on context-limited justifications, it may be
that Justice O'Connor's recent observation that "[t]he most important difference between heightened
scrutiny and rational basis review.., is the required fit between the means employed and the ends
served" is somewhat overstated. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
253. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). See also Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (explaining that racial classifications "must be 'necessary... to the
accomplishment' of' the government's compelling interest) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 (1964)) (alteration in original); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 306, 374-76 (1971)
(articulating the same standard of review for classifications based on national origin).
254. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))). See also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) (requiring
that classifications of nonmarital children bear "'an evident and substantial relation to the particular...
interests [the] statute is designed to serve') (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Clark, 445
U.S. 23, 27 (1980)).
255. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
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sufficient force, such as in Zobel, to suggest that the tailoring distinction,
although important, may not be as dispositive as has been suggested.25 6
But, you might say, we want to treat certain groups in a distinct
manner across several legislative contexts out of special solicitude for
them. Consider, for example, the singling out of the elderly in measures
regarding healthcare, antidiscrimination policy, and transportation. The
extracontextual inquiry would not, as a general rule, forbid this sort of
favorable treatment in different arenas. Instead, it would ask, with respect
to the classification in each arena, whether some connection exists between
the group classified, the type of treatment imposed, and the context for the
group's different treatment. This is no different from what equal protection
review, at all levels of review, already demands. An argument can be made
that the elderly have unique needs in each of the areas specified, to which
legislation may respond.
The extracontextual problem would arise with a measure unrelated to
the group's particular needs in that context. So, for example, a measure
that restricted voting rights of the elderly would lack the sort of contextspecific justification that a measure providing transportation assistance to
the polls might have. Or, to take the case of classifications imposing
burdens, the extracontextual inquiry would allow government to classify
based on a disability in a way that would limit the rights of individuals with
that disability in a variety of arenas, so long as the disability bore a specific
relationship to the context being regulated.
In sum, at all levels of review, there is a consistent, significant concern
with screening out justifications for classifications that are so general and
noncontext-specific that they could be invoked to justify burdening a trait
in all settings, effectively allowing for the creation of superior and inferior
classes. Thus, this concern belongs within any single standard.
E. BIAS INQUIRY
In addition to the means-focused intracontextual and extracontextual
inquiries, 257 a third inquiry that delves into the nature of the government
interests is deliberately ends-focused in its demand that government not
give legal effect to bias based on outmoded stereotypes about a particular
256. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-64 (1982) (emphasizing the lack of a sufficiently
tailored connection between Alaska's stated interest and its pipeline dividend classification).
257. The two are means-focused through their emphasis on the quality of the connection between
legislative means and government ends.
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class. 25 8 As the Court recently reiterated in the context of rational basis
review, "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws'
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ...desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest. '259 Whether characterized as "animosity," 260 "mere
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable [in the relevant context], 26 1 or "irrational prejudice, 26 2 the
Court has firmly singled out a set of government interests that are
illegitimate and, thus, impermissible, even under the most lenient review.
Not surprisingly, this condemnation under the rational basis standard
of government ends that give effect to bias and stereotyping reappears in
the heightened scrutiny context. As the Court put it in overturning a state
court determination altering child custody based on the race of the mother's
new spouse, 263 "[c]lassifying persons according to their race is more likely
to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns." 264 And, in
addressing a sex-based classification, the Court reviewed and condemned
the "gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes" embodied in the
265
statute's differential treatment of women and men.
As with the intracontextual and extracontextual inquiries, the bias
inquiry does not mechanically direct or otherwise eliminate the exercise of
judgment regarding which aims reflect bias or illegitimate stereotyping and
which do not. Indeed, the three strong rational basis cases that rest in part
on the condemnation of bias offer only a minimalist roadmap for discerning
improper purposes.266 In Romer, for example, the Court discerned the
258. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (stating that imposing a
"disadvantage... bom of animosity toward the class of persons affected" offends the concept of equal
protection of the law); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994) ("We shall not accept as a defense
to gender-based [differential treatment] the very stereotype the law condemns.") (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)); Palmore, 466 U.S. at
433 ("The Constitution cannot control [private] prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.").
259. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))
(emphasis added) (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. Id.
261. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
262. Id. at 450.
263. Palmore,466 U.S. at 434.
264. Id. at 432.
265. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
266. See Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 121, at 59-64 (discussing the Court's
analysis of animus in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer). Once an improper purpose is discerned,
however, the Court will not engage in a process of conceiving justifications for a measure beyond those
proffered by the government. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-36 (1996) (considering only the
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presence of impermissible animus not from the social history surrounding
the passage of Colorado's antigay amendment, 267 but from the utter lack of
connection between the sweeping restriction on antidiscrimination
measures protecting gay people and the justifications proffered for it.268 In
Cleburne, explicit evidence demonstrated consideration of improper
purposes-unjustified negative attitudes toward or fear of those with
mental retardation-but the Court's finding of "irrational prejudice" came
only after its determination that none of the proffered rationales explained
the permit denial. 269 The Court also had explicit evidence that the food
stamp provision at issue in U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno was aimed

to keep "hippies" from participating in the food stamp program, which led
it to condemn as impermissible the purpose "to harm a politically
unpopular group"; however, it did not offer additional explanatory analysis
for future cases. 270 The sole practical instruction to be drawn from these
cases, then, is that although improper purposes are sometimes found
because the classification lacks any meaningful connection to the
justifications proffered, in some instances, as in Moreno, improper
purposes may also be discerned from the legislative history or the context
of a measure's passage.
The Court's heightened scrutiny decisions generally do not provide
much additional guidance to distinguish impermissible stereotyping from
permissible generalization, in part because the presence of bias is presumed
or suspected whenever a suspect classification is made. 27 1 Some of the
justifications that were actually proffered by the government defending the classification); Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 448-50 (same); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-38 (1973)
(same). Cf Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)
("When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this
judicial deference [ordinarily accorded government action] is no longer justified.") (footnote omitted);
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 277 (1973) (considering the stated justifications for the legislative
classification and noting that the Court itself had "supplied no imaginary basis or purpose for this
statutory scheme").
267. See generally KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 102 (detailing the social and cultural context
in which antigay amendments passed in Colorado and elsewhere); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil
Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283
(1994) (analyzing the rhetoric used to promote antigay measures).
268. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
269. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 448-56.
270. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 ("The legislative history... indicates that [the] amendment was
intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the food stamp
program.") (citation omitted).
271. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)
("[Wihat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and
aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society."). See also Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 441
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cases, however, at least amplify the concern with stereotyping in ways that
may provide guidance for the single standard's inquiry. For example, the
Court has offered a variety of definitions of "stereotype" ranging from "a
frame of mind resulting from irrational or uncritical analysis," 272 to
"mistaken beliefs" and manifestations of "society's accumulated myths and
fears, '273 to "generalizations about groups of people." 274 The case law also
explains that some empirical support for a stereotype about a group does
not necessarily justify the use of that generalization. 275 Beyond that, little
is available to guide the assessment of a challenge to governmental
stereotyping.
Instead, the Court's most extensive explanation of the improper
purpose inquiry appears not in the rational basis or heightened scrutiny
cases, but in the cases that screen facially neutral classifications for the
element of improper motive required to make out an equal protection
claim. 276 In explicating this discriminatory purpose requirement, the Court
("[Sitatutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women."). Cf id. at 440 ("[Classifications] by
race, alienage, or national origin.... are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy ....
272. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001).
273. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (quoting Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 284 (1987)). The Court also acknowledged that "misperceptions often 'resul[t] from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of ...individual ability."'
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(7) (1994)) (alteration and omission in original).
274. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 452 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For additional
discussion of stereotypes, see J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 142 n.14 (1994) ("intuitive and
frequently erroneous biases"), City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (presumptions that are not "facts" or based in
"reason"), Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 441 ("outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of [a
population]"), Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (perceptions
lack "careful consideration of modern social conditions"), Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979)
("Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the
inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special
protection.") (citation omitted); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,435 U.S. 702,
707 (1978) ("[m]yths and purely habitual assumptions"), and Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320
(1977) (per curiam) (noting that the legislation in question did not embody stereotypes as an
"'accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females"') (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
275. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("This Court has long recognized,
however, that an impermissible stereotype may enjoy empirical support and thus be in a sense
'rational."') (citations omitted); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 n.11 ("We have made abundantly clear in past
cases that gender classifications.., violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical
support can be conjured up for the generalization.").
276. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977)
(elaborating on the test for discriminatory motive); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-42 (1976)
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in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. identified the following considerations, all of which emphasize the
context in which the government decision is made and enforced: the effect
of the official action,2 77 the "historical background of the decision,"278
"[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,"279
280
and "[t]he legislative or administrative history."
These considerations allow not only inquiry into the presence of
overtly hostile purposes, such as the anti-hippie statement in Moreno, 28 1 but
also examination of the way in which the government reached its decision
to classify. Thus, it is through the bias inquiry that a challenging party can
introduce, for example, evidence demonstrating serious defects in the
process that led to the classification's adoption, or evidence showing that a
legislature could not reasonably have thought that a classification would
282
serve its stated purpose.
As with the intracontextual and extracontextual inquiries, the shared
emphasis among all levels of scrutiny on rejecting classifications that serve
hostile or bias-laden motives illustrates the centrality of this concern and,
consequently, its importance to a unitary standard of review. Further, this
focus on ferreting out illegitimate state interests complements the
intracontextual plausibility inquiry and the extracontextual examination of
a justification's breadth by allowing for assessment not only of the fit
between the means and ends, but also of the ends themselves. In doing so,
the three inquiries capture the multifaceted concerns with means and ends
expressed at all points in the extant spectrum of equal protection review.
(setting forth the discriminatory motive requirement).
See supra note 10 for critiques of the
discriminatory motive requirement.
277.
Vil. ofArlington Heights,429 U.S. at 266.
278. Id. at 267.
279.
Id.
280.
Id. at 268.
See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967) (affirming that
considerations of a measure's "'immediate objective,' its 'ultimate effect' and its 'historical context and
the conditions existing prior to its enactment' were appropriate in determining the presence of an

improper purpose).
281.
U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (referencing the condemnation of
hippies in the statute's legislative history).
282.
As the Court has pointed out on numerous occasions, if a party demonstrates that the state's
asserted justification is not credible, then that justification may be rejected. See Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975) ("This Court need not in equal protection cases accept at
face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its
history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation.") (citations

omitted).
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F. THEORETICAL COMMITMENTS OF THE PROPOSED SINGLE STANDARD
A critical question remains regarding the type of equality that the
283
proposed standard purports to deliver in the name of equal protection.
With this question in mind, this section will consider the standard's
theoretical underpinnings. It will look first at the broader context of
equality theory and then at several major theories regarding the purpose of
rational basis review.
As an initial matter, the proposed standard embodies a view of the
Equal Protection Clause as a principled constraint on a government's
ability to differentiate between those within its jurisdiction. 2 84 For
example, the intracontextual inquiry is fundamentally concerned with the
comparative right of equality-that one should be subject only to
restrictions also imposed on similarly situated counterparts. 285 Likewise,
the bias inquiry forecloses a set of grounds for government action (i.e., the
state may not give legal effect to popular dislike of a class of people).
This commitment to ensuring comparative equality, however, does not
necessarily locate the test in any particular place along the formal
equality/antisubordination axis. Its inquiries share with formal equality
theorists 286 the concern that explicit differential treatment of similarly
283. See Sunstein, Sexual Orientation,supra note 45, at 1174 (referring to different principles of
equality). Cf Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1928-29 (2000) (commenting on the uncertain meaning of equality in
history).

284. This premise implicitly rejects an argument advanced most prominently by Peter Westen,
that equality "is an empty form having no substantive content." Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 596 (1982).
285. See Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1985)
("A right to equal treatment is a comparativeclaim to receive a particular treatment just because another
person or class receives it.").
Given the standard's insistence on nonarbitrary, nonbiased
differentiations between classes, equality of respect would likely result from its application as well,
although that is not the standard's central aim. Cf C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of
Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1983) (urging that the
equality-of-respect model reflects the best substantive understanding of the equal protection guarantee);
Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 280-81 (1983) (maintaining that equality
rhetoric has a substantive effect on legal rights and political culture).
286. For a general discussion of formal equality and other equality theories, see Hutchinson, supra
note 13, at 619-27. For discussions of formal equality, see, for example, William Van Alstyne, Rites of
Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Cmi. L. REV. 775, 809-10 (1979)
(criticizing affirmative action initiatives as infringing the right to formal, equal treatment), Barbara A.
Brown, Thomas 1. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
ConstitutionalBasisfor Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889-93 (1971) (making a formal
equality argument in the context of support for the Equal Rights Amendment), Mary Anne Case, "The
Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect
Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1442-47 (2000) (defending the focus on formal equality violations
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situated individuals, standing alone, may violate equality rights. Under the
proposed standard, however, such a formal distinction could survive an
equal protection challenge if plausibly explained by a context-specific and
legitimate justification. This deliberate emphasis on contextualizing
differential treatment has an affinity to antisubordination theory's concern
with providing redress for substantive inequalities, even absent formal
distinctions.287
The bias inquiry, too, could be construed to find
government action impermissible when it results in subordination of a
socially vulnerable class. However, in keeping with this Article's aim to
draw from, rather than transform, current doctrine, 288 the proposed test, like
the Court's current test, does not take a position on a key question for
antisubordination theorists: whether substantive inequalities give rise to
actionable equal protection claims absent formal distinctions between
289
classes.
in equal protection review of sex-based classifications), Robin L. West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape,
and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 53-60 (1990) (discussing the
rationality model of equality), and Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 328 (1984-85)
(addressing formal equality arguments while defending the "equal treatment model," which would
permit special treatment in response to unique needs to fulfill the equal protection guarantee).
287.

See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND

LAW 32-45 (1987) (addressing the sameness/difference and dominance theories for analyzing
discrimination). See generally Becker, supra note 69 (discussing the evolution of feminist thought
regarding legal rights); Ruth Colker, Anti-SubordinationAbove All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (advocating an antisubordination analysis); Fiss, supra note 13, at 123
(arguing for a "group-disadvantaging principle," which would reconcile doctrinal conflicts in the
affirmative action debate); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281 (1991) (examining the legal implications of women's systematic subordination). Cf
Mary Becker, Patriarchyand Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21,
22 (criticizing liberal feminism and dominance feminism as "empty at their core").
288. See supra text accompanying note 13.
289. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237-39 (1976). Davis currently controls this
question by requiring an equal protection claimant to prove discriminatory intent absent formal
discrimination. Id. at 237-40. The tiered framework, however, neither requires nor forbids this
approach, which has been broadly criticized. See supra notes 10, 276-80 and accompanying text. For
purposes of evaluating the proposed single standard, I do not enter this debate, but simply work within
the governing doctrine. With respect to the related issue of the level of government involvement
required for an equal protection claim to be made, I similarly accept, for purposes of discussion here,
the Court's current narrow construction of the state action requirement. See United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) ("Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored principle that the
Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action."). Extensive transformative
critiques have been well advanced by others. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution
in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 171-74, 217-22 (2001) (advancing a broader interpretation of the state
action requirement than is endorsed by the Court). Cf The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 46 (1883)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). According to Justice Harlan,
The citizenship thus acquired, by that race, in virtue of an affirmative grant from the nation,
may be protected, not alone by the judicial branch of the government, but by congressional
legislation of a primary direct character; this, because the power of congress is not restricted
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In addition to the formalist and antisubordination perspectives on
equality, other significant equality theories have identified conditions to be
considered in determining whether a particular classification violates the
Equal Protection Clause.
Suggestions have been made that equal
protection violations should be found when nonpublic values are served,29 °
where political representation of the burdened group is compromised, 29 ' or
when government cannot plausibly explain the distinctions it has drawn.2 92
The remainder of this section will consider whether the proposed standard
293
does, or should, take these equality theories into account.
The public-regarding values argument maintains that legislators can
and should act in ways to serve general public goals, but may not,
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, act in an effort to reward or
satisfy demands of an "interest group." 294 In other words, the argument is
that the scope of permissible trait-based distinctions is limited to publicregarding values only. Conversely, naked preferences in lawmaking for the
agendas of influential interest groups are impermissible, Cass Sunstein has
argued, because action based on these preferences, without more, suggests
the legislature's disregard for the need to be nonarbitrary and to consider
the reasonableness of its acts in context. 295 While not specifically
embracing the three tiers, Sunstein's argument also appears to accept the
rationality/heightened scrutiny distinction as fitting "nicely with the
requirement that a litigant show that the government decisionmaker acted
out of an impermissible motivation." 296 Rather than objecting to the
to the enforcement of prohibitions upon State laws or State action.... It is, therefore, a grave
misconception to suppose that the fifth section of the amendment has reference exclusively to
express prohibitions upon State laws or State action.
Id.
290. See, e.g., Sunstein, Naked Preferences,supra note 40, at 1713.
291.
See ELY, supra note 13, at 86-87, 160-70.
292. See Gunther, supra note 17, at 20-24.
293. As Tracy Higgins points out, these theories, including particularly those of Ely and Sunstein,
presume that equality exists among individuals except in unusual circumstances, which the theories
then seek to correct. See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 16971702 (1997). As Higgins argues, this assumption of preexisting equality fails to recognize the negative
effects of nonstate actors on access to power, individual autonomy, and the possibility of equality itself.
Id. As this part discusses below, the proposed standard refuses to assume either that a particular class
of individuals is uniquely at risk for equality injuries or that a preference for a particular interest group
necessarily poses a danger to securing constitutional equality. Indeed, in attempting to ensure a
contextualized inquiry for differential treatment, the proposed standard may be responsive to some of
Higgins's concerns by leaving room for considering the setting in which the governmental distinction
between classes occurs, Id.
294. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 40, at 1691.
295. See id. at 1690-91, 1712-13.
296. Id. at 1714 (footnote omitted).
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differences in scrutiny, Sunstein sees in the three tiers a reflection of his
core view that equal protection, like other constitutional doctrines, is
fundamentally concerned with ensuring that government "classifications
rest on something other than a naked preference for one person or group
over another., 297 In contrast, while the proposed standard demands a
plausible, context-specific, and nonbiased reason for a classification,
nothing in the proposed test precludes legislators from enacting laws in
response to interest group requests. All that is required is that the line
relate in some legitimate, limited way to the trait that is the basis for the
classification.
Consider the river pilots who challenged New Orleans's licensing
system, which effectively disabled nonrelatives of current license holders
from obtaining pilotage licenses. 298 The naked preferences theory suggests
that the pilots should prevail in their challenge if they persuade a court that
the nepotism system resulted from a legislative effort to preserve the rights
of a small group of people. 299 Under the proposed single standard, the fact
that the license distribution scheme might have been the product of a
political favor would not play into a court's equal protection analysis. So
long as no showing of bias toward the nonrelatives could be advanced, the
critical questions would be whether the distinction between relatives and
nonrelatives plausibly related to the safe operation of boats on the
Mississippi River, and whether the justification for the distinction was
context-specific. Similarly, a restriction forbidding opticians but not
optometrists from replacing lenses in glasses would not fail because it
lacked a "public" purpose; if a plausible connection could be found
between the restriction and an optician's training, the restriction could
stand.3 00
Although the proposed test does not embrace Sunstein's insistence on
public-regarding values, it does share "the central constitutional concern of
ensuring against capture of government power by faction 3 °1 in its
297. Id. at 1713.
298. See Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 555 (1947).
299. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences,supra note 40, at 1713-17.
300. Richard Klarman has suggested that Lee Optical illustrates the Court's rejection of a theory
that public-regarding values must exist to support classifying legislation. See Klarman, supra note 52,
at 249-50. Whether a relevant and nonoverbroad justification exists in either case is debatable, even
under the single standard, which suggests that the unitary standard might not be of great predictive
value in deciding borderline cases, even while it clarifies the inquiry. Questions regarding the proposed
standard's utility will be addressed in greater depth in Part V.
301.

See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 40, at 1690 (footnote omitted). See also THE

FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison).
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insistence on meaningful review of the link between the classification and
its context.30 2
Indeed, class legislation is the perfect legislative
embodiment of factional control of government, with differential treatment
imposed simply and freely at the will of the ruling class without the need
for justification. Rather than serving as a rubber stamp for faction-led class
legislation, the proposed single standard takes seriously the requirement
that a legitimate government interest actually explain why a group has been
singled out from among all others for the classification's burden, even
while deferring, as a general matter, to the government's need to classify.
The representation-regarding theory, most prominently advanced by
John Hart Ely, shifts focus away from the legislature's specific actions on
behalf of particular interest groups to the legislative process itself.30 3 This
argument contends that inequalities result when a group's opportunity to
participate in the political process is improperly barred or impeded in some
fashion. 30 4 In such cases, legislation hostile toward the marginalized class
30 5
can be promoted and passed without significant, effective opposition.
Ely has contended that where this type of process "failure" occurs, close
scrutiny of legislative classifications affecting that class is necessary to
ensure that the failure does not result in biased lawmaking. 30 6 In other
words, the equal protection guarantee requires that "courts should protect
30 7
those who can't protect themselves politically.This argument also embraces the concept that certain classifications be
treated as suspect and others not; its critical focus aims instead at refining
the jurisprudence related to each category. With respect to suspect
classification, for example, Ely commented that "one set of classifications
we should treat as suspicious are those that disadvantage groups we know
to be the object of widespread vilification, groups we know others
(specifically those who control the legislative process) might wish to
injure. ' '
302.
Like Sunstein's anticaste equality theory, which is concerned with legislatures systematically
disadvantaging groups of individuals who share "highly visible and morally irrelevant differences"
from the dominant class, the proposed standard shares a significant commitment to eradicating classbased prejudice. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411 (1994).
Yet the proposed theory diverges from the anticaste principle in expressing concern not just with actual
caste-like treatment of groups, but also with more limited distinctions between groups for generalized,

noncontext-specific reasons.
303.
See ELY, supra note 13, at 157-58.
304. See id. at 152-53.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 152-53, 157.
307. Id. at 152.
308. Id. at 153.
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As discussed at length above, the proposed test, unlike the
representation-regarding theory, does not treat distinct levels of heightened
scrutiny as essential to check against the importation of bias or arbitrariness
into law. Nor does it look to inequities in representation as clues to
violations. Yet the two are, in many ways, interrelated. Legislative
burdens are far more likely to be imposed on classes that are marginalized
in the political process simply because well-represented classes, and classes
able to gain allies, can advocate successfully against being unduly
burdened. Politically vulnerable classes, on the other hand, become
saddled with burdens not related to their common trait's relevance to the
legislative context, but to their lack of political power. Indeed, it is
inequities in representation that lay the groundwork for class legislation in
the first place. 30 9 Put another way, an improper process is unlikely to
produce legislation that can satisfy the proposed standard's dual insistence
3 10
on nonarbitrariness and absence of bias.
Gunther's advocacy for consistent "bite" in rational basis review
follows yet a different approach, pressing for more serious, less deferential
review even at the lowest level of the three tiers.3 11 His "intensified means
scrutiny, '"312 for example, proposes that "the Court take seriously a
constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that
legislative means must substantially further legislative ends." 313 While
pressing the Court to narrow the "wide gap" between minimal and strict
scrutiny,31 4 Gunther did not, however, support "abandoning the strict," and
specifically reinforced that his "expanded reasonable means inquiry would
not mean the end of strict scrutiny."3 15 To realize this goal of regular,
meaningful rationality review, Gunther proposed that the Court should no
longer hypothesize government interests for classifications; instead, it
309. For a discussion of class legislation, see supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
310. As the Court itself has recognized, only absent "some reason to infer antipathy" can we
assume that "improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process." Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted). In other words, a malfunctioning democratic
process of the sort Ely feared would tend to produce classifying legislation benefiting the dominant
class without regard to whether a meaningful, legitimate basis existed on which to burden that class's
socially vulnerable counterparts. See ELY, supra note 13, at 152-79.
311. See Gunther, supra note 17, at 20-24.
312. Id.at24.
313. Id. at 20.
314. Id. at 24. Under Gunther's model, "the Court would continue to demand that the means be
more than reasonable," although Gunther suggested that strict scrutiny had likely reached the limits of
its applicability. Id. ("The Burger Court is not likely to expand the list of such interests and
classifications significantly.").
315.

Id.
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should leave it to government to identify interests that classifying
316
legislation might serve.
The standard proposed here similarly seeks to achieve meaningful
review of all classifications, including those traditionally assigned the
weakest version of scrutiny, while encouraging appropriate legislative
deference. 3 17 The proposed test, however, does not adopt Gunther's
suggested ban on judicial hypothesizing of justifications for classifying
legislation. This is not because the concept of the bar on judges conceiving
justifications for challenged laws lacks merit. To the contrary, the bar
could reinforce separation-of-powers ideals given the awkwardness of the
judiciary conceiving justifications for legislation it is asked to invalidate.
But the very nature of our political process, with legislative enactments
frequently bearing little relation to input from constituents received by
elected representatives, makes the entire process unsusceptible to accurate
discernment of genuine legislative interests. 31 8 Further still, the political
trading and compromise at the center of the political process make it
unlikely at best that legislators themselves could regularly and honestly
3 19
articulate their specific interests in enacting classifying legislation.
Beyond these points of coherence and difference with existing
theories, the basic question remains whether the proposed standard
provides for any meaningful limits on the power of an unelected judiciary
to review popularly approved legislation. 320 The standard, after all, does
316. Id. at 46-47. Gunther's "relatively vigorous scrutiny" would contrast with the "extreme
deference" of the Warren era by having "the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that
have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture." Id. at 21.
The model asks that the Court assess the rationality of the means in terms of the state's
purposes, rather than hypothesizing conceivable justifications on its own initiative.... If the
Court were to require an articulation of purpose from an authoritative state source, rather than
hypothesizing one on its own, there would at least be indirect pressure on the legislature to
state its own reasons for selecting particular means and classifications.
Id. at 46-47.
317. See id. at 24. Gunther, however, specifically accepted the inevitability of multiple review
standards. See id. ("[R]easonable means inquiry would not mean the end of strict scrutiny. In the
context of fundamental interests or suspect classifications, the Court would continue to demand that the
means be more than reasonable-e.g., that they be 'necessary,' or the 'least restrictive' ones.").
318. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing the debate regarding post hoc
justifications). See also Archibald Cox, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, 94
HARV. L. REV. 700, 712-13 (1981) (book review) (same).
319. Further, Ely's concern with judicial hypothesizing may present a greater worry in theory than
in practice. In applying rational basis review, the Court generally has not been willing to conceive
additional justifications or otherwise sustain a classification after finding that any of the justifications
offered were either too attenuated or illegitimate. See supra note 235 (discussing the Court's reasoning
in three such cases).
320. Regardless of the underlying theory, the Court historically has had little difficulty reviewing
and invalidating both legislative and popularly initiated enactments, notwithstanding the
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not constrain the unelected judiciary to a mechanistic, predictable review.
Instead, it calls for judgments about the plausibility and specificity of, and
incorporation of bias or stereotyping into, proposed explanations for a
classification.
The single
standard's
acceptance
of the exercise
of
countermajoritarian judicial power can be defended in two ways: as
necessary to popular sovereignty, and as providing a stronger constraint on
judges' passion choices than the current tiered structure. With respect to
popular sovereignty, judicial intervention ensures at least the rudimentary
equal treatment of similarly situated classes that is necessary whether one
believes that equal citizenship is an essential precondition to healthy
governance 321 or that a political system must offer equal treatment and
opportunity for the mercenary purpose of maintaining legitimacy with its
322
constituency.
The single standard's demand for a context-specific justification
would serve this legitimizing function both by invalidating broad
exclusions of social groups that would directly cast doubt on a
government's integrity and by striking down classifications that could be
the seedbed for generalized trait-based differential treatment, such as the
noncontext-specific justification for distinguishing between long- and
short-term residents in Zobel. Similarly, the standard's insistence on a
plausible, nonarbitrary and nonbiased justification for government action
would protect against unwarranted exclusions of vulnerable groups from
full civic and economic participation in a way that could negatively affect a
countermajoritarian difficulty. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000)
(striking down portions of the Violence Against Women Act, which was enacted by Congress); Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24, 635 (1996) (finding a statewide voter referendum unconstitutional
because it classified lesbians and gay men so as to "make them unequal to everyone else"); Washington
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 483, 487 (1982) (voiding an initiative that sought to
circumvent school desegregation); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 71819, 739 (1964) (striking down a statewide voter referendum regarding a congressional reapportionment
scheme that resulted in certain populations having unequal political representation). See generally
BICKEL, supra note 12 (discussing the role and propriety of judicial review).
321. As used here, citizenship refers to the opportunity to participate fully in a society's political
and social life; it does not refer to legal citizenship. The proposed theory, at a minimum, would require
the absence of a fixed group of "secondary citizens." See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 ("A State
cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982)
("Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond
their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste' treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to abolish.").
322. See Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssUEs 293, 295
(1996) (elaborating on the different views of "rights-foundationalists" and Democrats with respect to
the legitimacy of the American constitutional order).
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government's credibility. In this regard, the proposed standard's scope of
judicial oversight simply ensures the minimal protection necessary for a
legitimate, functional popular sovereignty.
Indeed, the proposed standard's disinterest in the politics behind
legislative action, absent a showing of bias, guards against undue
invasiveness by the judiciary. 323
For example, although political
preferences for particular groups might have prompted the residency-based
restrictions in Zobel and the optician's restrictions in Lee Optical, the two
cases have fundamentally different equal protection implications with
respect to the countermajoritarian exercise of judicial power. It is not
difficult to imagine the power of the optometrists' lobby in Lee Optical. It
is also possible that in Zobel, even short-term Alaska residents might have
favored the length-of-residency distribution system in a strictly political
effort to curry favor for some other purpose. Yet, under the proposed
standard, the Alaska restriction would warrant judicial intervention while
the Lee Optical restriction might not-not because Alaska put into law the
runaway private preferences of long-term residents, but because it had the
underlying potential to support pervasive residency-based distinctions that
could, in turn, either incapacitate the democratic process or at least
undermine its legitimacy.
Beyond limiting incursions into government action to those
implicating popular sovereignty theories, the proposed standard also
imposes significant limits on the passion choices typically involved in
judicial review. Although no test can completely remove the possibility of
judges' personal preferences shaping their evaluations of challenged
measures, the proposed standard seeks to force those preferences into the
open by requiring that specific explanations for a classification be
discussed explicitly. The preferences and passion choices, formerly
cloaked in the garb of "deference to the legislature," must be disclosed and
explained. To the extent that this increased exposure encourages more
careful contextual reasoning, the single standard presents a potentially
powerful constraint or, at a minimum, a sharply focused lens through which
others can evaluate and critique a court's analysis.
323. The proposed standard could be said to allow intervention in spite of, rather than because of,
popular support for a measure. Cf Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 267, 279-81 (1979)
(upholding a veterans' preference on the rationale that the law was enacted in spite of, rather than
because of, its negative effect on women's employment opportunities).
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V. APPLYING AND ASSESSING THE PROPOSED SINGLE
STANDARD
Building on the groundwork laid above, this part will apply the
proposed standard to equal protection case law to assess the standard's
viability. One obvious question for this assessment is whether applying the
single standard would so enhance the rigor of review as to require
sweeping invalidations of rational basis classifications traditionally deemed
to be constitutional. Another question is whether the standard would so
weaken judicial review of traditionally suspect and quasi-suspect
classifications as to allow historically invalid classifications to stand. And
finally, assuming that the outcome, if not the precise analysis, of most
equal protection cases would remain static, what value does the test bring
as a new analytic tool?
To address these questions, this part will examine existing equal
protection jurisprudence, applying the standard first to a selection of
rational basis cases and then to a set of intermediate and strict scrutiny
decisions. As the applications will demonstrate, the proposed test does not
dramatically alter the outcomes of many cases, although it would revamp
the analyses used and cause shifts where the Court, in the name of
deference, did not carefully review classifications that, on closer look,
would be impermissible. This result should not be surprising because the
test encompasses elements already contained in rational basis review and
heightened scrutiny. However, the proposed test's context sensitivity
would have an effect on a particular subset of equal protection cases: those
dealing with classifications created for remedial purposes.
The test would have the additional effect, identified above in Part IV,
of forcing into the open, and possibly thereby constraining, judicial passion
choices that are now easily masked by reference either to the deferential
demands of rational basis review or the rigorous demands of strict
scrutiny. 324 With its emphasis on a context-sensitive evaluation of all
classifications, the proposed standard's attempt to cut a path between the
heavy deference and close oversight currently practiced in the name of
equal protection review offers some hope of escaping the extant
mechanistic traps. Through its unified application to all classifications, the
proposed standard also may realize equal protection's aim to screen out not
324. Again, of course, the effectiveness of any doctrinal test in constraining judicial passion
choices depends on the willingness and ability of decisionmakers to work with the test instead of
against it. No approach allowing any room for judgment can absolutely prevent a judge from
disregarding the constraint and following his or her ideological agenda.
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only those classifications that impose wholesale disadvantage on a group,
but also those less shocking measures, like Alaska's in Zobel, that quietly
disadvantage a class of people in a way that has the potential to give rise to
secondary citizenship categories.
A. THE RATIONAL BASIS CASES REVISITED UNDER THE SINGLE
STANDARD
Because the vast majority of rational basis cases sustain the
classification that is challenged, the pool of cases against which to test
whether the proposed standard will lead to increased judicial intervention is
large. Although this Article will not attempt to reconsider all of these
cases, a few of the most deferential will be reviewed here. The single
standard's application to the classifications at issue demonstrates that the
proposal contains sufficient checks to allow for meaningful review, yet
remains in balance with the Court's deferential stance regarding legislative
action.
The most frequently cited of the weak rational basis cases, Lee
Optical, provides a good starting point for the proposed standard's
evaluation. 325 In Lee Optical, the Court upheld against equal protection
and due process challenges an Oklahoma statute that effectively prohibited
opticians from fitting and adjusting eyeglass lenses without a prescription
from a licensed ophthalmologist or optometrist. 326 The opinion contains no
references to articulated state interests; the Court simply hypothesized that
the occasional need for prescriptions related to fittings of glasses or lens
duplication "was sufficient to justify" the distinction between opticians and
327
other eye care specialists.
How would this differential treatment of opticians fare under the
proposed single standard? The initial inquiry would be intracontextual:
325. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 40, at 1713 (describing Lee Optical as "the
most familiar example" of rational basis review).
326. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 484-85, 491 (1955). Lee Optical is
perhaps not the ideal example of a deferential case because its deferential posture grew explicitly out of
the shadow of Lochner. See id. at 488 ('The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.") (citation to numerous post-Lochner decisions omitted). Still, the case merits consideration
here because the Court regularly relies on Lee Optical's deferential formulation. See, e.g., Romer, 517
U.S. at 632; FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 316 (1993); Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 111 (1979); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471,484 (1970).
327. See Lee Opticalof Okla., 348 U.S. at 487.
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whether the government interest can, with sufficient specificity, explain
why opticians are singled out for the limitations imposed from among the
set of professionals who work with eye wear. 32 8 The explanation accepted
by the Court-that the expertise of an ophthalmologist or optometrist is
required sufficiently often to ensure proper preparation and adjustment of
eyeglasses-does explain the singling out of opticians in this context, as
opticians have different and relatively less relevant specialized training
than the other eyesight professionals identified in the statute.3 29 Further,
the training-related justification is not overly broad in a manner that would
justify a generalized or across-the-board burdensome classification of
opticians per the extracontextual inquiry. Absent an indication that bias,
archaic stereotypes, or hostility motivated the classification, 330 the result
under the new analysis, consistent with the result of the actual case, would
be to uphold Oklahoma's classification no matter how "unwise,
33 1
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."
Thus, the single standard's insistence on meaningful review would not
require the invalidation of a legislative distinction that did not amount to
class legislation, even if the distinction largely served economic interests
advanced by a particular influential sector of a community.
Dandridge v. Williams presents a more challenging case from
humanitarian and theoretical standpoints.3 32 The regulation at issue capped
welfare benefits provided through the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program so that families with many children received the same
grant as families with few children, leaving children in large families
foreclosed from resources even though they fell below the "standard of
need" established by the state. 333 With respect to government goals, the
Court found that the state's "interest in encouraging employment and in
avoiding discrimination between welfare families and the families of the
328. Although the statute formally distinguished ophthalmologists and optometrists from all
others, in operation, the classification imposed its burden on opticians, who were the only other
professional group licensed to deal with eye wear.
329. See Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. at 487.
330. It is possible that through the bias inquiry the plaintiffs in Lee Optical could have
demonstrated that although the rationale was plausible as a formal, logical matter, the gross
overinclusiveness of the classification strained the rationale's credibility and suggested that the
legislature had acted with an improper purpose. However, the Supreme Court did not identify as
significant any record evidence on this point. See id. at 489 ("For all this record shows, the ready-towear branch of this business may not loom large in Oklahoma or may present problems of regulation
distinct from the other branch.").
331. See id. at 488 (citation omitted).
332. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
333. Id. at 473-75.
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working poor" justified the cap on grants. 34 Elaborating, the Court
explained that
[b]y combining a limit on the recipient's grant with permission to retain
money earned, without reduction in the amount of the grant, Maryland
provides an incentive to seek gainful employment. And by keying the
maximum family AFDC grants to the minimum wage a steadily
employed head of a household receives, the State maintains some
semblance of an equitable balance between
families on welfare and those
335
supported by an employed breadwinner.
Although the Court upheld the regulation, it explicitly reserved
judgment regarding the law's wisdom and humanity. 336 Stressing that the
legislature rather than the judiciary is best suited to resolve challenging
societal problems, 337 the Court appeared to distance itself from the
consequences of its ruling. Over a vigorous
dissent by Justice Marshall,
338
the classification was permitted to stand.
As with Lee Optical, the analysis under the proposed standard would
turn on whether a plausible, context-specific, and nonbiased explanation
existed for Maryland's distinction in treatment of small families, which
would receive funding to the full extent of their "standard of need," and
large families, which would not. Instead of considering whether the grant
limitation provided an incentive to seek gainful employment, the critical
question would be whether the goal of encouraging employment could
explain the different funding for small and large families. And with respect
to the equitable balance argument, the proposed standard would again seek
to determine whether that goal could plausibly explain the statutory
distinction.
Viewed in this light, the state's justifications would face greater
difficulty. As Justice Marshall focused the question,
Persons who are concededly similarly situated (dependent children and
their families), are not afforded equal, or even approximately equal,
treatment under the maximum grant regulation. Subsistence benefits are
334. Id. at 486. The Court appeared to accept Maryland's contention that neither bias nor animus
motivated the classification. See id. at 483 ("Maryland says that its maximum grant regulation is
wholly free of any invidiously discriminatory purpose or effect ....
335. Id. at 486 (footnote omitted).
336. Id. at 487 ("We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation is wise, that it best fulfills
the relevant social and economic objectives that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a more just and
humane system could not be devised.").
337. See id. ("But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by
public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.").
338. See id.; id. at 508-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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paid with respect to some needy dependent children; nothing is paid with
Some needy families receive full subsistence
respect to others.
paid to other families
assistance as calculated by the State; the assistance
339
is grossly below their similarly calculated needs.

Notwithstanding Justice Marshall's sharp picture of the classification,
a majority of the Court accepted two nonresponsive justifications. 340 The
first of the accepted regulatory rationales-providing welfare recipients
with an incentive to seek gainful employment-may well be an important
government interest.3 4 1 However, it does not explain why families with
several children would be so encouraged but families with fewer children
would not. Without a rational basis test insistent on identification of a
government interest that could explain why one group is being treated
differently from another, the Court failed to see, or at least to be troubled
by, the lack of connection between the justifications and the classification
itself.342 After all, the general goals of encouraging employment among
unemployed heads of household and maintaining balance between the
income of those receiving public assistance and those in the workforce do
not explain why some families receive funds below their standard of need
and others do not. Regardless of how laudable, this interest does not
explain the line drawn by the state, as equal protection requires.
The state's other justification-creating some parity between those
employed and those receiving public assistance-may be similarly flawed,
though the analysis is somewhat more complex. Parity describes what the
339. Id. at 518 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
340. See id. at 486-87.
341.
Id. at 486.
342. Perhaps if the case were relitigated, the state might identify distinctions between large and
small families that would be meaningful in the context of public assistance and related legitimate state
interests. One of the difficulties for the state is that the regulation was apparently conceived in an effort
to save funds. See id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[I]n the early stages of this litigation the State
virtually conceded that it set out to limit the total cost of the program along the path of least
resistance."). Although governments can certainly engage in line drawing in an effort to save funds,
conservation of resources is rarely sufficient, on its own, to explain why government may burden one
group rather than another. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (recognizing cost savings
as a legitimate government interest, but not as a sufficient explanation for the infringement of rights);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971) ("The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an
otherwise invidious classification.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (recognizing a valid state interest in fiscal integrity, but specifying that a state
cannot preserve resources "by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens")).
Alternatively, a distinction between large and small families in a government-sponsored program
to provide support for dependent children simply may be the sort of class legislation that the Equal
Protection Clause cannot tolerate, because no sufficiently specific and plausible justification can explain
the different treatment.
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benefits cap achieved; it is not a statement of a government goal. In other
words, the government achieved parity by roughly equalizing minimum
wage earnings with the public assistance cap.
The relevant equal
protection question, however, concerns not what the government achieved,
but the reason why the government chose to achieve parity in a way that
burdened large families. An answer might be that the purpose of limiting
benefits to the point of parity with minimum wage earnings is to discourage
families from relying on benefits and encourage them to find employment.
(If paid employment provides a greater level of support than public
assistance, benefits recipients will presumably attempt to find work.)
When the actual justification is disentangled from the parity description, it
brings the analysis back to the flaw already identified: that the
encouragement of employment does not explain why large families are
singled out. Although traditional rational basis analysis, properly applied,
should recognize the inadequacy of this justification, the tendency toward
deferential embrace of government interests sometimes results in this type
of imprecise analysis.
Returning from Dandridge to a more recent, and more typical,
business classification, the Court's decision in FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc. illustrates that in the ordinary business regulation
case subjected to rational basis review,343 the proposed standard would not
likely alter the outcome, even if it reshaped the analysis. 344 At issue in
Beach Communications was the constitutionality of a regulation
distinguishing between cable television systems that serve buildings under
separate ownership and management, and those that serve buildings under
345
common ownership and management.
Here, the Court's analysis actually paralleled the analysis that would
be required under the single standard.346 In evaluating the classification,
the Court considered potential explanations for the difference in treatment
that had been developed from a regulatory efficiency model. The model
maintained that commonly owned and managed buildings would likely be
more limited in size, and that their residents would be more likely to
negotiate effectively through the common management than residents of
separately owned buildings, thereby avoiding situations in which operators
monopolize control over access to cable television. 347 In this case, unlike
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
Cf id.
Id. at 309.
See id. at 313-20.
Id. at 318-20.
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Dandridge, the Court's inquiry focused on the potential legitimate
explanations for the classification that related directly to the differences
between commonly and separately owned buildings. 348 By ensuring that
the Federal Communications Commission could distinguish meaningfully
between different types of cable operations to serve a plausible, contextspecific goal, the Court applied essentially the same analysis that the single
standard would require. 349 Moreover, analysis under the single standard
similarly would proceed noninvasively, respectful of the deference value
350
touted so highly by the Court in that case.
These applications help make apparent that in the majority of equal
protection cases involving distinctions that affect business operations,
courts are already engaged in exploring whether the challenged differential
treatment can be explained plausibly in context. Even where the discussion
is less than precise and the decision is awash in the language of deference,
the core equal protection analysis remains focused on the classification,
which is likewise the focus of the proposed standard.
Still, the structure of the proposed standard helps ensure that courts
consider whether a meaningful connection exists between governments'
interests and actions, which the extant standard-with its prioritization of
deference-sometimes elides. At the same time, in reinforcing judicial
focus on the actual distinction being challenged, the single standard avoids
taking on the trappings of heightened scrutiny that would render it unduly
invasive and nearly impossible to satisfy.
At the same time, the test cannot provide sure answers to how courts
will resolve the often fierce debate regarding whether a trait bears a
sufficiently plausible relationship to a regulatory context to justify the
differential treatment at issue. So, for example, this test will not magically
bring unanimity to a court seeking to decide whether a state may maintain
separate civil commitment rules for people with mental retardation and
people with mental illness, 351 or even whether a health-related concern
plausibly explains banning opticians from replacing lenses without a
352
prescription.
348. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,518 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
that similarly situated people were being treated differently), with Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at
312, 316-20 (sustaining different rules because of differences between the regulated entities).
349. See Beach Communications,508 U.S. at 316-20.
350. Seeid. at 313-16.
351. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333-34 (1993).
352. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,491 (1955).
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This inability to provide a high level of predictability to courts
engaged in review of legislative classifications need not be considered a
fatal flaw. To the extent that courts exercise judgment about the
reasonableness of legislative distinctions, no test could lead judges in
lockstep to the same conclusion. 353 What distinguishes the proposed test
from the current approach to rational basis review, as discussed above, is
not an ability to remove all differences in judgment. Instead, it is the
pressure that the proposed test places on courts to reveal their reasoning,
rather than hiding these judgment calls behind the language of deference.
B. THE SINGLE STANDARD AND THE HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY CASES
Application of the single standard to the heightened scrutiny cases
presents somewhat different risks than application in the rational basis
context. Because the test shifts away from the demanding requirement that
compelling and important government interests be narrowly tailored or
substantially related to a classification, its application might be expected to
result in increased doctrinal turmoil. As the discussion below reveals,
however, the test's incorporation of core concerns from the most rigorous
levels of review leaves the doctrine largely where it began, with most, but
not all, traditionally suspect and quasi-suspect classifications being
invalidated. Still, the new test provides sharper focus to some of the
analyses by facing directly the bottom-line equal protection question:
whether plausible, context-specific, and nonbiased justifications ever exist
for these distinctions.
As with the rational basis cases, far too many heightened review cases
exist to test the single standard against all of them. The discussion below,
therefore, engages with a select set of significant cases involving
classifications based on race, alienage, sex, and nonmarital parentage in an
effort to examine the proposed standard in context. After reviewing this
central group of cases, the section will close with consideration of cases
assessing programs involving the remedial use of race-based
classifications. As the discussion will illustrate, the proposed single
standard may provide a way out of the thorny analytic arena the Court has
created in its efforts to consider these programs through its suspect
classification framework. 3
353.
See generally Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent,
Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1274-75, 1279

(2001) (observing the trend toward regular dissent on the Court).
354. Of course, strict scrutiny of affirmative action plans is not necessarily required by the equal
protection framework, as demonstrated by the Court's own evolution in thinking about the appropriate
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One of the first race discrimination cases to engage in an extended
discussion of the differences between strict scrutiny and ordinary rational
basis review is McLaughlin v. Florida, which invalidated a statute
providing criminal penalties for interracial couples who "habitually live in
and occupy in the nighttime the same room." 355 Emphasizing that racial
classifications "bear a far heavier burden of justification" 356 than other
classifications and must be "necessary, and not merely rationally related, to
the accomplishment of a permissible state policy," 357 the Court found that
the state had failed to show that the statutory classification was necessary
for any purpose, including as an "adjunct to the State's ban on interracial
358
marriage."
Review of the McLaughlin classification under the single standard
would require a substantial shift in focus away from necessity and toward
the simpler question of whether a plausible, context-specific, and nonbiased
government interest could explain the different punitive treatment of
interracial couples. According to the state, the statute aimed "to prevent
breaches of the basic concepts of sexual decency . . . [such as] illicit
extramarital and premarital promiscuity." 359 The analysis, then, would turn
on whether this goal can meaningfully explain why one set of cohabitants
is subject to this rule and another is not based solely on race. Because the
goals of ensuring sexual decency and prohibiting promiscuity do not
explain why the statute subjected interracial couples to punishment not
imposed on intraracial couples engaged in the same activity, 360 the statute
standard of review. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 218-26 (1995) (reviewing
the history of the Court's varied approaches to race-based remedial classifications). Instead, some have
argued that the insistence on the highest level of review for remedial uses of characteristics such as race
may reflect the Court's manipulation of the existing tiered structure to serve ideological opposition to
affirmative action. See Rubenfeld, Anti-AntidiscriminationAgenda, supra note 12, at 1177 ("[T]he
current Court's constitutional case law has to be understood less in terms of its ostensible doctrinal
reasoning, and more in terms of an underlying agenda .. ");Spann, supra note 13, at 92 ("Benign
accounts of the Supreme Court's motivation in adopting its Adarand opposition to affirmative action
seem either disingenuous or unrealistic."). The unitary standard would not, by definition, share this
susceptibility to misuse in the service of passion choices as the same inquiries are to be applied to any
type of classification.
355. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964) (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 798.05 (repealed
1969)).
356. Id. at 194.
357. Id. at 196 (citation omitted). See also id. at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I agree with the
Court that... necessity, not mere reasonable relationship, is the proper test.").
358. Id. at 196. The Court specified that it was not taking a position on the constitutionality of
Florida's miscegenation ban. See id.
359. Id. at 193.
360. Id. at 196. The demand for basic reasonableness, rather than necessity, is not unknown to
strict scrutiny cases. For example, in McLaughlin, even while highlighting strict scrutiny's
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would fall under the single standard just as it had under more rigorous
36 1
review.
In Loving v. Virginia, the Court elaborated further the distinction
between rational basis review and strict scrutiny, 362 making Loving another
solid test of whether the proposed standard would wreak doctrinal havoc.
In Loving, the Court emphasized that unlike cases in which "the Court has
merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the
363
discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures,"
in cases involving racial classification the Court imposes a "very heavy
burden of justification. '' 364 Yet in considering the government's "burden of
justification," 365 the Court did not rely on the extra rigor of strict scrutiny
and concluded, instead, that "[t]here is patently no legitimate overriding
purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this
366
classification."
Under the proposed single standard, just as under the extant one, the
core inquiry would be whether any legitimate government interest could
explain why a state punished individuals who married interracially but not
those who married intraracially. The state had argued that "scientific
evidence" supported the distinction. 367 Under the single standard, the mere
significance, the Court characterized its inquiry in terms used by both the proposed single standard and
that of traditional rational basis review: "The courts must reach and determine the question whether the
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose-in this case, whether there is an
arbitrary or invidious discrimination between those classes covered by Florida's cohabitation law and
those excluded." Id. at 191.
361. See id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose
under our Constitution ... which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct is a
criminal offense."). The state separately argued that the statute was justified "because it is ancillary to
and serves the same purpose as the miscegenation law itself." Id. at 195. Because the Court did not
address the purpose of the miscegenation law, it is not possible, based on the Court's opinion, to
analyze whether the set of reasons offered might justify the singling out of interracial cohabitants for
punishment. As the discussion below of Loving illustrates, however, the standard reasons that might be
offered for such a law likewise do not survive review under the proposed standard. See Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
362. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8, 11.
363. Id. at 9.
364. Id. Virginia had attempted to defend the statutory classification by arguing that its equal
application to white and African American spouses presented no equal protection problem-an
argument that the Court soundly rejected. Id. at 8.
365. Id. at 9.
366. Id. at l1.
367. See id. at 8. With respect to the scientific evidence, the Virginia Supreme Court referenced
social science texts provided by challengers of the law, not its defenders. See also Loving v.
Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 82 (Va. 1966), rev'd sub nom. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1. Therefore, the
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offering of evidence would not translate to approval of the classification;
instead, the question would be whether the evidence could plausibly,
specifically, and legitimately explain the state's line drawing based on race.
Because, as was actually the case in Loving, both the evidence and the
classification itself would easily be found to embody bias, the single
standard would require invalidation of the Virginia law based on the bias
inquiry alone. As the Court concluded, Virginia's targeted prohibition of
"interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrate[d] that the
racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures
36 8
designed to maintain White Supremacy."
In addition, however, the extracontextual inquiry would have doomed
the classification, as the purported "proof' of African American inferiority
used to justify the miscegenation ban could be invoked to support exactly
the sort of class legislation that the Equal Protection Clause aimed to
prevent. 369 After all, a broad statement of a racial group's inferiority would
support official burdening of that group in contexts far beyond marriage.
The single standard similarly reshapes the reasoning although not the
outcome of a case challenging a classification based on alienage that, like
the race-based cases above, emphasized the distinction between rational
basis review and "close judicial scrutiny." 370 Applying strict scrutiny in
Graham v. Richardson, the Court rejected statutes that imposed durational
residency requirements on noncitizens, but not on U.S. citizens, for the
receipt of public benefits. 371 The Court held, in part, that concerns with
fiscal integrity did not constitute a compelling government interest
sufficient to justify the statutory discrimination at issue.372
Because the single standard does not distinguish between intensities of
government interest, the inquiry would be reframed to ask whether
concerns with cost savings can explain the burdening of benefits recipients
according to citizenship status. Here, as in Zobel, Hooper,373 and other
cases that addressed overly broad justifications, 374 the fiscal integrity
discussion contained in the text regarding evidence is based on supposition about the nature of evidence
likely to have been submitted by Virginia in defense of its discriminatory statute.
368. Loving, 388 U.S. at I I (footnote omitted).
369. Id.
370. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
371.
Id. at 376.
372. Id. at 374-75 ("The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious
classification.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633
(1969)).
373.
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985).
374. See supra notes 244-54 and accompanying text.
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defense would fail; not only is it not compelling under traditional strict
scrutiny, but it is also too general and, therefore, insufficiently explanatory
for purposes of the single standard.
Specifically, the government interest in saving money does not
explain why noncitizens are singled out from those in need of benefits.
Further, cost savings, if permitted to stand here, lacks any limiting
principle. It easily could be relied on to justify across-the-board
discrimination against noncitizens in a wide range of contexts far beyond
the specific welfare programs at issue in Graham, effectively relegating
375
noncitizens to permanent second-class status.
Applying the proposed standard to intermediate scrutiny cases gives
rise to a pattern similar to the one that emerges in reanalyzing the strict
scrutiny cases. Some analytic shifts occur, but minimal destabilization of
outcomes takes place. Particularly because sex-based and illegitimacybased classifications were, for many years, assessed under rational basis
review prior to being deemed quasi-suspect, 376 this stasis is not surprising.
Consider, for example, United States v. Virginia, in which the Court
struck down the ban on matriculation of women students to the Virginia
Military Institute ("VMI"). 37 7 The Court framed its review as requiring an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for government distinctions based on
sex. 3 7 8 While recognizing that "[t]he heightened review standard... does
375. Much has been written on the range of ways in which noncitizens are consistently the subject
of discriminatory and unequal treatment, notwithstanding the promises of equal protection. See
generally Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1047 (1994) (surveying and analyzing a wide range of exclusionary measures targeted at
immigrants); Kevin R. Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights" as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil
Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481 (2002) (addressing the historical and current
manifestations of bias toward immigrants). The question here, in the context of the single standard's
application to Graham, is whether an interest in cost savings can ever provide a permissible basis for
this differential treatment.
376. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763, 766, 776 (1977) (striking down the Illinois
Probate Act as lacking a rational purpose for an inheritance benefits scheme that differentiated based on
parents' marital status); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972) (using rational
basis review to invalidate a workmen's compensation statute that denied the same recovery rights to
unacknowledged nonmarital children as were provided to other children); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76-77 (1971) (voiding a fixed preference for men as estate administrators because no "rational
relationship to a state objective" existed); Glona v. Am. Guar, & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76
(1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1967) (finding no rational justification for the restriction of a
parent's right to bring a wrongful death action for the death of a child if the child's parents were
unmarried); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (identifying no rational justification for the
restriction of a child's right to bring a wrongful death action if the child's parents were unmarried).
377. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996).
378. Id. at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Nguyen, the Court stressed that the use of
the exceedingly persuasive justification requirement in Virginia had not altered the traditional
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not make sex a proscribed classification," 379 the Court added that
recognition of differences between the sexes may not be treated as cause
"for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on
380
an individual's opportunity."
Virginia had advanced two justifications for its policy: first, "singlesex education provides important educational benefits, and the option of
single-sex education contributes to diversity in educational approaches,"
and second, VMI's "adversative approach [to education] would have to be
modified were VMI to admit women." 381 The Court rejected each
justification, finding that "[n]either recent nor distant history bears out
Virginia's alleged pursuit of diversity through single-sex educational
options," 382 and that the concern about changing the adversative training
program rested on overbroad generalizations about women's physical
383
abilities and learning styles.
Under the proposed standard, the analysis would proceed differently
because the standard does not share the Court's near presumption that sexbased classifications are invalid.384 Instead, review would focus on the
connection between the sex-based distinction and the government's alleged
goals. Taking first the concern with diversity in educational approaches,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence tracks the way analysis under the
single standard would assess the connection between the classification and
intermediate review standard. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70-72 (2001). See also Virginia, 518
U.S. at 531, 533, 535, 545-46, 556. In fact, that characterization of the standard had been invoked in
several earlier cases addressing sex-based classifications. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136,
141 n.12 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 731 (1982); Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
379.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
380. Id. The Court added,
Sex classifications may be used to compensate women for particular economic disabilities
[they have] suffered, to promot[e] equal employment opportunity, to advance full
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people. But such classifications may
not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women.
Id. at 533-34 (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original)
(quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam) and Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)).
381.
Id. at 535 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Brief for CrossPetitioners).
382. Id. at 536. See also id. at 539 ("[W]e find no persuasive evidence in this record that VMI's
male-only admission policy is in furtherance of a state policy of diversity.") (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting the court of appeals decision, United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir.
1992)).
383. See id. at 541-45.
384. See id. at 531.
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the government's goals in context.38 5
As Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained, "The difficulty with [Virginia's] position is that the diversity
benefited only one sex; there was single-sex public education available for
men at VMI, but no corresponding single-sex public education available for
women." 386 In other words, regardless of the type of review applied, the
diversity goal could not meaningfully explain why the state had accorded
greater educational opportunities to men than to women.
The state's second justification presents a more interesting challenge.
Here, Virginia argued that the adversative training program was unsuitable
for women because women and men have "important differences... in
learning and developmental needs, [as well as] psychological and
sociological differences [that are] real and not stereotypes." 387 Virginia
maintained that accommodating these differences would require so
dramatic a transformation of VMI's educational approach that the
adversative training method would be destroyed.38 8 Under the single
standard, the intracontextual inquiry would ask whether these justifications
plausibly explained VMI's categorical exclusion of women.
The
extracontextual inquiry would assess whether the developmental,
psychological, and sociological justifications had any specific connection
to the admission bar, or whether they reflected mere generalizations that
could be used to support widespread classification of women beyond that
regulatory context. And the bias inquiry would seek to determine whether
the developmental differences proffered to support the sex-based
admissions ban reflected hostility toward, or impermissible stereotyping of,
women.
In this case, the extracontextual inquiry proves most helpful in
revealing the policy's core flaws. The generic developmental differences
between men and women relied on here, even if plausible, do not support
an absolute bar on women's admission. Further, they would, if accepted,
support women's exclusion not only from an institution like VMI, but also
from a wide range of opportunities, both inside and outside educational
environments. 389 This is the sort of noncontext-specific justification that
385. See id. at 558-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
386. Id. at 562 (Rehnquist, CT, concurring).
387. Id. at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Brief for Respondents).
388. Id. at 540.
389. It was these sorts of general convictions regarding women's demeanor and development that,
in an earlier era, led the Supreme Court to uphold exclusions of women from full societal and economic
participation. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-67 (1948) (upholding the denial of a
bartender license to a female tavern owner and her daughter), disapproved by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 210 (1976); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)
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could support broad legislation subjecting women to unfavorable sex-based
rules, which would be precisely the sort of class legislation the Equal
Protection Clause forbids. Thus, even under a less ostensibly rigorous
single standard, the exclusionary policy would fall.39 °
In the context of distinctions based on parental marital status, the
Court likewise has emphasized that intermediate scrutiny is critical to its
analysis. As close attention to the cases shows, however, the Court is
fundamentally concerned with whether a legitimate connection exists
between the classification and its context, consistent with the terms of the
rational basis standard.
In Clark v. Jeter, for example, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania's
six-year limitations period for paternity actions by nonmarital children who
had not previously received support. 39 1 Nonmarital children who had
received support and marital children, whose paternity was presumed, were
not similarly limited. 392 The Court performed a two-step analysis,
considering first whether the six-year period provided a "reasonable
(approving the Court's decision to uphold a sex-based denial of a license to practice law on the ground
that "[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother").
390. If the intracontextual and extracontextual inquiries were satisfied, the single standard would
also require examination of whether these justifications reflected bias or archaic stereotyping, contrary
to Virginia's contentions. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 549. Here, the analysis would depend on the
showings made by both parties. In its opinion, the Court found that VMI's admissions policy rested on
unacceptable "generalizations about 'the way women are,' [and] estimates of what is appropriate for
most women, [that] no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place
them outside the average description." Id. at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Whether VMI's policy would amount to undue stereotyping would be subject to debate under a
single standard, just as it was between the majority and dissent under the stricter standard in place.
Compare id. at 565-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("[Tihe State should avoid assuming demand
based on stereotypes; it must not assume a priori, without evidence, that there would be no interest in a
women's school of civil engineering, or in a men's school of nursing."), with id. at 566-67 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the "smug assurances" the majority offered when "explicitly reject[ing] the
finding that there existe[d] 'gender-based developmental differences' supporting Virginia's restriction
of the 'adversative' method to only a men's institution"). This same debate emerged under the tiered
framework in Nguyen. There, the majority urged that "[miechanistic classification of all our differences
as stereotypes would ... obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real." Nguyen v. INS,
533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001). The dissent, in turn, maintained that even if empirically true, the
generalizations regarding women and their relationship to childbirth could not support a sex-based
distinction "when more accurate and impartial functional lines can be drawn." Id. at 73, 90 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460 (1998) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting)).
391. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1988). Although Clark is the first case addressing
discrimination against nonmarital children explicitly to apply intermediate scrutiny, the Court
recharacterized its prior cases reviewing classifications burdening nonmarital children as having applied
intermediate scrutiny as well. See id. at 461. See also supra note 226 and accompanying text.
392. Clark, 486 U.S. at 464-65.
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opportunity" for seeking support, and then whether the "time limitation
placed on that opportunity [was] substantially related to the State's interest
in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims." 393 Through this
analysis, the Court found that "six years does not necessarily provide a
reasonable opportunity to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate
child. 3 94 The Court rested its ruling on the conclusion that the six-year
limitations period was not "substantially related to Pennsylvania's interest
395
in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims."
Proceeding under the single standard, the inquiry would shift to
whether the asserted interest in preventing fraudulent and stale claims
plausibly explained why nonmarital children seeking child support for the
first time faced a six-years-from-date-of-birth limitations period not
imposed on other children. On the one hand, the distinction seems
implausible because proof of paternity could be at issue in any support
case, raising for all cases the same issues of fraudulent and stale claims.
On the other hand, Pennsylvania could argue that a greater incentive might
exist to file fraudulent claims in cases where parents were not married and
no paternity presumption existed.
If the Court found the distinction plausible, a further question would
remain before judicial approval could be given under the single standard.
Not only must the government's goals plausibly relate to singling out
nonmarital children for a different, more burdensome procedure, but they
must also explain the selection of the particular burden imposed. So, for
example, a government might plausibly have different rules regarding
driving for those who are sighted and those who are blind, because vision is
important to driving. But the government could not regulate based on that
difference by tripling the price of a driver's license for people who are
blind. Instead, the burden itself must be plausibly connected to the
classification. Here, though some limitations period might be reasonable to
prevent fraudulent actions, a reviewing court could find the six-year
statutory period implausible, especially in light of the parenting challenges
associated with young children that would raise an unduly and
impermissibly high barrier to a support suit. That question, too, would
393. Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99100 (1982)).
394. Id. at 463.
395. Id. at 464.
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remain a topic for debate, just as it was under a nominally higher
standard.396
As the discussion above illustrates, the shifts required by the proposed
standard would have relatively little impact on outcomes, although the
analysis might be more straightforward and consistent than under the tiers.
There is one set of equal protection cases, however, that has troubled the
Court for nearly a quarter century and that continues to plague suspect
classification analysis: the affirmative action cases. It is primarily with
these cases that a shift not only in analysis but also in outcome would most
likely occur.

397

Before testing the proposed standard by applying it to extant case law,
we must consider the possibility that the risk of abandoning strict scrutiny
in favor of a single standard is simply too great. After all, the Court has
suggested that the analytic shift would be devastating, pointing to the
shame of Korematsu and insisting that "[a]ny retreat from' the most
searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error
398
occurring in the future."
In committing to the most rigorous review standard for all racial
classifications, regardless of whether the distinction burdened members of
a majority or minority race, the Court characterized imposition of the most
rigorous scrutiny as essential to screening out potentially illegitimate
classifications:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such racebased measures, there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are in
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out"
396. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the unanimous Court suggested that members of the Court
had serious reservations about the reasonableness of that limited period given the myriad difficulties
that might interfere with a parent's pursuit of support on a child's behalf. See id. ("Not all ...
difficulties are likely to abate in six years. A mother might realize only belatedly 'a loss of income
attributable to the need to care for the child.' Furthermore, financial difficulties are likely to increase as
the child matures and incurs expenses for clothing, school, and medical care.") (citations omitted)
(quoting Pickett v.Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)).
397. The redistricting cases would also present an opportunity for the Court to take a more
contextualized view of race that would allow racial minorities to benefit from redistricting efforts. For
a discussion of redistricting cases, see supra note 114.
398. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (discussing the Court's failure
in Korematsu to reject the bias-infected classification at issue). The Court also supported the need for
strict scrutiny by highlighting its view that all racial classifications, including remedial measures, have
potentially grave consequences for society. See id.
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illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is399
pursuing
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.

The majority's embrace of this perspective resolved the question
debated in a series of splintered opinions400 regarding whether remedial
classifications might deserve more flexible consideration than strict
scrutiny offered.401

Under the single standard, as noted above, no requirement that racial
classifications "serve a compelling governmental interest, and . . . be

narrowly tailored to further that interest" 40 2 would be imposed. Instead, the
central question would be whether a plausible, context-specific, and
nonbiased explanation exists for distinguishing based on race in the context
at issue. If the reason for the line drawing were so general as to justify
race-based distinctions outside the regulatory context, or if racial animus or
stereotyping prompted the classification, the single standard would require
the classification's rejection.
As shown above, however, the Court's concern with the damage
caused by racial classifications does not itself compel the use of extrarigorous review, as racial classifications were struck down for many years
prior to the application of strict scrutiny.403 Indeed, the Court's own
language undermines its insistence that only strict scrutiny can capture
invidious racial discrimination. In Adarand, for example, the Court's
observation that "racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis
399. Id. at 226 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion)); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) (same); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123
S. Ct. 2411, 2427 (2003) (quoting J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494). Cf Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2445
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("Close review is needed 'to ferret out classifications in reality malign, but
masquerading as benign'....") (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg. J., dissenting)).
400. See Adarand,515 U.S. at 218-21.
401.
Id. at 223-26. The Court also resolved that it would conduct equal protection review in this
context in the same manner under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 224. Reflecting
ongoing disagreement with respect to this standard, Justice Ginsburg commented that Grutter did "not
require the Court to revisit whether all governmental classifications by race, whether designed to benefit
or burden a historically disadvantaged group, should be subject to the same standard of judicial review."
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2348 n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
402. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235.
403. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 536-40 (1963) (using rational basis
review to order the desegregation of city-owned or operated parks and recreational facilities); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding, without reference to heightened review, that
segregated public schools violated the equal protection guarantee). Cf Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976) (striking down a civil service regulation that foreclosed resident aliens
from civil service positions because no "acceptable rationalization" supported the law); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915) (invalidating Arizona's Anti-Alien Labor Law as "repugnant" to the Equal
Protection Clause).
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for disparate treatment ' 40 4 embraces the basic rationality standard rather
than the narrowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny. Further, the
Court's stated reason for requiring categorical application of strict scrutiny
in every context was "to make sure that a governmental classification based
on race ...is legitimate,'40 5 which is, again, the language of rational basis
review40 6 and not the "compelling interest" demand of strict scrutiny.40 7
By grounding its analysis in the core concerns of rational basis review,
the Court acknowledged, perhaps unintentionally, that the task of
distinguishing between benign and illegitimate racial classifications is not
so difficult as to require a separate type of scrutiny. Against this
background, the decision to require strict scrutiny of remedial race-based
classifications must flow from the Court's intention to deploy strict
scrutiny's rhetorical power or to enshrine in doctrine its substantive
judgment that even well-intentioned racial classifications cause harm.
Either way, it is difficult to conclude that the adoption of strict scrutiny
grew out of a genuine fear that an impermissible use of race might actually
survive a less rigorous form of review.
Viewed in this light, the single standard would not present a terrible
risk of creating a hole through which pernicious racial classifications might
slip. Again, as the Court has recognized on many occasions, race is not
relevant to ability. 40 8 Even a test screening only for the plausibility, rather
than the necessity, of race-based distinctions should have no problem
capturing instances where the use of race reflects racial bias, stereotypes, or
hostility. Further, the counterpoint concern-that race-based remedial
404. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35 (1980) (Stevens, I., dissenting)). Cf Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (upholding legislation under rational basis review after evaluating
the state's "relevant social and economic objectives" for the legislation) (emphasis added).
405. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228 (emphasis added).
406. See, e.g., Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486 (applying rational basis review to inquire into the
state's "legitimate interest" in its regulation) (emphasis added).
407. The Court's opinions in Grutter and Gratz adhere more closely than Adarandto the language
of strict scrutiny. See supra note 399 and accompanying text. However, in Grutter-the only decision
to uphold the affirmative action plan at issue-the dissenters accused the five-justice majority of taking
a deferential "approach inconsistent with the very concept of 'strict scrutiny."' Grutter v. Bollinger,
123 S.Ct. 2325, 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id. at 2366
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Although the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its
application of that review is unprecedented in its deference."); id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("The Court ...does not apply strict scrutiny. By trying to say otherwise, it undermines both the test
and its own controlling precedents.").
408. See, e.g., Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854 n.5 (1986); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976);
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
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programs would be sanctioned to such an extent under the single standard
as to injure the legitimate equal protection rights of whites-is likewise
addressed by the single standard's prohibition against generalized
justifications for line drawing.
This intolerance toward nonspecific
justifications for discriminatory class legislation, rooted in the Equal
Protection Clause, extends to all individuals, regardless of race. Thus, for
example, an affirmative action program intended to remedy generalized
harms to people of color could not survive under the proposed standard
because that nonspecific justification could support broad differential
treatment based on race outside the regulatory context. 40 9 However, if a
justification were tied sufficiently to the context at issue and not so broad
as to support burdening the nonbeneficiary class in other contexts, it would
withstand single standard review.
The plan at issue in Adarand provides a good scenario against which
to evaluate how the proposed standard might reshape evaluation of
remedial measures. 4 10 The Small Business Administration offered a
program that provided favorable treatment to contractors who
subcontracted with "disadvantaged business enterprises," including those
owned by people of color.4a '
The question under single standard review would be whether the state
can explain that the use of race in the subcontractor statute is plausible,
context-specific (so as not to justify race-based distinctions in unrelated
contexts), and free of bias or hostility toward the burdened class. In
Adarand, the United States sought to justify the program by arguing that it
"provid[ed] remedies for the continuing effects of past discrimination," 412
and, in particular, "that discrimination in the construction industry had been
subject to government acquiescence, with effects that remain., 41 3 This
justification, specific to the construction context in which the program
409. Cf Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 295 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("Nor is it necessary, in my view, to resolve the troubling
questions whether any [raced-based] layoff provision could survive strict scrutiny or whether [such]
layoff provision could, when considered without reference to the hiring goal it was intended to further,
pass the onerous 'narrowly tailored' requirement.").
410. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 206-10 (describing Small Business Administration programs). The
Court's recent opinions in Grutter and Gratz are somewhat less useful for evaluating the proposed test,
in part because a majority of justices acknowledge their treatment of higher education admissions as
distinct, suggesting that their acceptance of diversity as a compelling government interest may not
extend outside the educational arena. See supra note 106. However, they will be addressed briefly
below. See infra note 420.
411.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 206-10 (describing Small Business Administration programs).
412. Id. at 265-66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
413. Id. at 266 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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operated,4 14 would sufficiently explain the government's use of a racial
classification while not supplying a justification so broad as to support
second-class status for the white-owned firms that contended they were
burdened by the program's consideration of race.
The majority opinion in Adarand raises an additional concern for the
single standard. The Court maintained that, without strict scrutiny, judicial
review would not recognize the harm flowing from the perception that
affirmative action measures benefit those "less qualified in some respect
[who are] identified purely by their race," and, further, that "that
4 15
perception... can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice.,
The Court failed to explain, however, why strict scrutiny would be the only
analytic approach sensitive to the potential backlash resulting from a racebased classification created for remedial purposes. As Justice Stevens
pointed out in dissent, firms qualifying as disadvantaged business
enterprises had not challenged the program, "perhaps because they [did]
not find the preferences stigmatizing, or perhaps because their ability to opt
4 16
out of the program provides them all the relief they would need.
Moreover, if a minority-owned firm were to challenge the program at
issue in Adarand and allege stigmatic harm, the analysis under both strict
scrutiny and the single standard would not necessarily, or even likely, result
in different outcomes. Preliminarily, under either standard, the Court
would first have to be persuaded that the stigma creates an actionable
classification, which would be difficult in the typical instance where the
stigmatic effect would be the secondary and unintended consequence of an
41 7
effort to remedy specific race-based discrimination.
414. Issue would be joined over the scope of the context, as noted in Part IV. Because the
government could point specifically to discrimination within the construction industry, this particular
program should survive charges that the justification would support extracontextual distinctions based
on race. On the other hand, the Court in Adarand might argue that the context at issue was a far more
specific one (i.e., the particular type of work being subcontracted). The reviewing court would then
have to determine the context's contours before making its judgment. In most cases, the legislative
framework provides the context, and the classification can be assessed against that framework's scope.
A party seeking to call the framework into question would need to show why that framework warranted
narrowing or broadening before the single standard's inquiries are applied.
415. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)). These concerns, the Court said, "make a persuasive
case for requiring strict scrutiny." Id.
416.

Id. at 247 n.5.

417. Cf Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (."[D]iscriminatory
purpose' ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decisionmaker ...selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.") (citations and footnotes
omitted); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("[A] basic equal protection principle [is] that
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If the claim were permitted to go forward, review under strict scrutiny
would ask whether the race-based remedial measure was narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling government interest that justified the specific burden
imposed-here, stigmatic harm. Assuming the same government interest
in redressing the effects of race discrimination in the construction industry,
the analysis would likely find that a race-based classification giving some
preference to minority-owned business candidates in obtaining
government-funded construction contracts was narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling government interest with the resulting rejection of the stigma
claim. 418 This determination would not be a particularly difficult one given
that the race-based preference would be limited and directly responsive to
the particular problem of race-based disadvantaging in the construction
industry. Indeed, if the government's stated goal is to redress racial
discrimination, it is difficult to imagine what, other than a racial
classification, the government might use more effectively to realize its aim.
As a result, strict scrutiny's narrowly tailored inquiry would not necessarily
lead to the invalidation of a race-based affirmative action program because
of stigmatic harms to members of the beneficiary class. Thus, the Court's
suggestion that concern with stigma mandates application of strict scrutiny
does not bear up under close analysis.
Considering the same scenario under the proposed single standard, the
Court would determine, as set forth above, whether the government could
plausibly explain its use of a race-based distinction with a justification
limited to the regulatory context. The single standard would then screen
for unduly broad or general justifications for the differential treatment
being challenged. Because the race-based classification in Adarand was
highly focused on, and limited to, the particular industry where a problem
of race discrimination had been identified, the explanation for the
differential treatment would be both plausible and context-specific. As a
result, the program could be sustained under single standard review as well,
notwithstanding the potential for stigmatic harm. 4 19 Ultimately, it appears
the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose.").
418. See Adarand,515 U.S. at 237 (discussing the determination in United States v. Paradise,480
U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion), that eradicating race-based discrimination
constituted a compelling government interest).
419. See id. at 206-08. The actual classification in Adarandrequired minority-owned enterprises
to "opt in" to the preference program; the program did not automatically encompass nondisadvantaged
minority-owned business candidates. See id. If this refinement were to survive the narrowly tailored
inquiry, then strict scrutiny arguably would have succeeded in achieving a more refined classification
than the single standard otherwise would have inspired. From a constitutional rather than political
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that under either standard of review, a context-sensitive use of race as a
remedial measure could, conceivably, survive a challenge.42 °
In short, racial classifications, whether within or outside of the
affirmative action context, do not absolutely compel the use of strict
scrutiny as insurance against invidious forms of differential treatment. To
the contrary, the Court has suggested repeatedly throughout the spectrum of
cases reviewing race-based classifications that differentiation based on race
is rarely legitimate or relevant. As shown above, even a unified standard
has no difficulty identifying and rejecting the use of race for impermissible
discriminatory purposes. Yet the single standard brings with it the
additional advantage of context sensitivity. Therefore, in situations where
race is used as a basis for remedying past discrimination, a reviewing court
would possess not only the power to screen for the presence of prejudice or
overly general justifications, but also the flexibility to consider whether,
when analyzed in context, a legitimate explanation justifies the remedial
use of a racial classification.
standpoint, however, it is not clear that the opt-in provision was necessary for the classification to be
sustained.
420. Cf id. at 237. The Court in Adarand commented,
[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact. The
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not
disqualified from acting in response to it.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519
(1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
Application of the single standard to the use of race in admissions by the University of Michigan
in its law school and undergraduate programs reinforces this conclusion. For both, the Court would
examine the plausibility of the connection between the use of race in admissions and the university's
goal of obtaining a diverse student body to serve its educational mission of preparing students for work
and civic participation. The Court would also ask whether this justification would support widespread
racial distinctions outside of the admissions process. And finally, the Court would inquire whether the
university's reliance on race to achieve a diverse class embodies bias or outmoded stereotypes about
race.

As with the cases discussed above, these questions could be answered in ways that would reach
the same outcomes as the Court reached in Grutter and Gratz, with the law school's "holistic"
admissions process avoiding the stereotyping and the class legislation-type problems that the
undergraduate point system might encounter. On the other hand, the Court could find little functional
difference between the two plans, as Justice Souter's dissent in Gratz maintained. See Gratz v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2441 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting). In this instance, the single standard
will not resolve the conflicts between the majority and the dissent in either case-that is something no
standard could accomplish. Instead, the contribution of a single standard is in preventing a debate about
the appropriate application of judicial scrutiny from obscuring the core equal protection inquiry into
whether the classification amounts to class legislation based on race.

2004]

EQUALITY WITHOUT TIERS

VI. CONCLUSION: THE "TRAINING" TIERS GIVE WAY TO A
SINGLE STANDARD
We began by considering whether the Court's current three-tiered
framework for equal protection review requires reconsideration, and, if so,
whether a single standard of review might provide an alternative approach
that would respond to current problems without creating widespread
Certainly, as addressed above, serious flaws
doctrinal instability.
associated with the tiers-including stagnation with respect to the set of
suspect classifications, the categorical application of heightened scrutiny to
classifications deemed suspect, and the unguided and unfocused doctrinal
wavering between deference and meaningful review in the rational basis
cases-suggest that the time for rethinking equal protection review is ripe.
Looking back, it appears that the emergence of multiple tiers
represented an important milestone in the Court's response to increasing
societal recognition that government action based on deep-rooted bias and
archaic stereotypes takes multiple forms and causes serious harms. The
development of a review mechanism aimed at unearthing and invalidating
forms of racial bias previously not apparent or troubling to many in the
classes flowed almost naturally from the
judiciary or in society's dominant 42
1
consciousness.
changes in cultural
With growing societal and judicial awareness of widespread
prejudices based on other characteristics, the Court reasonably deployed
the same type of review it used for race-based distinctions to screen this
new set of impermissible classifications. Not surprisingly, the Court then
modified the original review mechanism over a number of years to respond
to evolving social perceptions about the relevance of various characteristics
to government action.
Today, however, decades after the first pronouncement regarding
extra-rigorous review for racial classifications4 22 and over a quarter century
after the Court's decree that sex-based distinctions also merit heightened
judicial solicitude,4 23 the analysis prompted by the tiers appears to be too
See James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the
421.
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 291-93 (1990) (proposing that social

movements have a direct influence on "governmental and private institutions"); Robert C. Post & Reva
B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: FederalAntidiscriminationLegislationAfter Morrison and Kimel,

110 YALE L.J. 441, 496-502 (2000) (discussing the interaction between social movements and
constitutional jurisprudence in the 1960s).
422. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that racial classifications
are "subject... to the most rigid scrutiny").
423. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:481

simplistic. The tiered framework may have served its purpose, it turns out,
as an unwitting training vehicle for the Court.42 4 The tiers became the first
post-Lochner era method by which courts could closely review legislative
action for impermissible stereotyping or bias. They supported this
heightened form of judicial review with specialized screening and
streamlining techniques. In effect, the tiers became a tool for judicial
education regarding identity-based discrimination by government. But in
the 21st century, while education remains important, contemporary
jurisprudence requires a more sophisticated and sensitive response to the
complexities of a changed world. 25
This view of the tiers as a transitional analytic tool rather than a fixed,
necessary format dovetails with the existence of common core concerns
shared by rational basis and heightened scrutiny cases. In particular, a
baseline commitment to ensuring the existence of a plausible, contextual,
and nonbiased explanation for a classification and, relatedly, to preventing
the enforcement of class legislation, surfaces throughout the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence. The proposed single standard, by reflecting these
shared concerns, helps to illuminate the close relationship between the
different levels of review. In addition, its distillation of these core concerns
into a unified review mechanism helps to stabilize and explain what
otherwise appears to be significant confusion within the rational basis
cases. Regardless of whether it is the standard proposed here or a variation
on the standards proposed in the past by individual justices that takes hold,
it is critical at this juncture that the framework of equal protection review
itself face ongoing review to ensure that the Constitution will continue to
"neither know[ ] nor tolerate[ ] classes among citizens. 4 26
424. This is not to suggest that the federal judiciary has achieved consensus or become fully or
even largely sensitized to all the diverse manifestations of official bias. The argument here is more
limited: at this point in time, a single standard of review may be as effective in ferreting out
impermissible government action as the three-tiered approach, which, in all of its years of application,
has not brought about consensus on the question of when impermissible bias (as opposed to a
reasonable consideration) prompts trait-based differential treatment. Further, for the reasons addressed
above, the single standard fine tunes the standard of review in a way that the tiered system does not
effectively or consistently allow.
425. As discussed earlier, the predominant use of strict scrutiny for racial classifications in recent
years has been to invalidate affirmative action and redistricting measures intended to take remedial
account of past or present racial bias, rather than to invalidate new forms of racial bias. This dramatic
shift in the use of suspect classification analysis raises doubts about the continuing viability of the
current tiered approach.
426. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).

